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THIS REPORT 
 
This is an administrative and executive summary of an extensive research Project that was 
simply compiled by the Project Coordinator.  Thus I want to note and acknowledge that 
this is an abbreviated summary of extensive research conducted by several researchers in 
eight European countries, and several research and analytical reports* written by several 
colleagues over the period of three years.  I am indebted to their research and their reports, 
which have been used extensively throughout this report.   
In particular, however, this summary has made extensive use of the work of Emma 
Hughes, Laura Turney and Bobby Sayyid.  Emma and Laura produced extensive 
summaries of the research carried out in the two phases of this Project and Bobby 
contributed significantly in the formulation of the analytical framework for the research 
and the suggested alternative paradigm (see executive summary).  Their work is used 
extensively throughout this report and I am particularly indebted to their contributions.    
 
* The very extensive collection of documents that were produced during this Project are 
located at the following web site and can be accessed for academic purposes, as long as full 
credit is given to the authors and the Project.  WEB SITE: http//les.man.ac.uk.cgem. 
At the Home Page select “Projects” and at the “Muslim Voices” page select “Research 
Papers”.  This is password protected and you will need the following: 
Username:    eumuslim 
Password:    mus99lim 
 
 
 
For any further information about this Project please contact: 
Dr Pandeli M Glavanis 
CGEM / Sociology 
Williamson Building 
University of Manchester 
Oxford Road 
Manchester M13 9PL 
Phone: +44 161 275 2516 / 4794 
Fax: +44 161 275 2462 
E-mail: Pandeli.Glavanis@man.ac.uk 
Web Site: http://les.man.ac.uk/cgem 
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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a paucity of academic and especially research-based academic accounts of Islam 
and Muslims in Europe.  This is particularly so with respect to the dramatic changes, within 
the European Muslim communities, that have become increasingly visible during the last 
decade; “Muslim Voices”.  Furthermore at a time when Europeans are increasingly 
concerned in extending and developing the European Union, the issue of the role and status 
of ethnic (religious) minorities achieves central significance.  It is hoped that this project 
has made a contribution by reference to a detailed study of one European ethnic (religious) 
community, namely European Muslims in eight European countries: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland and UK. 
The project has noted that greater diversified forms of social exclusion and the 
marginalisation of this significant European minority have accompanied the increased 
socio-political and economic visibility of the European Muslims.  This in turn has raised 
serious concerns at the political and policy level with regard to its implications for the 
project of an extended and more unified Europe.  This poses some complex policy 
questions especially as the forms of social exclusion and marginalisation both differ 
significantly from one country to another and simultaneously exemplify cross-European 
trends.  The same applies to the manifestations of Muslim identity which both exemplify 
particularities and specificities, derived from the particular experiences in respective 
European states, as well as pan-European and even global trends.   
The project also noted that Islamophobia, hijabophobia and the fear of Islamic 
Fundamentalism among Europeans have accentuated the deterioration of socio-political 
relations between the settler Muslim communities and their fellow citizens.  This in turn 
has generated political manifestations, which are detrimental to any inter-faith or inter-
community relations and in some cases threaten civil order and thus the very fabric of 
European civil society. 
Thus the Project has concluded that it is imperative for the future of a harmonious Europe 
that European policy makers (at the European, National and Regional levels) confront and 
challenge Islamophobia, in its various manifestations and in the various areas of social, 
political and economic life.  Furthermore, the project argues that it is imperative that 
European policy makers cooperate closely with European Muslim associations and 
organisations in order to reduce the social exclusion and marginalisation of this very 
significant section of the European population. 
In this respect the Project has also made two central recommendations and various 
additional suggestions for policy formulation.  The first recommendation operates at the 
epistemological level and argues that Western Social Science needs to reconsider its 
analytical and methodological approach to the study of European identities and this is 
highlighted in the executive summary.  The second recommendation operates at the policy 
level and argues for the establishment of a European Directorate for Muslim Affairs as 
part of a wider European Commission for the Future of a Multi-Ethnic Europe. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This Project started from the premiss that public discourse and policy-making have 
converged, so as to highlight some of the negative effects of the drive to enhance 
“economic growth and competitiveness”.  In particular, this convergence has highlighted 
the manner in which this may have contributed to an increase of the “social exclusion and 
marginalisation” for different social groups and communities within the European Union.  
The Project also considered the need to produce new knowledge on both the forms and 
processes of “social exclusion”, which can contribute to the initiation of policies that will 
enhance “social cohesion” and effective processes of “social re-integration”, and thus 
contribute to “sustainable economic development”.  Thus, we engaged in these debates 
with the intention to make a contribution, by presenting an analytical and comparative 
account, of a particularly important and increasingly “visible” European ethno-religious 
community, which exemplifies many of the “characteristics” of social exclusion and 
marginalisation, namely the European Muslims. This was done in eight European States: 
Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy and Switzerland.   
The issues researched in this project are relatively new and innovative.  This derives 
primarily from the fact that for more than a century Western social science had accepted 
that the assimilation of cultural and religious identities into a national society was a 
necessary precondition for socio-economic and political development.  In fact, diverse and 
competing ethnic and religious communal identities were seen as a primary factor in 
dividing post-colonial societies and hindering development.  European scholars perceived 
ethnic and religious identities as inimical to rational social planning and economic 
development, and instead highlighted the classical European model where, it was assumed, 
modernity had eroded communal identities in favour of citizenship and loyalty to the state. 
Furthermore, conventional European social sciences also assume that communities of 
immigrants, settlers and/or ethnic origin will invariably follow a course characterised by 
the privatisation of religion, which it is also assumed is the case in the “host” societies.  
Nevertheless, and as this Project has already noted through its fieldwork research, a sizable 
section of the European Muslim population has refused to adhere to this model and has 
instead chosen to exemplify in an increasingly visible manner their Islamic identity.  This 
exemplification of a visible religious/ethnic identity, however, in turn generated many 
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misconceptions about these European Muslim citizens and of Islam itself.  Such European 
Muslim citizens have been characterised as the “Muslim Threat” within Europe, and as 
such the media, for example, have inadvertently contributed to an accentuation of the 
“social exclusion” and “marginalisation” of this section of European society.   
This project has also noted how Political Islam in Europe, Central Asia and the Middle 
East, since the 1970s, has continued to furnish evidence for the salience of ethnicity as an 
organising principle for political action, and is forcing a number of scholars in different 
areas of the social sciences to re-think the long-standing theoretical and conceptual models 
regarding the relationship between the "new" ethnic (religious) identities and 
citizenship/nationhood.  This academic concern to theorise and account for the "new" 
socio-cultural and political phenomena has recently (in the 1990s) gained a degree of 
urgency. 
By the late 1980s. Islam was the chief vehicle of political opposition in North 
Africa and the Middle East, regardless of official state ideology, political 
system or leadership...Elsewhere, in states as diverse as Turkey, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Trinidad, Islamic groups strained the relationship 
between governments and governed....In addition, Islam was the leitmotif of 
rebellions in Burma, Chad, Ethiopia, Thailand and the Philippines...In the 
context of international relations, Islamic  issues helped to justify and fuel 
conflicts between Iran and Iraq, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
Israel and the Arab states collectively, and Pakistan and India over the status of 
Kashmir. (Jeff Haynes, 1993: 64) 
The need to account for this phenomenon intensified with the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and the emergence of new nation-states which legitimated Islam as the state ideology (e.g. 
Uzbekistan), the events in ex-Yugoslavia (e.g., Bosnia and Macedonia), the implications of 
thousands of Albanian-Muslim refugees in Greece, and the newly empowered "Muslim 
Voices" at the heart of the European Community (e.g. the Salman Rushdie affair and 
Muslim Parliament. in Britain, the "head scarves" affair in France, Turkish “Islamic 
Fundamentalism” in Germany, etc.).  This was particularly the case in 1989 and after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall.  For as Gilles Kepel has noted  
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, an entire way of 
conceptualising the twentieth century world disappeared.  At a stroke not only 
the confrontation between east and west, but also conflicts between social 
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classes expressed politically in the left-right opposition became 
obsolete…However, along with the end of the old order symbolised by the wall, 
1989 also brought events which signalled new dimensions reflecting some of the 
contradictions of the world to come…in Britain’s rundown inner cities working-
class Pakistanis burnt copies of The Satanic Verses [and] in France, instead of 
uniting in celebration of the bicentenary of the 1789 Revolution and the values 
it proclaimed, was rent by divisions as it had not been since the Dreyfus affair, 
over an apparently trifling incident: could French society allow three Muslim 
girls (living in an underprivileged city suburb) to wear an Islamic veil to attend 
state school ?  (Kepel, 1997:1) 
Nevertheless, this project has also noted that there is still a paucity of analytical and critical 
research which can account for the manner in which Islam as a global ethnic/religious 
identity motivates and structures political action, and thus postulates a new relationship 
between ethnic (religious) identity and the nation-state project.  Instead, there is a plethora 
of often contradictory and in some cases polemic accounts of the "disruptive" potential of 
“Islamic Fundamentalism”.  In fact, it could be argued that the media and a certain type of 
scholarly research has already defined “Resurgent Islam” as primarily responsible for the 
sharpening “cultural” confrontation between Europe and the Islamic world.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that Islam in Europe is currently seen as the dangerous and threatening 
“OTHER”.  Especially as scholarly work has yet to present satisfactory accounts of the 
background and manner in which a variety of forms of political activism (“Muslim 
Voices”), have contributed to the emergence of new social, cultural, political and religious 
(cultural identity) fault-lines at the heart of post-industrial European societies.   
This, of course has been the primary concern and focus of this research Project, whose 
significance is enhanced when we consider the fact that that these new socio-political and 
cultural movements have established themselves outside the 'space' where Islam has 
traditionally been presented as a socio-political ideology and force.  This is due to the fact 
that it has also blurred the long-standing 'us and them' view held by most Europeans, as 
they have had to accept within Europe the existence of substantial settler communities of 
Muslims: four million in France, two million in Germany and just under two million in 
Britain (using conservative estimates).  Western scholarship, of course, has addressed the 
issue of  'Political Islam ' and its role in reshaping political space in the Middle East, Asia 
and other parts of the non-European world (see Ayubi, 1991).  What it has failed to do, 
however, is to consider the extent to which it can also constitute an alternative basis for the 
mobilization of global political order, and thus its ability to affect political organization 
within Europe.  In other words, can Islam and especially contemporary 'Political Islam' 
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exemplify a non- Western way in which political space can be organised and thus challenge 
the  'European' state system, which emerged during centuries of socio-political and cultural 
struggles that were grounded in a Judeo-Christian tradition (Allen1995; Beeley, 1995). 
A consideration of the failure of Western scholarship to seriously consider the possibility of 
any other socio-cultural tradition as being capable of influencing changes on a global scale 
was of course beyond the specific focus of this Project.  Nevertheless, it is important to quote 
Peter Worsley's comment on this matter.  Following an extensive analysis of various 
theoretical and conceptual models of the nation-state, Worsley notes that  
none of the models so far discussed take culture into account.  All of them are 
variants of one kind or another of political economy, though without cultural 
dimension is impossible to make sense of a modern world in which nationalism 
religion and inter-ethnic hostility have been far more important than internationalism 
and secularism.  Models based on political economy alone, therefore, are quite 
incapable of explaining such phenomena as the rise of a modern version of Islam, 
which is wrongly labelled 'Fundamentalism' …the modern world has been shaped by 
cultural communities, From the Catholic Church and Islam to secular ideologies and 
movements like communism which transcend the boundaries of even the largest and 
most centralised state (Worsley, 1990, pp.92, 94). 
The failure of Western social science to account for the possibility of culture (Islam) as a 
force that can shape political space has also been compounded by the high degree of 
ignorance about the various Muslim communities that reside in different parts of the 
European Union.  It is for this reason that this Project has taken on board the presentation of 
both descriptive and analytical data based on extensive research in eight European countries.  
This is because much of contemporary European social science exemplifies a great paucity of 
studies, which address themselves to the various settler (ethnic) communities for whom Islam 
is more than just a privatised religion.  Indeed, as Jorgen Nielsen points out  
so dominated by the secular assumptions of academic sociology was the field, that 
well into the 1970s there seemed to be an expectation that communities of 
immigrant origin would quickly follow a course characterised by the privatisation 
of religion...It was partly due to the refusal of a substantial proportion of the 
Muslim immigrants and their children to adhere to this model that the attitude of 
parts of the academic community began to alter during the mid-1980s. (Jorgen 
Nielsen, 1992: vii) 
This academic realisation was to some extent related to events in the Middle East, where 
Islam was becoming a potent political force with some "disruptive" potential, as perceived 
from a Eurocentric sociological discourse.  It was the politics of the Muslim Communities 
in Europe, however, that challenged the existing status quo, and in particular the "Rushdie 
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Affair" in Britain and the "head scarves" in France.  These events quickly moved the 
Muslim Communities in Europe to the top of the political and media agendas.  As a 
consequence the second half of the 1980s saw an increase in academic research and 
publications that dealt specifically with the Muslim Communities in Europe.  In Britain, for 
example, there is now a noticeable increase of studies, which attempt to account for the 
perplexing phenomenon of what is referred to as the “revival” of Islamic tradition, culture 
and religion.    
Nevertheless, as the events leading to the Gulf War and its repercussions, emphasised once 
again the centrality of the politics of Muslim Communities in Europe, they also 
compounded the misconceptions and ignorance, especially in the field of popular European 
culture. (Searle, 1992; Bresheeth & Yuval-Davis, 1992)  In part, this is due to the fact that 
as Europe witnessed the emergence of a newly empowered "Muslim Voice", the field of 
academic research "...remains a largely unexplored one, and the production of research 
and publication continues to depend on relatively specialised interests and limited 
funding." (Nielsen, 1992: viii)  Instead, it is the media which has continued to play the 
leading role in forming European perceptions of Islam and Muslim Communities in 
Europe.   
Thus, it is not surprising that the emergence of "Muslim Voices" across Europe, which 
have been making demands for equal access to social, economic and cultural resources 
within the different states in the European Community, have already been stereotyped as 
the "Muslim Threat", and thus contribute to the further marginalisation and social exclusion 
of those immigrant and settler populations which aspire to nothing more than the basic 
citizenship rights of tolerance, justice, employment, education, etc..  Such misconceptions 
and ignorance, of course, combine to prevent European Muslim populations from access to 
equal opportunities, and in many respects undermine government policies such as the 
various Race Relations Acts in the different member states of the European Union.   
It is for the above reasons that this Project took on the task of confronting such 
misconceptions and has attempted to present a preliminary analytical framework within 
which we can account for the phenomenon of Political Islam in general and the newly 
empowered “Muslim Voices” within the European Union in particular.  In this sense the 
primary objective of this Project can be restated as being that of placing on the European 
social research, intellectual and political agenda issues which are relatively submerged at 
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the present time.  This was accomplished by locating the study of Political Islam and the 
“Muslim Voices” within the European Union in an analytical framework which distanced 
itself from the commonly held assumption that the Western European narrative has an 
overriding importance in the analysis of modernity. (Asad, 1993)  Instead, this Project 
argues that the study of European Muslims and the manner in which they express their 
socio-political and cultural identities should be located in an analytical framework where 
they are “agents of their own history”, albeit within a broader global socio-political and 
economic structure.   
Thus, in the first instance the Project highlights the broader canvass on which the varieties 
of European “Muslim Voices” have made their mark.  For although European Muslims 
should not be subsumed analytically into the Western and European narrative, the analysis 
of Political Islam cannot be located outside the path of the modern juggernaut of global 
capitalism. (Asad, 1993: 5)  In other words, we need to highlight the economic, social and 
political structures within which European Muslims have adopted the vocabulary of 
Political Islam as a means of expressing their identities and bring attention to their 
narratives.  The Project also considered in a schematic form the prevailing intellectual 
paradigm(s) that have contributed to the current analytical framework within which we 
receive accounts of Political Islam and the European “Muslim Voices”.   
The Project approached the above stated policy objectives by reference to two 
contemporary debates within the social sciences: the sociology of employment and work 
and the politics of identity.  In particular we used recent work in both these areas of social 
knowledge in order to construct the analytical framework within which qualitative and 
quantitative data from the European Muslim communities is discussed.  Furthermore, and 
given the particular focus of this project, the research and analysis highlights the 
significance of the spatial (New Europe) and chronological (post-1989) context within 
which the European Muslim communities have bee studied.   
 
1. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Europe suddenly seems to have made the uncomfortable discovery that it is full of Muslims, 
although it is hard not to think of “European Muslims” as an oxymoron.  Historically, the 
identity of Europe was constructed through the exclusion of Islam, and clearly elements of 
that construction still circulate in popular as well as elite discourses.  For “Europeans”, the 
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effect of Muslim settlement in Europe is disturbing for three main reasons: firstly, one of the 
main exclusions around which the identity of Europe was constructed was that of Islam 
(Herrin, 1989), thus the Muslim presence impacts on the nature of modern European identity 
in that it challenges the very idea of Europe.  Secondly, the Muslim presence seems to 
problematise the Westphalian order.  Thus, policy makers except Muslims to abide by 
Westphalian conventions and accept no higher loyalty than that of the state, even if the state 
is not inclined to reciprocate that loyalty.  Furthermore, even such liberal institutions as 
universities explicitly state that Muslims need to be taught tolerance, the hallmark of 
secularism. (Halliday, 1996).  Thirdly, it presents academics with a major challenge, namely 
how to conceptualise ethnic identities.   
During the nineteenth century, European writing found it convenient to use measures of 
race, language and culture to define ethnic identity.  Ethnicity was seen in essentialist 
terms, membership of an ethnic community was imparted from birth and immutable for the 
rest of one’s life.  It is difficult, however, to see how European Muslims can be contained 
in such classical notions of ethnicity.  This is particularly the case as Muslim identity 
within the European Union directly challenges positivist ethnography by pointing towards 
its socially constructed rather than its biologically given nature.  In this respect the 
emergence of ‘Muslim Voices’ within the European Union coincides with the recent 
explosion of interest in the subject of ‘identity’.   
This interest has been manifested in a variety of academic disciplines and traditions (see, 
for example, Hall, 1988; Connolly, 1991).  What is common to these approaches is an 
appreciation of the centrality of the question of identity for any understanding of political, 
cultural and socio-economic phenomena.  At the outset I should make clear that it is 
important to make the distinction between identity politics and politics as identification.  
Identity politics arises from somebody declaring themselves to have a particular identity 
option.  This is different from the idea that ultimately all politics is about identification.  
What politics does is to try and make people connect with collectives or projects. Politics 
refers to an ensemble of discourses (both linguistic and extra-linguistic) the aim of which is 
to establish a social order in context, which is inherently contested.  The formation of a 
social order entails the articulation of subject positions, and their antagonistic organisation.  
Thus, the act of politics is an act of identification: without subject positions a social order 
cannot be formed.  What does not follow from this is that every single subject position, 
every identity option, must have a considered political option.  It does mean, however, that 
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a political project with no linked identity is unthinkable.  That is, from mundane 
administrative policies to statements of grand politics, the process of identification is central to 
politics.   
The ‘Muslim Voices’ project remit to explore the relationship between “economic growth and 
competitiveness” and “social exclusion, marginalisation, economic deprivation and cultural 
disadvantage” in the context of the largest ethnicised minorities in the European Union 
(Muslims) hinges upon the question of identity.  Identity refers to process by which subjects 
are formed.  The process of formation is not a superstructural moment, it is not restricted 
merely to the cultural aspects, but, rather, subjects are formed through a dense network of 
social relations.  Thus the sounds of ‘Muslim Voices’ are not a cacophony of identity 
politics - another group demanding recognition and respect - but rather the emergence of a 
significant, political subject position. 
The idea of a Muslim identity is constantly put under erasure (Sayyid, 1997).  Analysts have 
tended to treat “Muslimness” as an epiphenomenon of other more sturdy bases of identity 
formations (class, kinship, caste, ethnicity...).  To some extent, this derives from the way in 
which post-war studies of settlers in Europe have for some time been dominated by an 
‘Immigrant Studies Model’ (ISM) (Sayyid, 1997).  This model is based on there being a 
sharp distinction between the host society and immigrants.  Accordingly migration can be 
attributed to socio-economic imbalances between distinct areas - which push people (for 
example, demographic growth, strife, etc), and areas that pull people towards them (for 
example, labour scarcity, economic and political freedoms).  The ISM studies model has 
overlaid these socio-economic imbalances with cultural signifiers, which establish a “super 
hard” difference between host and immigrant.  This difference is marked in a variety of 
ways: for example, whereas the host society has networks, immigrants have kinship; 
whereas the host society has modernity, the immigrants are bound by tradition.  Second, the 
model proposes that with the passage of time this distinction will be eroded as the host 
society consumes the immigrants and they adapt to the host culture.  Third, the form of this 
adaptation can be represented in discrete and successive stages called generations.  A 
generation is one of the key units of analysis for this type of narrative.  Generations are 
considered to be permanent units by which the immigration experience can be measured.  
Generational differences are articulated as the crystallization of social, political and cultural 
changes.  In other words, time is spatialised through the notion of generation and each 
generation marks the progress towards full assimilation into the host community.  The 
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immigrant studies model has wide circulation both in academic and popular culture.  It is 
against the backdrop of the ISM that the usual stories about Muslims in Europe are written 
and disseminated.  Issues of cultural schizophrenia in the form of generational conflict, the 
notion of dual allegiance (problems of being “Muslim and Western”), arranged marriages, 
cruelty to animals, domestic violence and, of course, illegal immigration provide 
newspaper columnists, policy-makers and many academics with their staple diet.   
This analytical tendency to deny the political nature of Muslim identity is not only the 
product of the ISM (and its associations with Orientalism), but also of the way in which 
nationalist discourses within Muslim communities have also served to undermine the idea of 
a distinct Muslim identity.  As a consequence, there are Turks and Kurds in Germany, North 
Africans in France and South Asians in Britain.  The question then arises - at which point do 
diverse communities become identified as Muslims?  The idea of Muslim communities being 
internally divided along ethnic or sectarian lines is found in many of the member country 
studies.  For example, it is remarked that Muslims in the Netherlands include differences in 
terms of countries of origin, but also ethnic, political and sectarian differences (the Arabs 
and Berbers from Morocco, the Turks and Kurds from Turkey, and so on…).  One 
consequence of such differences is to suggest to public authorities that really there is no 
meaningful entity called “Muslim”, and the outward forms that these seem to take are 
merely the work of “self-appointed community leaders” and other partisan activists.  This 
line of thinking is not specific to the Dutch case, but underlines much of official and semi-
official attitude to Islam in the European community.  The emphasis on Muslim unity 
seems to neglect that any community will be internally divided.  These internal divisions 
while being administratively confusing do not by themselves mean that a specific 
community lacks cohesion.  Rather, it suggests that we should view communities not as 
organic entities, but rather as political projects that coalesce around particular issues and 
themes.  In this case, the internal division of Muslims should not belie their agreement over 
specific issues.  For example, the Muslim community in Britain is as heterogeneous as 
many other Muslim communities – this, however, did not prevent them from establishing a 
kind of consensus on the need for grant-maintained Muslim schools.  In this way, it may be 
more helpful to see Muslim communities as civil societies, where a variety of organisations 
and individuals contend for some kind of hegemony. 
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Imagining Europe 
The eight member countries have very different historical relations with world of Islam.  
Countries such as Greece and parts of Italy were under direct Muslim rule; others have 
controlled large Muslim populations as part of their colonial will-to-power (for example, 
Britain and France). There are other countries which, until post-war migration, had little direct 
contact with the Muslim world (for example, Germany and Belgium).  These different 
histories have had important effects on the way various member states have dealt with their 
Muslim populations.  There is, however, a more general sense in which relations between the 
Muslim populations of these various countries is linked by nature of the fact that these 
countries consider themselves to be part of Europe and Europe has had a particular historical 
relationship with the world of Islam. 
Despite the history of the last 300 years, the identity of Europe remains contested and 
somewhat uncertain.  According to Agnes Heller, a European identity was a dispersed affair.  
It was the discourse of modernity that aggregated the various disparate elements (the various 
successor states to the Roman empire) into a consolidated form under the name of Europe as 
she declares: ‘Modernity the creation of Europe, itself created Europe...’.  What Heller seems 
to be suggesting is that European identity is not structured around a geographical or ethnic 
complex, but is, rather, an ideological construction of a very special kind.  Europe is an 
ideological formation centered on the discourse of modernity.  There was no European 
identity outside the project of modernity.  As a consequence, Muslim settlement challenges 
the notion of “Europeaness” at three distinct levels: 
Ø firstly, it problematises the historical conventions governing the identity of Europe; 
Ø secondly, it problematises European identity by contextualising the project of modernity; 
and 
Ø thirdly, Muslim settlement problematises the state-civil society relations which are said to 
be characteristic of Europe.   
As Judith Herrin writes, the term Europa is first used in the Eighth and Ninth centuries to 
designate the area over which Charlemagne exercised jurisdiction, that is, the lands outside 
the control of the Caliph and the Emperor in Constantinople.  It was the inability of the 
Emperors of the Second Rome and the Caliphs to lay claim to the old boundaries of the 
Roman Empire that allowed Charlemagne to forge a distinctive identity (Herrin, 1989: 477).  
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This identity was formulated as Latin Christians began to articulate a discourse of blood and 
soil during the period following the Eleventh Century as a means of differentiating themselves 
from those who were “enemies of the Christian name” (Baertlett, 1994: 252).  Thus, 
“Christian” came to connote not only a “racial” but also a territorial category.  Hence, 
Christendom emerged as racialised formation locked in mortal combat with other cultural 
formations - which rejected Latin Christendom (ibid.  250-255).  Thus, there is way in which 
the “unEuropeaness” of Muslims is not reducible to social exclusion due to socio-economic 
factors, but, rather, that social exclusion is manifestation of a primary, earlier conceptual 
exclusion.  Europe was explicitly the area of the world that excluded the territories under 
Muslim jurisdiction.  What is Europe if it is the case that recent attention has focused on how 
Muslims constitute the largest minority in the European Union?  How can Europe 
accommodate Muslims and still remain Europe?  In other words, by what means can Europe 
include in its embrace the exclusion of those that have constituted its own identity. 
Modernity and Muslims in Europe 
As many of the member country reports make clear there is a great deal of ignorance about 
Islam and Muslims within member countries.  Much of the ignorance is expressed in terms of 
the traditional or backwardness of Muslim cultural practices, (see, for example, the 
conclusion of the German report).  If we consider that notions of modernity are tied in with 
notions of “Europeaness” than it follows that those who are considered “un European” will 
tend to be seen as “un modern”.  Such a perspective negates the possibility that different 
cultural heritages may have different ways of being contemporary.  For instance, the 
phenomenon of professional Muslim women wearing the veil is actually a fairly recent 
development (Fifteenth Century AH)- and not some practice lost in the mist of time.  The 
assumption that secularisation is a component of modernity - puts into question people with 
religious affiliations - and Muslims are precisely defined in terms of religious affiliation.  
Muslim settlement interrupts the idea of the progressive nature of historical development and 
the universal nature of modernity, and because of the way in which notions of modernity are 
tied into notions of European identity, Muslim settlement becomes a signifier of Europe’s 
provincialisation.   
Muslims and State-Civil Society 
The assertion of Muslim subjectivity presents a serious challenge to the idea of what 
Gramsci called the integrated state, that is, a union between the state and civil society.  This 
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is due partly to the way in which a Muslim subject position remains a potentially 
transitional one.  As Manuel Castells writes, ‘(F)or a Muslim, the fundamental attachment 
is not to the watan (homeland), but to the Umma, or community of believers, all made 
equal in their submission to Allah’ (Castells, 1997: 15).  While, it is the case that Castells’ 
reading of Muslim subjectivity reproduces Orientalist and neo-Orientalist accounts of 
Islam, what is interesting is that in context of Muslim settlement in Europe, the potential 
transnationality of a Muslim subject position is enhanced, partly by the migrant and refugee 
origins of the majority of Muslim settlers in Europe, but also by the process of European 
integration which helps to produce a common Muslim identity among its various Muslim 
settlers.  The effect of this transitionality is creating, at least in embryonic form, a Muslim 
civil society that overlaps national and European boundaries.  Given that currently the main 
form of seepage across the boundaries embedded in the Westphalian system tend to involve 
Muslims, these Gaulist type demands of one state, one people, and one government are 
bound to become fudged.  This project of the nationalisation of Islam creates a tension, for 
not only does it deny the transnationality of Muslim identity, but it also provides a 
mechanism for public authorities to re-enact colonial type relations with their Muslim 
settlers.  It is in the interest of the various Muslim organisations to avoid becoming a 
branch of the state, for only in their autonomy from governments can they act as advocates 
of Muslim popular interests. 
2. MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: SOCIAL EXCLUSION & MARGINALISATION 
The Muslim settler communities in the different project countries have originated in different 
parts of the ex-colonies and this has been documented in the Statistical Representation of the 
Muslim Presence in Europe.   Furthermore, some project countries (for example, Greece and 
Italy) have only recently began to experience migration and so their analysis differs from that 
of the other project countries in that it was not until the mid 1970s that migration to Greece 
and Italy became more important that migration from these regions.  It is also important to 
note that project partners have stressed the heterogeneity of the Muslim settler communities 
living in Europe.  Although the settler communities share a common faith (Islam) they often 
originate from very different regions (Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, South Asia, etc.). 
It is clear, however, from the data collected by the project partners involved in this project 
that varying forms of discrimination affect Muslim settler communities precisely because of 
their ‘Muslimness’.  With the establishment of ‘visible’ communities, mosques, prayer halls, 
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settler infrastructures (schools, halal butchers, etc) came more concrete markers of 
‘difference’, which have often, resulted in resentment, suspicion and mistrust from the host 
society. Furthermore, as well collating evidence relating to political exclusion in Europe, 
this project has been able to gather statistical evidence that indicates that Muslim 
communities are also materially deprived (high unemployment, poor working conditions, 
poor health and housing, low educational qualifications and poverty). 
The problems encountered by Muslim settlers in Europe are diverse and complex and they 
have changed over time.  If we look firstly to the issue of migration and settlement itself we 
can see from the reports that Muslims tended to migrate to Europe to find work and usually 
worked in poorly paid, semi or unskilled areas such as manufacturing, mining and 
construction.  European countries, however, have encouraged or discouraged immigration 
depending on the economic and/or demographic needs of the country at any given time so 
the sense in which migrant labour has been welcome or unwelcome has ebbed and flowed 
over the past forty or so years.  These differentials in approaches to migration have meant 
that policies and conditions have not been consistent and certainly the experiences of 
Muslim settlers in Europe has changed in that the original migrants were primarily male, 
we are then looking at family reunification and then moving into second and third 
generations who have very different experiences to those of their parents.  Furthermore, the 
attitudes and policies of European states have changed considerably over the years as 
varying strategies have been forwarded and/or adopted to think about integration, 
assimilation and/or co-habitation with reference to settler communities.  For France, 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, the general perception has been, in terms 
of immigration, that settlers would gradually adapt to and assimilate into the host society, 
although during the 1980s, there was more of an emphasis on the concept of integration.  
These terms have often lacked clear and precise definition and furthermore it has often 
been perceived that the individual settler has responsibility for his/her social integration or 
social exclusion.  From this perspective it has often been the case that the legal or social 
obstacles to social, economic, and cultural integration have rarely been adequately 
examined as political questions.   
In Germany and Switzerland Muslims (in conjunction with other ‘foreigners’) are unable to 
vote and are thus excluded from political participation.  This is certainly a form of direct 
discrimination that when combined with the general perceptions of the ‘Auslander’, 
‘immigrant’ and ‘gastarbeiter’, has profound consequences for Muslim communities.  
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Although many Turkish families in Germany have been settled for three generations they 
continue to be denied full participation in the political processes of the country.  As the 
report for Switzerland makes clear, the operation of the ‘three-Circles’ policy determines 
the rights given to various groups of migrants, for example, the terms and conditions of 
employment permits, housing and property rights, etc.  Muslim migrants in the ‘third 
circle’ are subject to severe restrictions with reference to working permits and residency 
and a further form of direct discrimination in Switzerland is a labour policy that prohibits 
access to certain jobs, for example, teaching in state schools, key positions in the medical 
sector, positions of responsibility at federal level, etc.  
Although other European countries do not deny the majority of their Muslim population 
citizenship this does not mean that such groups subsequently do not experience exclusion 
or marginalisation.  For many French Muslims, especially the youth living in the suburbs of 
large cities, there are increasing tensions as a result of economic and social deprivation 
coupled with negative treatment by the authorities, particularly the police.  These kinds of 
tensions are also replicated in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. 
The secular state system in France has meant that visible signs of religious identity are 
perceived or regarded as disturbing. This perception has certainly manifested itself most 
clearly in what has been called the ‘headscarves’ affair wherein Muslim girls who wish to 
wear the headscarf have been excluded from school.  This antipathy towards headscarves 
for Muslim women (hijabophobia) has been manifested in other countries apart from 
France and it would seem that a broad misunderstanding of headscarves and their symbolic 
nature has manifested itself widely across the countries involved in this project.  Even if 
there are no distinct state policies pertaining to the headscarf, disapproval and 
misunderstanding has been generally observed in educational and employment sectors in 
all project countries.  In Swiss and German schools, although there are no restrictions about 
students wearing the headscarf, teachers and principals encourage female students and their 
parents to remove it, the prevailing perception being that it symbolises the oppression or 
subordination of women.  As a visible manifestation of an Islamic identity the hijab, for 
Muslim women, is often seen as representing patriarchal society and oppression, 
furthermore, state precepts are often rooted in the principles of secularism which in turn 
discriminates against those who wish to visibly express their faith identity.  Interestingly in 
both France and Switzerland Catholic, Christian and Jewish educational practitioners are 
not required to remove their symbols of faith (crucifixes, kippas, etc) and they do not 
21 
appear elicit the same negative assumptions about the wearers identity.  
In contrast, in the Netherlands the right to wear headscarves at work is covered by the 
General Act on Equal Treatment (1994) and there have been several cases on this matter 
that have all been won by the plaintiff.  In terms of educational matters in the Netherlands 
the majority of cases where issues have been raised are related to female students with 
reference to the wearing of the hijab, mixed schooltrips and mixed physical education 
lessons.  A prominent case from the Netherlands is the headscarf-affair in Alphen aan de 
Rijn where in 1985 the alderman of education decided to prohibit the wearing of the hijab 
at school although eventually, after much protest from the Muslim community the 
prohibition was withdrawn.  There has, however, been no development of a clear policy 
regarding wearing the hijab as some schools permit it and others do not. The issue has 
subsequently been the source of conflict between parents and schools and employees and 
employers and has spilled into other areas of education such as physical education, 
particularly swimming lessons. 
The issue of wearing the headscarf has elicited various levels of response in the project 
countries and with all other aspects of Muslim life the experiences of Muslims and the 
responses of the authorities differ from country to country.  In Germany, Muslim women 
who cover their heads usually find themselves excluded from employment in the public 
sector unless they agree to remove it.  Only those religious education teachers who teach 
elective classes in a native language are exempt from the prohibition, other teachers are not 
allowed to wear headscarves because the German State requires staff to dress in an 
‘ideologically neutral’ fashion which means that although female students may wear 
headscarves, female Muslim teachers cannot.  
Although in other project countries there are not necessarily official rules in place that bar 
the wearing of the hijab there continues to be discrimination against Muslim women who 
choose to wear it, in the UK, for example, in spite of the relatively high visibility of 
Muslim women working in chain stores, banks, supermarkets, etc, women still encounter 
hostility and negativity in less enlightened workplaces.  There have recently been a number 
of cases in which Muslim women have had to take their employers to court or file a 
grievance against them for unfair dismissal rooted in the headscarf. 
Furthermore, 7.5% of the complaints to the Equal Opportunities Centre in Belgium reports 
involved work and employment which included racist and anti-Muslim attitudes by 
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employers: for example, discrimination during the hiring process due to the headscarf or a 
‘foreign’ sounding name, discrimination in promotions and transfers and regulations about 
time off that do not allow for Muslim holidays.  In 1996 the Dutch Commission for Equal 
Treatment received 14 complaints about religious discrimination, some of these were from 
Muslims and most concerned ‘women wearing headscarves during work’ and praying 
during working hours. 
Further issues pertinent to Muslim communities in particular involve issues such as Muslim 
cemeteries, halal butchers, mosque building and education.  Throughout the project 
countries, concerns have been raised by Muslim communities about these matters with 
varying levels of response from the relevant state authorities.  With reference to cemeteries 
the project has ascertained that provision for Muslim burial rites is at best patchy and at 
worst non-existent.  In Belgium and Switzerland, for example, there are currently no 
Muslim cemeteries and there are insufficient Muslim plots provided in the limited number 
of public cemeteries, although in the Netherlands and the UK there are a number of Muslim 
cemeteries.  Furthermore, host country public health regulations are often incompatible 
with the traditions of Muslim communities.  Halal meat is also an issue that is approached 
differently by the project countries, in that some states allow the slaughter of animals 
according to Islamic rite and others, such as Germany and Switzerland, do not, thus 
necessitating the importation of halal meat from other countries.   
With regards to state funded Muslim education, it has only been very recently in the UK 
that permission has been granted for the establishment of grant maintained Muslim schools 
(for further information on this topic, see Turney (1999) 'Muslim Voices' in the European 
Union: 'Multiculturalism' & 'Equal Opportunities' in Education).  In other project countries, 
Muslim schools have also been established although the majority of them continue to be 
privately funded. 
It would appear that the situation with regards to measures for practising Islam in schools, 
that is, prayer facilities, dress and dietary obligations, are not met by each member state 
equally.  Britain has progressed some way by allowing Muslim girls to dress according to 
Islamic instructions, non-participation in certain activities (e.g. swimming), the celebration 
Islamic festivals and providing halal school meals, however, these kinds of provisions are 
usually at the discretion of the individual school and some Muslim students continue to 
encounter problems.  Switzerland and Italy, especially as the latter is a fairly recent country 
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of immigration, have not quite reached the same level of advancement and there are still 
cases of confrontation between schools and parents.  In order for Muslim children to 
concentrate on the objective of attending school, gaining an education, these issues 
certainly require further consideration.  
The reports also indicate quite clearly that there is an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic 
discourse present in the media although it is often contradictory and there is often a distinct 
difference between portrayals of Muslims in the national media and coverage in local 
media.  The mainstream media, at present, seems to constitute the most powerful medium 
for the propagation of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim discourse, particularly in terms of 
engendering a conceptual link between ‘negativity’ and Islam.   
Researchers in Belgium have argued that the category of ‘religion’ should be added to the 
list of factors to cover this form of discrimination as awareness of this limitation in the law, 
allows racist texts and commentaries to abuse ‘Muslims’ rather than ‘North Africans’ thus 
allowing writers to escape penal sanctions.  In Britain, as in Belgium, Muslims who have 
been the victims of discrimination have had to take their cases to court on grounds of either 
racial or sexual discrimination, as the law does not recognise religious discrimination.  
Introducing appropriate legislation in these countries would end the need for individuals to 
tailor their grievances to fit current legal provisions.  In its Second Review of the 1976 
Race Relations Act the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) identified several areas 
where current legislation may need attention: firstly, there is no law in Britain that protects 
people from religious discrimination; secondly there is no law in Britain concerning 
incitement to religious hatred; thirdly, current blasphemy laws only protects the established 
Christian religion.  
It is clear from the available evidence, that despite fairly comprehensive legislation in some 
regions that adequate application of the law is not easily accomplished.  Further, in certain 
areas, such as housing, education and public services, discrimination continues, as these 
areas are not yet covered by the legal system.  Whether this discrimination is a result of 
specific institutional structures or an inability (or unwillingness) on the part of authorities 
to enforce equal opportunity laws is an issue that requires further examination.  
It is difficult to discern religious discrimination from racial discrimination and xenophobia. 
French, Italian and Swiss researchers, for example, felt that the anti-immigrant feeling was 
more prominent than a specific anti-Muslim discourse; many of the migrants in these 
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countries are also Muslims and thus anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments become 
intertwined as anti-immigrant rhetoric is expressed in an anti-Muslim fashion. This is 
aggravated by a perception (which is exacerbated by right-wing political groups) that 
immigrants deprive the host population of employment opportunities.  
Addressing the issue of incitement to religious hatred is laborious and proving that such 
incitement has occurred is difficult.  The Italians and Dutch point out that this is because 
the line between opinion and incitement is blurred and therefore recommend improvements 
in legislation against incitement.  
Political representation varies at the level of the national and the local.  In Britain, for 
example, Muslims are beginning to establish themselves in local politics, but with the 
exception of one Muslim Labour MP, they have not yet really achieved national status (in 
Italy and Greece, of course, political participation is moving at a slower pace because of 
comparatively recent nature of immigration).  Belgium and Greece have also witnessed the 
emergence of Muslim political representation, however, in Switzerland and Germany for 
example, Muslims find themselves excluded from the political process and from 
representing Muslims in elections.  Where they have been able to, however, leaders in local 
government have brought about changes to the running of institutions such as schools, 
hospitals, government offices (for example, halal food, modifying dress codes, prayer 
facilities) and are involved in consultation with service providers for a more culturally 
sensitive way of delivering services.   
Overall, this project has identified and begun a broad examination of the need to study 
Muslim communities as Muslims rather than as ‘ethnic minorities’.  Certainly any attempt 
on the part of local and national authorities to deal with issues relating to equal 
opportunities, integration, etc, must consider that any attempt to by-pass this identity will 
probably not result in any great success.  Although the ethnicity of Muslim communities in 
Europe may vary from region to region, their concerns and their articulation of their 
concerns, needs and requirements are fairly standard and in keeping with the basic tenets of 
their religious identity.  Certainly it would not be valid to assert that Muslim communities 
are the only communities in Europe that are experiencing discrimination, exclusion and 
marginalisation as other settler communities also suffer from social, economic and political 
exclusion.  This project and the reports written by the various project partners make clear 
that the importance of examining a discourse that negatively impacts upon Muslim 
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communities lies in its intersection with other forms of discrimination that are rooted in 
xenophobia, race, ethnicity, gender and class.  What these reports have revealed is that 
Muslim communities are susceptible to discrimination in terms of employment, 
underachievement in education, infant mortality, or ghettoisation, exclusion (in some 
countries) from public schools partly because of their religious convictions or the refusal to 
acknowledge their cultural and religious identity.  Thus, these accounts provide some 
analysis of the ways in which the ‘Muslim Voices' have become politicised and also 
highlight those areas for which policy needs to be re-evaluated and those areas in which 
inequalities and double standards need to be addressed.   
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SCIENTIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT RESULTS 
AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Any attempt to try and summarise the findings of a large Project such as this is bound to 
produce an account, which is truncated and in many respects misrepresents the social reality 
of the populations and communities that were researched.  This is particularly so in a research 
project, which has relied extensively on qualitative, approaches and studied a section of 
European society, which exemplifies simultaneously diversity and particularism (in each 
country studied), and a “communal identity” which cuts across these European political 
boundaries (an Islamic identity).  It is for this reason that this section presents a brief 
summary of the research findings, but also presents short accounts of the specificity of each 
Muslim population in its respective country (as an appendix).  This it is hoped will allow the 
reader to appreciate both the general issues, which constituted the basis from which we 
derived our policy recommendations (presented in the following section) and the particular 
characteristics and concerns of each population in its own country of residence. 
Furthermore, the previous section noted at some length that the issues under consideration 
and especially the analytical and methodological approach adopted by this Project are to 
some degree quite new and innovative within the scope of contemporary European social 
science.  In this respect, therefore, it is necessary to present in some detail some of the 
analytical and conceptual issues which both informed the research and emerged as a the 
components of what we would like to suggest is a “new analytical paradigm” for the study 
of European Muslims.  The analytical and methodological issues concerned, of course, also 
reflected the two different phases of the Project:  
Ø a broad characterisation of the Muslim population in each country (including a 
demographic account) with a particular focus on the “politics of identity”; and  
Ø a specific and focussed discussion of issues pertaining to the employment of Muslim 
women with a particular focus on the “sociology of employment and work”.   
Thus, this section of the report is divided into two parts.  Parts one and two represent the two 
phases of the Project, with Part Two also incorporating the specific analytical issues as it is 
targeting gender issues and work.     
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PHASE ONE 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN 
MUSLIM POPULATIONS 
 
Although there has been a Muslim presence in Europe for several centuries it has not been 
until recently that Muslim communities in Europe have found themselves the focus of social, 
economic and cultural research.  The reasons for this are many, and are rooted in a diversity 
of factors such as, the immigration policies of the European Union, and the gradual change 
from within the settler communities themselves; from a sense of transience to one of 
permanence.  With this residential permanence we have thus witnessed the emergence of 
empowered and politicised Muslim voices that are articulating their needs and fighting for 
their rights as Muslims living and working in Europe.  For these reasons, and in light of 
growing evidence of widespread exclusion and marginality this project began in February 
1997 in order to identify the various pathways and forms of exclusion that affect Muslim 
communities, to assess the impact of these pathways and suggest possible strategies that 
would aid in the process of integration into the social, economic and political life of Europe. 
Throughout Europe, settlers who had been identified as ‘black’ or ‘foreigners’ have now 
been recognised as Muslims and although until recently religious identities were somewhat 
“invisible” to the various “host societies”, Muslims are today increasingly attempting to assert 
their rights and are articulating their interests through the construction of mosques, the 
building of Muslim cemeteries and the celebration of religious holidays, etc.  With the 
emergence of this identity as an assertion of ‘self’ and community there has also emerged a 
number of other issues in the context of examining ‘Muslim Voices’ particularly in terms 
of how we can account for the emergence of a specific Muslim identity and the specific 
forms of exclusion and marginality that pertain to that identity.   
This project is contextualised in the general social, economic and political trends and in 
previous studies of Muslim communities (of which there have been few in number).  The 
debates about whether or not Muslim communities should be identified by their faith or by 
their ethnicity have also informed the overall analysis.  Recently Fred Halliday (1998), for 
example, has argued that it is more constructive and accurate to talk about national 
identities and ethnicity than it is to talk about ‘Islamophobia’ or anti-Muslimism.  Research 
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undertaken for this project however, indicates quite clearly that it is precisely because 
individuals, groups and communities are articulating their identities and needs as Muslims 
rather than as ‘Pakistanis’, ‘Turks’, ‘Algerians’, etc, that they are encountering problems as 
Muslims and that these issues intersect with forms of exclusion and marginalisation linked 
with issues of xenophobia, ethnicity, gender, class and poverty.   
While the debates and discussions about ‘European’ identity, nation states and citizenship 
continue to rage it is clear that Muslims in Europe occupy an interesting yet uneasy space in 
the idea of ‘Europe’ and it is a space that certainly requires further consideration.  The project 
consultation paper ‘What is Europe?’ (Richards, 1997) points out that the European Union has 
centralised the notion of citizenship in recent years in an attempt to build a sense of 
community that is analogous to that of the nation state.  This idea of identity, of encouraging a 
solidarity that transgresses national borders is of particular interest when we think about the 
position of those communities who identify themselves as ‘Muslim’ first, and as ‘British 
Pakistani’ or ‘French Moroccan’ second.  This is important not only in terms of 
personal/group narrations of self and notions of society and place, but also in terms of how 
communities might find themselves marginalised, experiencing social exclusion precisely 
because their identity does not conform with Western assumptions about citizenship and 
loyalty to a nation state or federation of nation states.  Muslim communities, articulating their 
identity primarily in terms of their faith thus find themselves occupying a precarious space in 
terms of the construction and maintenance of identity of the West.   
In any examination of Muslim communities it is clear that a myriad of factors contribute to 
their experiences of living in Europe.  These are often rooted in ethnicity, gender and class as 
well as their Muslim identity.  This synopsis however, will highlight those spheres of social 
and economic life that pertain directly to communities as Muslims and will hopefully make 
clear the importance of analysing ‘Muslim voices’ in this context. The term ‘Islamophobia’ is 
relatively new, although it has been in use now for approximately ten years.  It has been in use 
since the late 1980s and the term encapsulates what this project has concurred is an 
identifiable phenomena in Europe, namely that of a fear or hatred of Muslim peoples and 
Islam which manifests itself in various forms of discrimination.  In the United Kingdom, the 
Runnymede Trust adopted the term when it published a consultation paper in 1997 asking 
organisations, groups and individuals to comment on the phenomenon.  The Commission that 
was established to look into ‘Islamophobia’ identified a number of issues that it held to be 
areas in need of analysis and perhaps policy intervention. Islamophobia is manifested in many 
29 
different forms and in many different areas.  The core aspects of this phenomenon have been 
identified by the Trust and provide a useful starting point for any investigation into 
Islamophobia and its consequences.  It must be recognised however, that Islamophobia differs 
from other forms of discrimination, in that the discourse that has developed about Islam and 
Muslims is highly politicised in an international arena in a way that social and political 
discourses about other religions and peoples is not. 
Over recent years the notion of Islamic fundamentalism has increasingly gained prominence, 
particularly in the media, so much so that often to be a Muslim is to be an Muslim 
Fundamentalist.  Muslims become constructed as religious fanatics, oppressive and primitive, 
peoples who oppress and abuse women, who are intolerant and who marginalise themselves 
by insisting on outdated religious doctrines that are out of synch with the workings of the 
modern world.  In this way, Muslim communities (and other settler communities) are 
constructed as ‘outsiders’ and ‘strangers’ who occupy a space in Europe that is often viewed 
with suspicion, fear and mistrust.   
The Runnymede Trust Commission’s report on Islamophobia, published in 1997 highlighted 
many of the important reasons as to why a study of social exclusion and marginalisation is 
important for Muslim peoples and certainly brought the notion of anti-Muslim sentiments to 
the fore in the UK.  Areas such as employment, education, the media, housing, public 
services, healthcare, etc, have been highlighted as spheres in which Muslim men and women 
experience varying forms of discrimination that centres primarily around their ‘Muslim’ 
identity as well as factors such as ethnicity, gender, class and poverty. Although the 
Runnymede investigation concentrated on the UK, this project has collated a large amount of 
data that indicates that the social exclusion and marginalisation of Muslim communities is not 
confined to the UK but also manifests itself in a number of different forms throughout Europe.   
When this project began in February 1997 it aimed to provide ‘an analytical, descriptive and 
comparative account ¼ of the different forms and processes by which European Muslims 
(citizens, residents and immigrants) have been socially excluded and marginalised.  It 
proposed to do this by examining the different national forms and processes by which 
European Muslims have been socially excluded.  Furthermore, it proposed to map those 
mechanisms that have generated the socio-economic and cultural conditions within which 
Muslims in Europe have experienced ‘a progressive process of marginalisation leading to 
economic deprivation and various forms of social and cultural disadvantage’. Each of the eight 
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countries involved in this project were thus asked to examine the position and experiences of 
Muslim following a specific format.  It has been necessary to formulate a common format in 
order to facilitate the comparative nature of the project.  The reports that constitute the main 
‘spine’ of this report provide some responses to the issues and queries that were raised in the 
format report structure.  It was hoped that by constructing a common format with a common 
set of questions to respond to that this would help researchers and the co-ordinator to compile 
standardised national reports for comparative purposes.  The responses that project partners 
have provided to these questions will hopefully provide a comprehensive summary of Muslim 
Voices and of the experiences of settler/migrant communities in the various project countries.  
Project partners were asked to address a series of questions under various headings (for 
example, historical context, contemporary debates, legislation, social, political and cultural 
organisations, education, media, notions of discrimination, employment …).  By following a 
format and addressing the issues in sequence it has been possible to produce a rounded 
account of the varying forms of exclusion and marginalisation that affect settler communities 
as Muslims, ethnicised minorities, etc. 
The varying levels of social exclusion and marginalisation experienced by settler 
communities (for this project Muslim settler communities) has been documented and 
explored by the eight partner countries involved in the ‘Muslim Voices’ project.  This project 
has been aware from the outset that the circumstances, experiences, responses and 
recommendations would differ from project country to country and indeed, the project has 
encouraged and thrived on such differentiation that has added a great deal of dynamism and 
intellectual debate to the entire process.  The migration process to the project countries has 
taken different forms and has occurred during different historical periods.  As such, the 
processes of exclusion and marginalisation that this project has been able to document are 
certainly quite complex and intersect at a number of different levels and identifying those 
processes has not always been straightforward – for example how are we able to differentiate 
between xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism, etc, to arrive at a coherent narrative of that links 
social exclusion and Muslim identity? 
In its second phase the project aimed to look at the expansion of new forms of informal and 
formal employment particularly “home-working” in which Muslim women workers constitute 
a significant proportion of the work force.  Furthermore this project aimed to examine the 
types of employment available to Muslim settlers (legal and illegal) in each partner country, 
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its location (geographically and economically) and the problems faced by Muslim settlers 
when seeking employment.  In examining the employment practices of both employer and 
worker the project hoped to contribute to debates about the extent to which Muslims in Europe 
are socially excluded; what constitutes the forms and processes of this social exclusion; to 
analyse the role of informal employment practices in accentuating social exclusion; to 
evaluate the role of new Muslim immigrants in accentuating social exclusion; to account for 
their response to social exclusion and marginalisation; and to formulate some 
recommendations for policies regional and Europe-wide policies that would aid integration. 
This part will concentrate on the data collected from the first phase of the project and in 
doing so will introduce some of those more general areas in which Muslim communities 
experience varying forms of exclusion and marginalisation.   
 
Social Exclusion and Marginalisation 
The settler communities in the different project countries have tended to come from quite 
specific areas and in this way this project thus links to issues relating to colonial and post-
colonial encounters (for further information on the ethnicity of Muslim settlers in each 
project country, see Brown (1997), ‘Statistical Representation of the Muslim Presence in 
Europe’).   Furthermore, some project countries (for example, Greece and Italy) have only 
recently began to experience migration and so their analysis differs from that of the other 
project countries in that it was not until the mid 1970s that migration to Greece and Italy 
became more important that migration from these regions.  It is also important to note that 
project partners have stressed the heterogeneity of the Muslim settler communities living in 
Europe.  Although the settler communities share a common faith (Islam) they often originate 
from very different regions (Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, South Asia, etc.). 
It is clear, however, from the data collected by the project partners involved in this project 
that varying forms of discrimination affect Muslim settler communities precisely because of 
their ‘Muslimness’.  With the establishment of ‘visible’ communities, mosques, prayer halls, 
settler infrastructures (schools, halal butchers, etc) came more concrete markers of 
‘difference’ which have often resulted in resentment, suspicion and mistrust from the host 
society. Furthermore, as well collating evidence relating to political exclusion in Europe, 
this project has been able to gather statistical evidence that indicates that Muslim 
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communities are also materially deprived (high unemployment, poor working conditions, 
poor health and housing, low educational qualifications and poverty). 
The problems encountered by Muslim settlers in Europe are diverse and complex and they 
have changed over time.  If we look firstly to the issue of migration and settlement itself we 
can see from the reports that Muslims tended to migrate to Europe to find work and usually 
worked in poorly paid, semi or unskilled areas such as manufacturing, mining and 
construction.  European countries, however, have encouraged or discouraged immigration 
depending on the economic and/or demographic needs of the country at any given time so 
the sense in which migrant labour has been welcome or unwelcome has ebbed and flowed 
over the past forty or so years.  These differentials in approaches to migration have meant 
that policies and conditions have not been consistent and certainly the experiences of 
Muslim settlers in Europe has changed in that the original migrants were primarily male, 
we are then looking at family reunification and then moving into second and third 
generations who have very different experiences to those of their parents.  Furthermore, the 
attitudes and policies of European states have changed considerably over the years as 
varying strategies have been forwarded and/or adopted to think about integration, 
assimilation and/or co-habitation with reference to settler communities.  For France, 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, the general perception has been, in terms 
of immigration, that settlers would gradually adapt to and assimilate into the host society, 
although during the 1980s, there was more of an emphasis on the concept of integration.  
These terms have often lacked clear and precise definition and furthermore it has often 
been perceived that the individual settler has responsibility for his/her social integration or 
social exclusion.  From this perspective it has often been the case that the legal or social 
obstacles to social, economic, and cultural integration have rarely been adequately 
examined as political questions.   
In Germany and Switzerland Muslims (in conjunction with other ‘foreigners’) are unable to 
vote and are thus excluded from political participation.  This is certainly a form of direct 
discrimination that when combined with the general perceptions of the ‘Auslander’, 
‘immigrant’ and ‘gastarbeiter’, has profound consequences for Muslim communities.  
Although many Turkish families in Germany have been settled for three generations they 
continue to be denied full participation in the political processes of the country.  As the 
report for Switzerland makes clear, the operation of the ‘three-Circles’ policy determines 
the rights given to various groups of migrants, for example, the terms and conditions of 
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employment permits, housing and property rights, etc.  Muslim migrants in the ‘third 
circle’ are subject to severe restrictions with reference to working permits and residency 
and a further form of direct discrimination in Switzerland is a labour policy that prohibits 
access to certain jobs, for example, teaching in state schools, key positions in the medical 
sector, positions of responsibility at federal level, etc.  
Although other European countries do not deny the majority of their Muslim population 
citizenship this does not mean that such groups subsequently do not experience exclusion 
or marginalisation.  For many French Muslims, especially the youth living in the suburbs of 
large cities, there are increasing tensions as a result of economic and social deprivation 
coupled with negative treatment by the authorities, particularly the police.  These kinds of 
tensions are also replicated in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. 
The secular state system in France has meant that visible signs of religious identity are 
perceived or regarded as disturbing. This perception has certainly manifested itself most 
clearly in what has been called the ‘headscarves’ affair wherein Muslim girls who wish to 
wear the headscarf have been excluded from school.  This antipathy towards headscarves 
for Muslim women (hijabophobia) has been manifested in other countries apart from 
France and it would seem that a broad misunderstanding of headscarves and their symbolic 
nature has manifested itself widely across the countries involved in this project.  Even if 
there are no distinct state policies pertaining to the headscarf, disapproval and 
misunderstanding has been generally observed in educational and employment sectors in 
all project countries.  In Swiss and German schools, although there are no restrictions about 
students wearing the headscarf, teachers and principals encourage female students and their 
parents to remove it, the prevailing perception being that it symbolises the oppression or 
subordination of women.  As a visible manifestation of an Islamic identity the hijab, for 
Muslim women, is often seen as representing patriarchal society and oppression, 
furthermore, state precepts are often rooted in the principles of secularism which in turn 
discriminates against those who wish to visibly express their faith identity.  Interestingly in 
both France and Switzerland Catholic, Christian and Jewish educational practitioners are 
not required to remove their symbols of faith (crucifixes, kippas, etc) and they do not 
appear elicit the same negative assumptions about the wearers identity.  
In contrast, in the Netherlands the right to wear headscarves at work is covered by the 
General Act on Equal Treatment (1994) and there have been several cases on this matter 
34 
that have all been won by the plaintiff.  In terms of educational matters in the Netherlands 
the majority of cases where issues have been raised are related to female students with 
reference to the wearing of the hijab, mixed schooltrips and mixed physical education 
lessons.  A prominent case from the Netherlands is the headscarf-affair in Alphen aan de 
Rijn where in 1985 the alderman of education decided to prohibit the wearing of the hijab 
at school although eventually, after much protest from the Muslim community the 
prohibition was withdrawn.  There has, however, been no development of a clear policy 
regarding wearing the hijab as some schools permit it and others do not. The issue has 
subsequently been the source of conflict between parents and schools and employees and 
employers and has spilled into other areas of education such as physical education, 
particularly swimming lessons. 
The issue of wearing the headscarf has elicited various levels of response in the project 
countries and with all other aspects of Muslim life the experiences of Muslims and the 
responses of the authorities differ from country to country.  In Germany, Muslim women 
who cover their heads usually find themselves excluded from employment in the public 
sector unless they agree to remove it.  Only those religious education teachers who teach 
elective classes in a native language are exempt from the prohibition, other teachers are not 
allowed to wear headscarves because the German State requires staff to dress in an 
‘ideologically neutral’ fashion which means that although female students may wear 
headscarves, female Muslim teachers cannot.  
Although in other project countries there are not necessarily official rules in place that bar 
the wearing of the hijab there continues to be discrimination against Muslim women who 
choose to wear it, in the UK, for example, in spite of the relatively high visibility of 
Muslim women working in chain stores, banks, supermarkets, etc, women still encounter 
hostility and negativity in less enlightened workplaces.  There have recently been a number 
of cases in which Muslim women have had to take their employers to court or file a 
grievance against them for unfair dismissal rooted in the headscarf. 
Furthermore, 7.5% of the complaints to the Equal Opportunities Centre in Belgium reports 
involved work and employment which included racist and anti-Muslim attitudes by 
employers: for example, discrimination during the hiring process due to the headscarf or a 
‘foreign’ sounding name, discrimination in promotions and transfers and regulations about 
time off that do not allow for Muslim holidays.  In 1996 the Dutch Commission for Equal 
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Treatment received 14 complaints about religious discrimination, some of these were from 
Muslims and most concerned ‘women wearing headscarves during work’ and praying 
during working hours. 
Further issues pertinent to Muslim communities in particular involve issues such as Muslim 
cemeteries, halal butchers, mosque building and education.  Throughout the project 
countries, concerns have been raised by Muslim communities about these matters with 
varying levels of response from the relevant state authorities.  With reference to cemeteries 
the project has ascertained that provision for Muslim burial rites is at best patchy and at 
worst non-existent.  In Belgium and Switzerland, for example, there are currently no 
Muslim cemeteries and there are insufficient Muslim plots provided in the limited number 
of public cemeteries, although in the Netherlands and the UK there are a number of Muslim 
cemeteries.  Furthermore, host country public health regulations are often incompatible 
with the traditions of Muslim communities.  Halal meat is also an issue that is approached 
differently by the project countries, in that some states allow the slaughter of animals 
according to Islamic rite and others, such as Germany and Switzerland, do not, thus 
necessitating the importation of halal meat from other countries.   
With regards to state funded Muslim education, it has only been very recently in the UK 
that permission has been granted for the establishment of grant maintained Muslim schools 
(for further information on this topic, see Turney (1999) 'Muslim Voices' in the European 
Union: 'Multiculturalism' & 'Equal Opportunities' in Education).  In other project countries, 
Muslim schools have also been established although the majority of them continue to be 
privately funded. 
It would appear that the situation with regards to measures for practising Islam in schools, 
that is, prayer facilities, dress and dietary obligations, are not met by each member state 
equally.  Britain has progressed some way by allowing Muslim girls to dress according to 
Islamic instructions, non-participation in certain activities (e.g. swimming), the celebration 
Islamic festivals and providing halal school meals, however, these kinds of provisions are 
usually at the discretion of the individual school and some Muslim students continue to 
encounter problems.  Switzerland and Italy, especially as the latter is a fairly recent country 
of immigration, have not quite reached the same level of advancement and there are still 
cases of confrontation between schools and parents.  In order for Muslim children to 
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concentrate on the objective of attending school, gaining an education, these issues 
certainly require further consideration.  
The reports also indicate quite clearly that there is an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic 
discourse present in the media although it is often contradictory and there is often a distinct 
difference between portrayals of Muslims in the national media and coverage in local 
media.  The mainstream media, at present, seems to constitute the most powerful medium 
for the propagation of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim discourse, particularly in terms of 
engendering a conceptual link between ‘negativity’ and Islam.   
Researchers in Belgium have argued that the category of ‘religion’ should be added to the 
list of factors to cover this form of discrimination as awareness of this limitation in the law, 
allows racist texts and commentaries to abuse ‘Muslims’ rather than ‘North Africans’ thus 
allowing writers to escape penal sanctions.  In Britain, as in Belgium, Muslims who have 
been the victims of discrimination have had to take their cases to court on grounds of either 
racial or sexual discrimination as the law does not recognise religious discrimination.  
Introducing appropriate legislation in these countries would end the need for individuals to 
tailor their grievances to fit current legal provisions.  In its Second Review of the 1976 
Race Relations Act the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) identified several areas 
where current legislation may need attention: firstly, there is no law in Britain that protects 
people from religious discrimination; secondly there is no law in Britain concerning 
incitement to religious hatred; thirdly, current blasphemy laws only protects the established 
Christian religion.  
It is clear from the available evidence, that despite fairly comprehensive legislation in some 
regions that adequate application of the law is not easily accomplished.  Further, in certain 
areas, such as housing, education and public services, discrimination continues as these 
areas are not yet covered by the legal system.  Whether this discrimination is a result of 
specific institutional structures or an inability (or unwillingness) on the part of authorities 
to enforce equal opportunity laws is an issue that requires further examination.  
It is difficult to discern religious discrimination from racial discrimination and xenophobia. 
French, Italian and Swiss researchers, for example, felt that the anti-immigrant feeling was 
more prominent than a specific anti-Muslim discourse; many of the migrants in these 
countries are also Muslims and thus anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments become 
intertwined as anti-immigrant rhetoric is expressed in an anti-Muslim fashion. This is 
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aggravated by a perception (which is exacerbated by right-wing political groups) that 
immigrants deprive the host population of employment opportunities.  
Addressing the issue of incitement to religious hatred is laborious and proving that such 
incitement has occurred is difficult.  The Italians and Dutch point out that this is because 
the line between opinion and incitement is blurred and therefore recommend improvements 
in legislation against incitement.  
Political representation varies at the level of the national and the local.  In Britain, for 
example, Muslims are beginning to establish themselves in local politics, but with the 
exception of one Muslim Labour MP, they have not yet really achieved national status (in 
Italy and Greece, of course, political participation is moving at a slower pace because of 
comparatively recent nature of immigration).  Belgium and Greece have also witnessed the 
emergence of Muslim political representation, however, in Switzerland and Germany for 
example, Muslims find themselves excluded from the political process and from 
representing Muslims in elections.  Where they have been able to, however, leaders in local 
government have brought about changes to the running of institutions such as schools, 
hospitals, government offices (for example, halal food, modifying dress codes, prayer 
facilities) and are involved in consultation with service providers for a more culturally 
sensitive way of delivering services.   
Overall, this project has identified and begun a broad examination of the need to study 
Muslim communities as Muslims rather than as ‘ethnic minorities’.  Certainly any attempt 
on the part of local and national authorities to deal with issues relating to equal 
opportunities, integration, etc, must consider that any attempt to by-pass this identity will 
probably not result in any great success.  Although the ethnicity of Muslim communities in 
Europe may vary from region to region, their concerns and their articulation of their 
concerns, needs and requirements are fairly standard and in keeping with the basic tenets of 
their religious identity.  Certainly it would not be valid to assert that Muslim communities 
are the only communities in Europe that are experiencing discrimination, exclusion and 
marginalisation as other settler communities also suffer from social, economic and political 
exclusion.  This project and the reports written by the various project partners make clear 
that the importance of examining a discourse that negatively impacts upon Muslim 
communities lies in its intersection with other forms of discrimination that are rooted in 
xenophobia, race, ethnicity, gender and class.  What these reports have revealed is that 
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Muslim communities are susceptible to discrimination in terms of employment, 
underachievement in education, infant mortality, or ghettoisation, exclusion (in some 
countries) from public schools partly because of their religious convictions or the refusal to 
acknowledge their cultural and religious identity.   
These reports have presented a descriptive and analytical account of Muslims in Europe 
and a number of conceptual and methodological issues have been examined.  These reports 
have also examined the socio-historical mechanisms by which marginalisation and 
exclusion have occurred and within which identity is constructed have been established as 
the context within which a politicised ‘Muslim Voice’ has emerged.  These accounts 
provide some analysis of the ways in which the ‘Muslim Voice' has become politicised and 
also highlight those areas for which policy needs to be re-evaluated and those areas in 
which inequalities and double standards need to be addressed.   
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PHASE TWO 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF MUSLIMS WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO ISSUES OF GENDER 
 
The second phase of the project was both shorter and targeted at employment with a 
particular reference to gender issues.  In this sense it was more of a micro-sociology and 
the empirical research concentrated on a few qualitative case studies.  Thus, this phase of 
the project also relied upon a more specific and focussed set of analytical issues and 
methodological concerns.  It is, therefore, necessary to present some of these issues as an 
introduction to the substantive part, which follows. 
ANALYTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the past, literature concerning race, gender and class has focused almost exclusively on 
each area individually, as discrete categories that can be separated and analysed apart, 
without reference to the intersections between these, or other issues at the root of exclusion 
and marginalisation, such as religion, age, sexuality, nationality.  With the emergence of 
the movements of ‘third world’ and black feminists, these issues have begun to be taken 
into consideration jointly, and there is a slowly growing body of literature dedicated to 
exploring the interconnections between different forms of marginalisation and 
discrimination and how these impact on identities, social structures and the position of 
individuals in the labour market. 
Ethnic minority women in Europe find themselves at the convergence of combined forms 
of discrimination due to their specific position in society.  Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) 
note that ethnic minority women suffer on the following counts: 
Ø as migrants, disadvantaged legally, politically and economically; 
Ø through racist attitudes and practices in society; 
Ø as women, affected by sexist attitudes and practices; 
Ø as members of particular classes, which then dictates the type of employment 
available to them. 
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The stereotypes that surround ethnic minority women in Britain, for example as passive 
victims, only serve to justify and perpetuate these attitudes and forms of discrimination.  
Until relatively recently, feminist theories had consistently failed to address the different 
facets of oppression experienced by women.  Beginning from the premise that a given unity 
exists between all women, they failed to acknowledge differences in nationality, race, 
religion, culture and class.  Even when theories were mediated by the recognition of the 
extent of the impact of class differences, differences in ethnicity and culture were not 
incorporated.  Westwood (1984) emphasises the need to explore the links between race, 
class and gender, in order to be sensitive to the specificities of the position of ethnic 
minority women. 
We cannot use a simple unity ‘woman’ as the basis of our understanding; instead, we 
have to posit real women, human beings formed and sustained materially in a 
specific social formation who may, nevertheless, have come from other cultures and 
another part of the global economic system  (Westwood, 1984; p9). 
Lutz et al (1995) describe the divisions in the feminist movement represented by the 
assertion that ‘the personal is political’, in its own socio-economic context a radical 
statement forging acceptance of the relevance of the private, female, sphere to the public, 
male, domain and the interconnectedness of the worlds of production and reproduction, 
which nevertheless makes assumptions about the nature of the ‘personal’ as an objective 
reality.   This does not take into account the different experiences and constructions of the 
‘personal’ in the ways that women position themselves in relation to others, affected by 
specific social relations within different communities.  This effectively essentialises gender 
differences and marginalises the experiences of women who were not white, middle class 
and failed to tackle discrimination on the basis of different forms of oppression.  Women 
will not always prioritise the effects of gender discrimination because of the shared 
experience of being female, when oppression on the basis of race, for example, may result 
in significantly more adverse effects on a daily basis. 
The understanding of the necessity to treat different forms of discrimination on the basis of 
race, gender and class as highly interconnected has given rise to alternative theories 
surrounding the position of ethnic minority women in British society today.  I focus here 
particularly on the literature examining the position of ethnic minority women in the labour 
market. 
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In assessing labour market participation, the first obstacle is the lack of satisfactory data 
regarding the employment of ethnic minorities (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; 
Phizacklea, 1994).  Official statistics, from Labour Force Surveys for example, fail to show 
true rates of economic activity, as this obscures activity in the informal sector, family 
labour and home-working.  Neither do they present an accurate picture of the distribution 
within sectors of ethnic minority employment, of which the majority tends to be in the 
lowest level jobs, or ghettoised within certain industries (see for example Phizacklea, 1994; 
Westwood, 1984 & 1988; Brah, 1994). 
 
1. Culturalist and Structuralist approaches 
Approaches to the assessment of the position of ethnic minorities in society can be broadly 
divided into the ‘culturalist’ approach and ‘structural’ approach.  Culturalist theories focus 
on the cultural differences between communities and the advantages or disadvantages these 
may present in terms of work opportunities, for example hard work and risk taking, the 
ability to exploit an ‘ethnic niche’ in the economy, or the limitations placed on women’s 
participation in public life.  This approach has been heavily criticised (Phizacklea, 1988; 
Westwood and Bhachu, 1988; Brah, 1994) as it presents minority women as passive 
victims and fails to see culture as dynamic and affected by the social and economic context. 
To start with the lived experience of black and minority women in British society and 
generate explanations within the structure of that society is itself a critique of 
common-sense accounts in which ethnic and cultural elements were abstracted from 
the whole structure of relations of which they were a part.  Cultures were dissected 
and pieces of them offered as a means of understanding minority peoples and their 
lives…Once we dispense with this and present a material and dynamic account of 
cultures and ethnicities we can see the ways in which cultures and ideologies, and 
cultures and economics, are embedded within one another.  (Westwood and Bhachu, 
1988; p11). 
Phizacklea (1988) asserts that, aside from being a racist explanation for the disadvantages 
minority groups face, culturalist theories which claim that ethnic minorities are best placed 
to become successful ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ give no explanation for changes in 
employment over generations, nor do they take into account the racial discrimination, 
harassment and violence that reduce the alternatives.  Rationalising the use of women’s 
labour at home and their ‘natural skills’ as stemming from cultural limitations on 
alternative employment, overlooks the necessity of unpaid labour to make an enterprise 
economically viable and in effect justifies exploitation. 
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In addition to culture, Brah (1994) highlights the importance of structure and agency to the 
lives of the young Muslim women in her study, and posits that any explanation of the 
position of Muslim women in the labour market must account for the following: the history 
of colonialism and imperialism and the timing of migration, the recent restructuring of 
national and global economies and the concurrent changing structure of labour markets, 
state policies, particularly immigration control, racial discrimination in the labour market 
and the segmentation of labour markets by gender, class, age and ethnic background.   
The structural approach, which takes into account these historical and material dimensions, 
is able to analyse the distinctive position of ethnic minority women in the labour market, 
particularly of Muslim women who are concentrated in some of the lowest-paid, low-skill 
work in manufacturing and the service industry with lower average earnings than white 
women.  This, the structural approach suggests, is not due to cultural factors, but rather a 
combination of the factors listed above, which together force Muslim women into a 
particularly unfavourable position in the labour market.  This approach examines empirical 
and historical evidence to address how labour is socially constructed and framed within 
personal narratives and collective histories (Brah, 1994).  It is essential when examining 
culture that it is seen within the structures of power in which it exists.  
2. Historical setting 
The situation of ethnic minorities and employment today is framed within the context of 
colonialism where men and women from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean came to Europe to 
take on the lowest paid jobs, which the indigenous population were unwilling to accept.  
From this colonial background originates the forms of gendered racism ethnic minority 
women face in the labour market today.  The subordinate class position in which many 
ethnic minorities still find themselves is also affected by their concentration in declining 
industries, such as manufacturing, and consequently a higher representation among the 
unemployed.  Many Muslim women joining their husbands arrived to a recession and their 
employment options were thus immediately limited.  In this climate, home-working or 
supporting a family business through unpaid labour were among the few options open to 
them.  Those who did not arrive as dependents, but for economic reasons, themselves faced 
a similarly constricted range of options.  The image of ethnic minority men as a threat to 
men’s employment and of their wives as dependents has continued to shape the views of 
teachers, careers officers and employers, negatively affecting women’s employment 
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prospects today (Brah, 1994).   Lutz et al (1995) suggest that women from minority 
cultures are often accorded a symbolic role as representatives of their nation and its honour, 
and with respect to Muslims, this is symbolised powerfully by the veil, a stereotype that 
perpetuates images of passivity and has the effect of silencing women and assuming 
vulnerability.  The reality, however, as empirical evidence from Brah’s research (1994) 
shows is that the majority of Muslim women regard paid work for women as a high priority 
and their earnings are indispensable to the household budget.  Those who do not work due 
to cultural constraints are few, and they may still envisage a different future for their 
daughters, yet the cultural stereotype of the dependent and oppressed Muslim woman 
persists. 
3. Recent political and economic changes 
Over the past two decades, recession, along with the growth of multi-national companies and 
the rapid emergence of new technology, has led to a radical restructuring of work on a global 
level.  This has resulted in a casualisation of employment, deskilling and downsizing, the 
adoption of ‘flexible’ labour practices, a deterioration in working conditions generally and, 
with the power of trade unions also diminishing, the worker has ever less control over the 
production process and increasing insecurity at work.  As the production process searches out 
the cheapest production costs and lowest overheads in order to maximise profit, a high 
proportion of jobs available are temporary or casual with short-term contracts and a lack of 
associated benefits such as holiday or sick pay.  The workers who are most susceptible to 
exploitation by these kinds of working conditions are the low qualified or low skilled, and 
particularly those working in declining industries.  Since there is a high concentration of 
ethnic minorities and migrants in low-level, low-pay jobs, in manufacturing, the retail 
industry, the service and informal sectors, and a low concentration in growth industries, they 
suffer disproportionately.  Ethnic minority women especially, are affected unfavourably by 
these changes as the segregation of the labour market has resulted in a concentration of 
women in the lowest paying jobs.  Many women are forced to accept home-working as an 
option, through lack of other alternatives outside the home, or in order to combine work with 
caring responsibilities. (see Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987; Tate, 1994; Mitter, 1986). 
Phizacklea (1994) questions the benefits of the Single European Market for ethnic minority 
residents.  Although there are 15 million minority citizens in Europe, they do not enjoy the 
same freedom of movement as white Europeans.  Immigration and settlement policies place 
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restrictions on ‘third country’ residents, which means they are unable to move around to 
improve their situation in terms of work or living conditions.  She also identifies an increase 
in racism, but a lack of political will to tackle it through legal protection.  Labour markets 
remain racialised and gendered, and a single market is likely only to further polarise this 
situation.  Lutz et al (1995) also point to the growth in nationalism in Europe, which rather 
than generating a sense of belonging and unification as Anderson (1983) had suggested, 
particularly in relation to independence struggles, delineates powerful boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion.  The creation of ‘Fortress Europe’ employs a new nationalism to 
maintain internal cohesion by marginalising all but the dominant ethnic group.  Minority 
women are not only more likely to be marginalised in employment but are also adversely 
affected by strict immigration and settlement laws which often class women as dependents, 
thus becoming central to the nationalist project: 
It is clear that although women are differentiated by ‘race’ and nation, they are 
centrally positioned within the exclusions and exclusions of nationalism and racism 
(Lutz et al, 1995; p13). 
 
4. Gender, race and class discrimination in the labour market 
The labour market is not only racialised, but gendered also, and ethnic minority women are 
thus doubly disadvantaged in this respect.  The employment opportunities of both white and 
ethnic minority women are restricted due to domestic responsibilities, lack of child care 
facilities and the segmentation of the labour market.   Class disadvantage comes into play 
here, as women working for low wages cannot afford to pay for domestic help or child care.  
As Westwood (1984) illustrates graphically with her study of women working on the factory 
floor of a hosiery department, there is still a strong link between what is seen as ‘women’s 
work’ and domestically-based skills.  What are conceived of as ‘natural’ skills of dexterity, 
sewing, mending and so on are done by women, whilst control over the labour process and 
technological skills and expertise are predominantly concentrated in the hands of men, also 
according them power over women’s earnings and time.  In the case of home-workers, the 
connection with the home is physical, reinforcing this association.  All of the women involved 
worked a double shift, undertaking domestic responsibilities in addition to their day at the 
factory.  Westwood defines this exploitation of women’s labour as the material basis for 
patriarchal power, maintaining women in a position subordinate to men.  The intersection of 
discrimination on the basis of sex and race means that ethnic minority women are most likely 
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to hold the lowest level and lowest paid jobs.  Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) demonstrate 
how racial and sexist exclusion become most apparent in family labour within ethnic 
businesses.  Unskilled, repetitive machining work is reserved for women, whereas the 
entrepreneurial skill and control of the enterprise is monopolised by men.  Anthias and Yuval-
Davis emphasise the fine intersection between gender, race and class in this situation: class 
and race disadvantage in the labour market may be overcome through self-employment, but at 
the expense of increased patriarchal gender relations.  Particularly significant to the feminist 
debate however, is that in the face of extensive racial discrimination in the labour market, they 
highlight the fact that the women involved do not necessarily see this coping strategy as 
exploitation; the family may in this situation become a site of resistance rather than 
oppression.  Similarly, Phizacklea (1988) stresses that although in focusing on ethnic ties as 
resource has the positive effect of moving away from an emphasis on ethnic minorities as 
passive victims, it simultaneously obscures the patriarchal gender relations inherent in this 
situation.   Businesses such as textiles, catering and retail are labour-intensive and can only 
survive on unpaid family labour, which may explain why there is a higher proportion of Asian 
self-employment than Afro-Caribbean for example; the family structure and availability of 
unpaid labour becomes a prerequisite for the success of the business.  Women in the ethnic 
economy are therefore not ‘free labourers’ in the capitalist system; they do not receive 
financial reward for their labour, and do not share an identical class situation, but are working 
under patriarchal relations of production.  In encouraging ethnic business as the creation of 
alternative employment in the face of recession, the state therefore supports a gender specific 
and ethnically segregated low pay labour market for women. 
5. Women and the state 
Ethnic minority women’s position in the labour market cannot therefore be explained solely 
on the basis of a lack of qualifications and language skills or by cultural restrictions; this is 
clearly not the case for second and third generation immigrants above all.  Phizacklea (1994) 
claims that the state plays a significant role in shaping job status through immigration policy.  
It is not only work permit allocations and recruitment policies that limit opportunities for 
ethnic minority women, but family reunion policies.  The necessity to prove availability of 
funds to support one’s spouse entering the country without recourse to state benefits is likely 
to force people into informal sector work, particularly as access to the labour market is not 
always granted immediately.  Successive immigration acts have imposed rigorous restrictions 
on the entry to Britain of commonwealth citizens and their spouses, so that although the 
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ideology of the nuclear family is firmly supported by the state, this does not appear to extend 
to migrant families (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992).  Across Europe, migrant families find 
themselves in a similar position making citizenship, argue Anthias and Yuval-Davis, a 
racialised and gendered concept.  
Ethnic minorities already established in Britain may also see the state in predatory terms, 
according to Westwood (1984).  The lack of facilities for child care or care of the sick and 
elderly restricts women’s employment options, yet women can be reluctant to devolve the 
caring responsibilities to the state and thus a measure of control.  The state can all too often 
be seen as anti-family, especially for women who have experienced racism at the hands of 
social services, police, education and health authorities. 
6. Theorising exclusion and marginality 
Allen (1994) argues that simple dichotomous categorising of, for example, black and white, 
ethnic and non-ethnic, leads to the exclusion and marginalisation of all who do not exactly fit 
these categories.  It is equally important to take into consideration how people perceive 
themselves, in addition to how they are perceived and treated by others.  It becomes clear that 
with regard to gender, class and race, it is difficult to construct discrete categories to explain 
people’s experiences.  As Allen comments, 
In Europe many people have mixed affiliations and origins.  Social scientists need to 
explore the conditions under which these are productive and creative and those which 
promote them as destructive and alien (Allen, 1994; p100). 
The complexities of the interaction of subordinate positions based on race, class and gender 
relations need to be explored within the broader social context.   Questions of identity with 
regard to gender, ethnicity, race, nationality and religion have too often been considered 
irrelevant to the economic situation and having little effect on the market and production 
relations.  While it is apparent that the social, economic and political structure affects the 
position of individuals in the labour market, and therefore their agency, it is also true that 
individual identies, and social relations impact on societal structure and consequently social 
change.  Allen asserts the importance of considering identity as ‘a social product located in 
time and space.  It is not a fixed static entity, but has to be seen as a dynamic process’ (1994; 
p90).  When analysing issues of race, class and gender it is impossible to separate different 
forms of subordination and establish a hierarchy.  Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) likewise 
underline the importance of recognising how different forms of oppression interact and 
relate.  Although analytically, discourses can be separated, the reality of experience is not 
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easily divisible into categories as each level of discrimination due to race, class or gender is 
practiced in the context of the others. 
[s]exism and racism have to be analytically separated, but...the issue of equal 
opportunities has to connect together the different ways in which gender, race and 
class are intertwined in the concrete experience and practice of disadvantage and 
exclusion (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; p128). 
 
SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNT 
The second phase of the project looks at the position of Muslims in Europe regarding 
employment.   This phase expands on the preliminary accounts given in phase one, analysing 
the employment situation in greater detail and the involvement of Muslims in, or exclusion 
from, the labour market, in both the formal and informal sectors, legal and illegal work.  Each 
partner country gives an overview of the types of work Muslims are employed in, the work 
available to Muslims, and possible reasons for unemployment, examining why the position of 
Muslims in the labour market may be weak and problems faced by Muslims while seeking 
employment.  The research examines the distribution of Muslims in employment in terms of 
geographical location in rural and urban sectors, in terms of vocation, and in terms of income 
levels.  It also addresses educational and generational differences within the Muslim 
communities and their impact on employment choices or barriers.  Evidence of the existence 
of discrimination in the labour market is explored and the restrictions this imposes on 
Muslim employment choices.  The extent of the involvement of Muslims in Trade Union 
activities and Muslim organisations gives some indication of the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms available to combat discriminatory practices.  In addition, the proportion of 
Muslims who are self-employed, or involved in ‘ethnic enterprises’ charts employment 
choices and employment opportunities open to Muslims.  
This phase focuses in particular on the situation of Muslim women in Europe in the labour 
market, using case studies and life histories to illustrate the specific experiences and obstacles 
encountered by Muslim women relating to their work trajectories.  Micro-level studies 
investigate the levels and forms of participation in paid work through examining entry into 
the labour market, the types of work undertaken, working conditions experienced, 
expectations and attitudes of the worker, her family and her employer, and the choices or lack 
of choices available to Muslim women.  The reports also explore identity formation; how 
factors of religion, nationality, gender and age converge, and how self-perceptions are 
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affected by the position of the women in society, in the labour market, in the community and 
in the family. 
This exploration of the participation of Muslims in the labour market and the levels of 
representation of Muslims in certain areas of the economy is intended to contribute to the 
analysis of the presence of a ‘Muslim Voice’ in Europe and the extent of the inclusion or 
marginalisation of Muslims in each of the partner countries.  The reports give descriptive and 
analytical accounts of issues pertinent to the Muslim communities concerning employment, 
and how discriminatory employment practices on the basis of religion intersect with those of 
gender, race and class, resulting in economic, social, political and cultural marginalisation.  
The responses of the Muslim communities, of the host societies and of the state to social 
exclusion, are used to formulate policy recommendations to improve the integration and 
participation of Muslims in Europe. 
 
1. Recent developments in the labour market 
An analysis of Muslims and employment must necessarily be framed in the context of the 
profound socio-economic changes that have occurred on a global level over the last two 
decades.  Globalisation and the changes in the nature of work and employment patterns have 
transformed labour market participation in Europe.  Deregulation of the labour market and 
the necessity to reduce labour costs have resulted in production becoming increasingly 
decentralised, forcing companies to employ a cheap and flexible workforce employed on a 
casual basis in order to remain competitive.  As multinationals gain more power, companies 
move to where the production costs are lower, forcing workers to settle for lower wages and 
unfavourable options such as outsourcing, subcontracting, home-working and part-time, 
temporary contracts.  When the terms of employment are casualised, the employer has no 
obligations or legal responsibilities to the worker, rendering the worker vulnerable to the 
whims of the employer and the market, thus leading a precarious, insecure existence, and 
more likely to experience poverty.  In smaller companies, effective unions are less likely to 
function; where the worker is not formally employed there are no channels open to protest 
against unfair employment practices.  Casual workers can find themselves exploited in terms 
of low pay, absence of benefits (for example sick pay or holiday pay), long, anti-social hours, 
a heavy workload, and a lack of work security.  Workers prepared to accept such conditions 
are those with no other alternative: throughout Europe there is an abnormally high 
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concentration of immigrants (both legal and illegal) working in the informal sector and in 
low-paid jobs.  Furthermore, the working population is now growing in size, with a much 
higher proportion of women in the labour market.  An increase in the number of non-manual 
jobs and a decline in manufacturing, along with a growth in the service sector and the number 
of part-time jobs, has resulted in an increase in unemployment and underemployment 
(particularly male), and an increase in the number of low-paid, part-time service sector jobs, 
mainly filled by women, bringing about the ‘feminisation’ of the immigrant working 
population.  In all the partner countries those at the bottom end of the employment scale in 
insecure, temporary, part-time and low-paid jobs are disproportionately from immigrant or 
settler communities.  
In such a climate of insecurity in the labour market, immigrant communities can come to be 
seen as a threat in the competition for scarce employment, housing and public services, 
exacerbating existing prejudices in society against immigrants in general, and manifested as 
racist or religious discrimination.  Thus, even established settler communities can be 
negatively affected by discrimination in the labour market, intensified by recent socio-
economic change.  As the Belgian report notes, this phenomenon “is rooted in both the social 
effects of the economy’s structural transformations and society’s endemic ethnic 
discrimination” (p170). The reports show these employment patterns to be replicated across 
Europe, albeit with some regional differences.  The German economy, for example, faces 
particular problems due to a rise in unemployment resulting from German reunification and 
increased competition arising from the opening up of East European markets.  Differing 
immigration histories (detailed in phase I) and geographical location mean that the settler 
communities in each partner country are distinct from each other in terms of nationalities, 
time of arrival, establishment of communities and support organisations etc.  Immigration 
policies also vary widely, affecting the status and opportunities for settler communities.  The 
immigrant communities are constantly changing, either through the different socialisation 
processes of second and third generation Muslims, or through new immigrant communities 
made up of refugees and asylum seekers currently establishing themselves, notably from 
Former Yugoslavia.  In addition, each report also emphasises the fact that the Muslim 
communities within each country are not a monolithic bloc, but are heterogeneous, and 
composed of different sub groups.  The diversity of Muslims in Europe becomes apparent.  
Muslims may be recently arrived or temporary immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers, or 
settlers granted EU citizenship who represent an established minority group.  They may also 
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be second or third generation Muslim immigrants, or those native to the partner country who 
have converted to Islam.  The purpose of focusing on Muslims in the European Union in this 
project is to investigate how a group in society with a common social characteristic, namely 
religious affiliation, has been affected by socio-economic change and the extent to which 
they suffer from social exclusion as a result. 
2. Muslim workers  
Evidence from all the partner countries suggests that atypical working patterns, in 
conjunction with low wages and labour market immobility are responsible for an atypical 
social life and conditions of poverty for many Muslims in Europe, resulting in 
marginalisation or exclusion from society.  Although Muslims across Europe occupy a wide 
variety of positions and levels in most sectors of the economy, there is a high concentration 
to be found at the lowest end of the job market.  Many hold part-time, flexible, temporary 
jobs and are invisible in statistics.  Recent immigrants are often employed as unskilled or 
semi-skilled workers due to a lack of language skills and/or qualifications, or due to the 
intention of returning home.  In Germany for example, migrants are largely employed in 
mining, manufacturing, commerce, hotels, restaurants and construction.  As heavy industry 
and manufacturing have been particularly affected by the restructuring of the economy, 
migrants are also most adversely affected by job losses.  Seasonal workers employed in the 
agricultural sector, hotel and building trades in Switzerland are recognised to have the lowest 
status, living without their families on low wages and in poor housing conditions. In Greece 
and Italy, migrants find seasonal work as builders and unskilled industrial and agricultural 
workers, or work in the retail industry.  Amongst the migrant Gypsy populations in Greece, 
work is found as street vendors, cleaners and conveyor’s assistants.  In the UK, different 
minority groups tend to be concentrated in different industries; South Asian Muslims for 
example, are concentrated in the textiles and clothing industry and, more generally, in 
transport and communications.  There are also a large number of Muslims, particularly 
women, employed in the service sector in many European countries, as hotel and restaurant 
workers, domestic help, cleaners and porters.  These workers often do not have contracts, 
health insurance or holiday entitlement and are forced to work long hours for low wages. 
There is a low representation of Muslims in senior positions and management levels in most 
European countries.  In the UK, where there are a considerable number of Muslims employed 
in the medical profession, these statistics mask the fact that they are often employed in inner 
city areas with a lack of resources. The perception of Muslims in Belgium as a problem-
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generating social category, plus the division of society into ethnic classes maintains the low-
status of Muslim workers. Furthermore, increased restrictions are placed on immigrants due 
to immigration policies and employment regulations.  In Switzerland for example, only Swiss 
nationals can be employed in the public sector.  In Greece, undocumented Albanian migrants 
are unable to receive welfare benefits despite making social security contributions through 
labour market activity.  
Muslims in Europe are also more strongly represented amongst the unemployed.  Research 
has shown that when the economy contracts, the unemployment rate of minorities rises faster 
(see Modood, 1997).  In the UK, even in cities with relatively small minority populations, 
they account for a disproportionately large number of the unemployed.  The proportion of 
young unemployed men from ethnic minorities is considerably higher than for young white 
men, even with the same levels of education and qualifications.  These statistics are similar in 
the other partner countries, for example in Germany the sectors with the highest levels of 
unemployment are those with the highest proportions of Muslim immigrants.  A high level of 
unemployment is therefore common amongst immigrants, despite the fact that the majority of 
the immigrant population is of employable age.  In Switzerland, permanent resident migrants 
are three times more likely to be unemployed than Swiss nationals.  In Italy, although long-
term unemployment is not a common problem for Muslim workers, the majority change or 
lose jobs frequently, leading to precarious employment. 
Faced with discrimination and marginalisation, the relationship to the host society invariably 
alters, and with it the participation of Muslims in public life.  The Belgian report posits two 
models of Muslim immigrant participation, as communitarians, and assimilationists.  The 
communitarians demonstrate a strong ethnic or community presence and an adherence to 
their cultural background.  A strong attachment to Islam is not viewed as a barrier to 
participation in society, but should infer honesty, and mental stability.  Representation 
through Muslim associations and groups is used as a means to facilitate their acceptance by 
Belgian society.  The assimilationists on the other hand, participate as citizens in the host 
country’s political structures and associations as a way of combating racism, discrimination 
and exclusion.  They associate the negative image of Islam created in Europe with their 
exclusion from society and therefore aim to keep their faith private, whilst working to 
eliminate discrimination on religious grounds by entering “the fora of democracy where 
power is wielded” (p166). Muslims interviewed in Belgium were found to occupy a range of 
positions between these two poles; comparisons can be drawn with responses from 
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interviewees in other partner countries also. The two models depict key mechanisms for 
coping with exclusion from the host society.  Specific survival strategies may include 
accessing family or community networks to find work in the informal sector, setting up small 
businesses, or resorting to illegal activities. 
As a consequence of the difficulties for minority groups in securing employment in the 
formal sector, they become over-represented in the informal economy.  The informal 
economy covers a wide range of activities, some legal and others illegal, including tax 
evasion, unpaid economic activities undertaken for the household or friends, the criminal 
economy or any profitable activity undertaken outside of legal obligations.  Employers 
exploit the lack of alternatives available to immigrants by using clandestine workers who are 
cheaper and more flexible than legal labour.  Illegal labour often corresponds to illegal 
residence and this is also reflected in the crime statistics: the number of resident immigrants 
sentenced in Switzerland is 1.3 times higher than among Swiss citizens of the same age and 8 
times higher among asylum seekers, the differential here mainly due to infractions of the 
Federal Law on the Stay and the Establishment of Immigrants.  Asylum seekers and refugees 
in Germany cannot work without a work permit; in Switzerland they must wait for three 
months from filing the application, and in both cases they therefore often become hidden, 
illegal labour.  Immigrants from outside the EU, for example Turks in Germany have limited 
conditions of residence in the EU and can easily become illegal workers due to pressure to 
engage in atypical employment.  Homeworking is increasingly common, but often crosses 
borders into illegality with respect to safety conditions and rates of pay or because the 
income is undeclared.  The Netherlands emphasises the vague distinction between the 
informal and formal sectors, which means that legislation can be difficult or unfavourable to 
enforce, but it appears that those who profit most from the informal economy are young and 
well-skilled, rather than illegal workers with little education, who are also forced to the lower 
end of the informal economy.                                                                                                                                                      
A rise in immigrant entrepreneurship is evident in virtually all of the partner countries.  Faced 
with a lack of employment options, self-employment can be interpreted as a way to avoid 
exclusion in the labour market; the fact that the levels of self-employment, especially 
amongst minority groups, increases with a rise in unemployment would appear to illustrate 
this.  Immigrant communities and minority groups are able to take advantage of social 
networks (e.g. family labour) and ethnic niches in the economy (e.g. halal food), although 
many have expanded considerably beyond the ‘ethnic economy’.  This implies that although 
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ethnic enterprises may become established through exploiting an ethnic niche, they are not a 
marginal segment and can “play an important bridge function between sending and receiving 
countries in economic, political, social and cultural terms”. (Germany, p40).  The French 
report suggests that discrimination comes into play particularly at the threshold of the world 
of business and immigrants therefore retreat into sectors such as shop keeping and restaurants 
to cope with exclusion.  Small firms are favoured by the rise of the service sector and the 
growth of the financial sector and immigrants are able to take advantage of opportunities in 
self-employment in small businesses which can meet unstable demand, and necessitate only a 
small amount of capital, in addition to using family labour resources.  The development of 
ethnic enterprises in Italy is credited to gaps left by native Italians in, for example, productive 
craftsmanship and services.  The Dutch report, however, also highlights similarities between 
migrant and non-migrant entrepreneurs based on age, education levels and (low) participation 
of female entrepreneurs.  They suggest that cultural background is only one aspect pertinent 
to small enterprises, concluding that the high percentage of ethnic enterprises is due rather to 
long-term unemployment of minorities.  The main impetus for self-employment among 
minorities in the UK was found to be unemployment, underemployment, job dissatisfaction 
and blocked opportunities, with racism being seen as a significant factor. 
Activities of first generation or recent immigrants are most often confined to the types of 
employment enumerated above.  Career paths of subsequent generations and of younger 
immigrants with higher levels of education tend to be more diverse and more evenly spread 
across different sectors of the labour market.  It is apparent, however, that even with native 
language skills and educational qualifications, difficulties are still experienced by Muslims in 
Europe in terms of employment.  The micro level studies of the career paths of Muslim 
women illustrate some of the problems experienced and issues of importance to Muslim 
women and employment. 
3. Muslim women and employment 
In focusing on Muslim women and employment, the project explores connections between 
gender, marginality, Islam and work.  In general, the research concludes that Muslim women 
are more marginalised in society than men, due to a combination of different factors, but sees 
increasing participation in the labour market despite obstacles.   Many of the difficulties 
Muslim women face in the labour market are the same as for Muslim men, comprising 
racism and religious discrimination, the lack of secure, full-time positions available, lack of 
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language skills and qualifications in some cases, high levels of unemployment, restrictions of 
immigration policies etc.  The growth of the service sector has resulted in lower 
unemployment levels for Muslim women than men due to increased opportunities in this 
sector, albeit in very low-paid and insecure employment.  However, there is a much higher 
concentration of women, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in part-time employment, work 
associated with lower pay, lower status and fewer possibilities for promotion. In addition 
they face the sexual division of work and gender discrimination in the labour market.  As the 
French report highlights, “Being a working woman, who is also an immigrant and a Muslim, 
provides three possibilities for discrimination in the labour market and three areas of 
vulnerability in such a market” (p 4).  The specific employment choices, career paths, types 
of work undertaken and work preferences of the women interviewed for this project are 
shown to be extremely diverse and varied depending on levels of education, qualifications, 
length of time spent in the partner country, nationality, age, culture, generation, family 
responsibilities and relationship with Islam.  The life histories that make up part of this 
project illustrate the extent of the marginalisation of Muslim women in Europe and describe 
their different ways of coping with social exclusion due to their ‘Muslimness’.   A wide 
variety of women participated in the interviews, of different ages, nationalities and levels of 
education; some who were born in the partner country and others who were recent 
immigrants, in order to gain a more complete picture of the lives of Muslim women in 
Europe.  
Inequality and segregation in the labour market is often based on nationality (those women 
with citizenship of the host country have access to a greater number and variety of jobs), 
education (qualifications from the country of residence lead to a greater possibility of 
professional integration), language skills (native language skills also grant access to a higher 
status jobs) and relationship to Islam (headscarf wearing women find themselves 
discriminated against in secular states).  A combination of all these factors is more likely to 
lead to reduced opportunities, lower incomes and marginalisation from the labour market and 
society.   
As a consequence of the type of employment engaged in, the women interviewed had 
varying relationships to their work, ranging from a way to provide financially for the 
household, or a means of earning extra income, to a means of attaining fulfilment, 
opportunity and independence.  Those in the latter category, unsurprisingly, are younger, 
more educated and with the most stable employment. 
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The part-time, ‘flexible’, temporary, casualised labour described above, seems to be more 
common amongst Muslim women.  In France, Muslim women frequently hold jobs in the 
‘mobile tertiary sector’, comprising work such as private or domestic service and shop-
keeping; only 16% are salaried employees in the public sector with its associated benefits.  
When difficulties are encountered in seeking employment, for example racism or religious 
discrimination due to names or wearing headscarves, women from several countries 
described how they must resort to informal networks and contacts in order to secure work.  
This requires a high degree of initiative, determination and flexibility.  Some women reported 
that they did not wear a headscarf due to fear of discrimination or inability to find work; 
others searched for alternative types of employment, for example homeworking, self-
employment, social or youth work (France, Germany, UK).  Policies to create opportunities 
for Muslim women have failed due to assumptions that have been made and a lack of 
consultation.  In the Netherlands for example special employment projects for immigrant 
women focused on domestic care and service industries, eliciting little response.  Once in 
work, some women reported anti-Muslim sentiments or racist attitudes of their employers or 
colleagues.  Most, though not all, are able to take time off for religious holidays, although 
this is either negotiated or taken as annual leave, rather than taken for granted. 
The responses of the Muslim women interviewees to discrimination are varied.  In Belgium 
for example, some of the women, on discovering that their position as immigrants would 
always determine the limits to their achievements, make a significant personal effort to move 
outside the immigrant community in order to be treated as Belgian women.  They refuse to 
be restricted to the ethnic labour market and strive to be recognised as professionals, even 
though they realise it is easier for them to find work in these sectors.  Others, however, 
struggle to neutralise the effects of this categorisation by acting as spokespeople for their 
communities.  They publicly condemn the discrimination shown to them and their families 
and fight for equal treatment.  Younger, headscarf wearing women aim to be accepted by 
society as Belgian Muslims and stress their right to practise their faith and participate fully in 
society.  
Muslim women often find themselves in a position particularly vulnerable to discrimination 
due to their visibility if they wear a headscarf.  A common sentiment was expressed in 
several reports that “women wearing a headscarf are regarded as champions of an ideology 
that is incompatible with the basic principles of democracy” (Germany, p49).  The headscarf 
in the west is seen as a reactionary symbol of tradition and oppression, of sexual inequality 
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rather than an identity marker of their faith that they freely adopt. This can provoke a variety 
of reactions to the women concerned from hostility, to a desire to ‘emancipate’ (Germany, 
Switzerland) or ‘save’ the women from their patriarchal communities (Belgium), to 
discrimination on this basis in employment.  The ‘neutrality’ of values in secular states 
causes the paradoxical discrimination by employers against women wearing headscarves, 
particularly in education or occupations involving substantial contact with the public.  This 
conditions to a large extent the types of employment available to Muslim women, or the 
types of employment they will themselves consider.  For example, it is for this reason that 
some Muslim women choose to be self-employed (for example a young Muslim woman in 
Germany who, after countless attempts to secure employment where she was always asked to 
remove her scarf, eventually started a community newspaper) or to work from home (for 
example many Muslim women of Pakistani origin in the UK who work at home sewing 
garments for the textile industry).   Whereas non-practising Arab women working in 
Switzerland felt the labour market was open to all, women wearing headscarves have found 
the headscarf to be ‘incompatible’ with the labour market.  Similarly, some Pakistani Muslim 
women in the UK held the belief that with adequate skills and qualifications, Muslims will 
not face discrimination in the labour market, but women wearing headscarves who have more 
contact with the community all condemn racist attitudes and comments towards them.  
Muslim women of Turkish origin living in Germany face the additional challenge to their 
choice to wear headscarves, as the issue is also fiercely debated in Turkey.   Headscarves 
have become a self-conscious decision, particularly for women from the younger generation.  
Where for the older generation the headscarf is traditional, for younger women it represents 
greater freedom.  They feel constantly challenged to defend their choice and justify their 
views, which has lead them to acquire an in-depth knowledge of Islam and the Koran and a 
new self-understanding (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands).  In Germany, women known 
as ‘veiled feminists’ demand positions in political parties, criticise male interpretations of 
Sunna and patriarchal structures and deem gender-specific spatial segregation unnecessary.  
Ironically, protests have lead to increased participation of pro-Islamic women in society and 
politics.  Muslim women in the Netherlands have protested at the pressure on them to 
become ‘emancipated’, stressing that “’modernisation’/emancipation is not the same as 
westernisation or ‘Dutchification’” (Netherlands, p20).  In Belgium, the young headscarf 
wearers feel that their identity is challenged and their own responsibility goes unrecognised.  
They also feel that they are seen as a collective by Belgian society rather than as individuals 
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and are more likely to be considered ‘fundamentalists’.  On the contrary, their status as 
Belgian citizens, they believe, gives them the right to express their faith publicly and to be 
accepted as Belgians along with their faith, signalling “the transition from politeness to 
politics” (Belgium, p?).   Headscarves thus, in certain situations, become a political attribute, 
“instruments of reaction to mechanisms of domination, of mobilisation in public, and of 
claiming the right to equality” (Belgium, p?).  Similarly, the older generation of Muslim 
women interviewed in Germany see themselves as ‘guests’ in Germany who therefore ought 
to adapt to the host society, whereas the younger generation see the headscarf as compatible 
with German society: they have a constitutional right to practice their faith, they feel ‘at 
home’ in Germany, and therefore have the right to assert their interests. 
The position of Muslim women in society appears to be quite distinct for different 
generations of immigrants. The first-generation working woman generally works out of 
necessity, with a very limited choice of insecure, low-paid work, such as manual work and 
cleaning.  Women who arrived in the host country to reunite with their families felt isolated 
due to the absence of relatives and social contacts and the lack of language skills, thus 
becoming dependent on their husbands and children.  Women who immigrated as children 
and were educated in the host country may also experience social instability and low status in 
the labour market.  These women all stress the importance of education for their children in 
order to benefit from opportunities in society. 
Women born in the host country, and having citizenship are the most likely to enjoy a sense 
of stability, socialisation and permanence and they hold the greatest variety of occupations in 
society.  Work, rather than being a financial necessity is a symbol of fulfilment and 
opportunities in society.  This group of women are also more likely to be critical of the labour 
market situation, holding the lack of acceptance of a different culture accountable for 
inequalities, rather than assuming that the lack of qualifications or language skills is 
responsible.  Their identity is most often expressed in terms of their faith and the nationality 
of the host country, for example Muslim British women, whereas for their parents their 
identity is based on their nationality, Pakistani Muslim.  The German report likewise suggests 
that self-definition for the younger generation is expressed via culture and religion: although 
links to the country of origin are weaker, links to Islam become stronger in order to “achieve 
a new cultural justification of their minority status” (p76). Even non-practising Muslims who 
have a greater attachment to their culture of origin assert that Islam plays an important role in 
their lives (Switzerland).  However, there are also young Muslim women who prefer to be 
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discreet in their religious practices (France) or reject an Islamic identity altogether (Belgium).  
Belgium and France both draw on the work of Goffman (1975, 1984), to explain how the 
realisation of their stigmatisation in society affects the identity formation of young Muslim 
women and causes feelings of alienation and marginalisation.  According to a Dutch study 
(Van der Zwaard, 1995), second generation immigrants have a different frame of reference: 
they have a sense of permanence and are more willing to “discuss issues such as gender 
segregation, paternal authority and freedom of action” (Netherlands, p20).  The attitudes of 
the host society to second and third generation Muslim women is ambiguous: they are either 
regarded as doubly discriminated against because they face resistance both from within their 
community and from outside it, or conversely they are seen as having a privileged position 
due to their insights into the western and the migrant/Muslim culture. 
Organisational membership also varies between the different generations.  The younger 
women show a much higher degree of organisation and involvement with unions or Islamic 
organisations, whilst the older women maintain that due to language problems and a lack of 
time this is the responsibility of the younger generations.  However, there was also 
considerable uncertainty among many of the women, young and old about the effectiveness 
of such organisations and their ability to reflect their interests. 
Muslim women also face discrimination on the basis of their gender.  As with many non-
Muslim women, they must cope with a ‘double day’ of work plus domestic and family 
responsibilities.  Paid work is often the subject of negotiation within the family, particularly 
concerning the type of work that can be undertaken and the hours worked.  First-generation 
Muslim women of Turkish origin in Germany complain that the negative attitude of Turkish 
men towards their work limits their choice of occupation.  These differing cultural norms also 
affect the type of work Muslim women are occupied in, for example it is more common for a 
woman to work in Turkey than in Morocco, and correspondingly, there are more Muslims of 
Turkish origin working in the Netherlands, than those of Moroccan origin.  Muslim women 
in both the UK and in the Netherlands assert that Islam is no barrier to women working.   
Dutch research has determined two ‘emancipation models’: an orientation towards work and 
an orientation towards care.  Rather than being dependent on nationality, religion or 
immigrant status, socio-economic position was found to be a major determinant.  Dutch 
women with young children from low socio-economic backgrounds also fit into the model 
‘orientation towards care’.  Low wages do not pay for childcare, and women in this position 
are therefore unable to take paid work.  Muslim women of Pakistani origin working as home-
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workers in the UK cite disadvantages inherent in home-working very similar to those 
experienced by white British women home-workers: long hours for low pay, with no benefits 
or security and the stress of combining work with child care and domestic tasks. The reasons 
for undertaking this type of work are also replicated, in terms of child care and the 
responsibility for taking care of the household, in addition to the reluctance on the part of 
their husbands for them to take paid work outside the home.  Pakistani Muslim women 
however, particularly first-generation, face the additional disadvantages of a lack of language 
skills and educational qualifications, and they tend to be concentrated in the lowest-paid jobs.  
Yet younger, second- and third-generation Muslim women with the advantages of language 
skills and qualifications, still experience racism in the labour market, leading to their 
effective exclusion from many sectors of the economy.   
Conclusions 
Muslim women thus face discrimination on three counts: on the basis of religion, gender and 
nationality, which combined cause marginalisation and social exclusion.  The increased 
insecurity and flexibility of the job market has only served to amplify existing inequalities.  
The different responses and coping strategies of the Muslim populations in Europe are 
diverse; the emergence of Muslim voices in Europe therefore will also reflect a variety of 
interests and agendas, dependent on itinerary, social position (Belgium) and cultural 
background (Netherlands).  An acceptance of the diversity of cultures in Europe is strongly 
advocated by the partner countries, which rather than merely tolerating the presence of 
Muslims in Europe, could provide opportunities for the most vulnerable sectors and enable 
society to benefit from their presence.  Project recommendations address social, religious and 
institutional representation of Europe’s Muslims. 
The reduced social role of the state has adversely affected the levels of security of the poorest 
members of society, disproportionately affecting Muslim and immigrant populations.   
However, the expansion of the ‘new Muslim middle class’, composed of young, working 
Muslims could move towards ensuring the cohesion and momentum of the Muslim 
community (France).  Also essential, particularly concerning Muslim women, is to ensure 
increased employment alternatives, for example by child care provision, or relevant and 
accessible women-only training courses and to provide legal protection in the workplace to 
minimise exploitation by employers (UK) and eliminate discriminatory hiring practices and 
reform labour laws (Belgium).  This may involve the dissemination of appropriate 
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information, or creation of advice centres with suitably qualified support workers who are 
able to access and gain the confidence of the Muslim community.   In respect to this, public 
awareness is also important, as the Belgian report highlights.  There is a need to distinguish 
racism from Islamophobia in order to reduce religious as well as race discrimination.   
Across Europe, the media is repeatedly charged with inciting religious discrimination 
through negative portrayals of Islam.  Greater knowledge and sensitivity to different faiths 
and cultures would enhance the possibilities for integration of ethnic minorities into society 
and particularly affect Muslim women who often suffer greatest through the visible sign of 
the headscarf. 
Muslim leaders in Switzerland are primarily concerned with the need for: the education of 
Muslim children in the Islamic tradition; the creation of Islamic cemeteries and mosques; and 
official state recognition of Islam. The Federal Commission against Racism (Switzerland) 
proposes new forms of legislation to facilitate the integration of Muslims in Switzerland 
including, a law against discrimination, a law for integration, a law to facilitate naturalisation 
and voting rights for immigrants.  Belgium also recognises the urgency for official 
recognition of the Islamic faith through the creation of a representative body of Muslims, and 
the outlawing of discrimination founded on the wearing of headscarves.  It also advocates a 
broader education in schools, based on immigrant pupils’ cultures of origin and the history of 
international population movements, religions and civilisations. 
The necessity for institutional representation of the Muslim community is evident, as 
Muslims are under-represented in the structures that govern societal interests (Germany).  A 
“comprehensive, holistic migration, integration and minority policy” (Germany, p?) is 
recommended in order to enable steering of migration, support for the integration of 
immigrants and the participation of minorities in political, legal, social and cultural life.  The 
right to vote and stand for office in at least local elections is advocated in the Belgian report, 
in order to recognise the permanence of the Muslim populations in Europe and facilitate 
political participation.  In conjunction with this, simplifying the process of naturalisation, 
abrogating the laws and orders that allow the expulsion of foreign offenders and improving 
the relationship of the law with the country’s Muslim immigrants would work towards the 
elimination of discrimination in the country’s institutions. 
Although a lack of data and existing studies in this field prevent any wider conclusions from 
being drawn, concrete policy recommendations can be made on the basis of the results of this 
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research in order to reduce marginalisation and facilitate integration.  It is imperative, 
however, that further projects and research be carried out to illustrate the full extent of the 
participation, and the changing nature, of Muslim communities in Europe.   
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary concern and focus of this Project was the production of an analytical, 
descriptive and comparative account of the different forms and processes by which 
European Muslims (citizens, residents and immigrants) have been socially excluded and 
marginalised. in eight European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Switzerland, The Netherlands and UK).  Thus the research was carried out with reference 
to: 
Ø identifying the different national forms and processes by which European Muslims 
have been socially excluded in each of the eight countries; 
Ø producing a 'European' social map of the complex and diverse mechanism which have 
generated socio-economic and cultural conditions within which European Muslims 
have experienced a progressive process of marginalisation leading to economic 
deprivation and various forms of social and cultural disadvantage; 
Ø identifying those trans-national, European 'pathways' which have contributed to these 
forms of social exclusion; and 
Ø identifying both national and European policies that aim to combat social exclusion in 
general and with regard to European Muslims in particular. 
A compilation of the scientific findings can be subdivided into two main categories:  
1. trans-national characteristics; and  
2. particular specificities identified in some of the countries under investigation.   
The trans-national characteristics can be summarised under five major headings, and will 
constitute the focus of this introductory section. 
First, demographics - the quantification of Muslims in Europe: The primary problem 
here was the identification of the Muslim population in many of the countries, which do not 
have census material that highlights “religion” as a category.  Thus, the research sought to 
review the extent to which the Muslim presence in Europe can be quantified from a variety 
of statistical sources, available in the public domain, which do highlight country of origin, 
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ethnic fertility rates, immigration figures, etc.  The scientific findings therefore consist of 
the ‘best estimates’ of the Muslim population for individual countries in Europe and 
provide a general picture of their size, composition and geography.  The demographic 
quantification was been carried out for 17 countries in Europe1, in order to highlight the 
variety of mechanisms that do exist within the EU in measuring ethnic and religious 
populations.  The findings did highlight the inconsistencies arising from such an inter-
European survey and noted the absence of a single methodological approach.  In particular 
the research highlighted the need to develop a method by which individuals (Muslims) 
within the immigrant and settler communities (first and subsequent generations) can be 
identified.  This part of the research concluded by producing a demographic ‘model’, which 
we believe can be used on a European level to continue to quantify Muslims, irrespective 
of the absence of statistics on religious self-identification.  As to the actual figures we can 
note that they vary from the largest population in Germany (2,589,071) to the smallest 
population in Switzerland (156,000).  For further details see Appendix Two. 
Second, identification - how do we define ‘Muslims’?  The scientific findings above were 
partially influenced by qualitative research, especially among Muslim organisations and 
associations, which provided alternative accounts of the Muslim population that derive 
from socio-cultural accounts of this population.  This research highlighted the contested 
meanings of identifying Muslims and provides possible answers to such questions as 
whether Muslim identity is attached to a cultural or geographical place of origin (as much 
of sociology has assumed) or whether it presumes the profession and practice of the faith of 
Islam.  The research findings suggest that if it is the former, then many of the spatial 
boundaries can be dismissed through European Muslims belonging to the Ummah (trans-
national Islamic religious community).  If, on the other hand, it were the latter, it would be 
very difficult to quantify religious observance, as the question of how to measure the 
practice of a religion is problematic.  As there is no question (except in Switzerland) 
regarding religious affiliation in the various censuses, it is difficult to accurately assess who 
Muslims 'are' except by geographical association.  Thus the research findings highlight 
methodological centrality of both the 'self-ascription'/'self-identification', as a starting point 
which gives space to the expression of a Muslim identity by Muslims themselves, as well 
                                                
1 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. 
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as the more generic ‘political’ identification which derives from the presence and visibility 
of “Muslim Voices” (active associations, organisations, etc.) in different countries.  This 
qualitative research in the eight countries has constituted the basis from which we 
developed the dynamic simulation model (mentioned above), as a possible way of 
estimating the Muslim populations and to make constructive projections concerning the 
rate of growth and different flux variations - death rate, birth rate, reversions, immigration, 
emigration, etc.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third, the identification of patterns and forms of social exclusion at a national, trans-
national and European level:  Research findings indicate that European Muslims 
experience different forms and degrees of exclusion and marginalisation in the eight 
countries, which in some respects is also the case with other immigrant and settler 
populations (irrespective of ethnicity, or religion).  Nevertheless, the research has also 
found that it is also possible to identify certain common categories, in all eight countries, in 
which Muslims (immigrants and settlers) experience particular forms of exclusion: 
Education, Elections and the Political process, Employment, Gender, General legislation, 
Immigration & Asylum, Media, Police harassment, Racial/Religious violence 
(Islamophobia), and Social Welfare.  It is in this context that this report will make a policy 
MUSLIM 
Cultural 
NON-
MUSLIM 
Religious 
(devout) 
Religious 
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recommendation for the establishment of a Directorate for European Muslim Affairs as 
part of a broader Commission for the Future of Multi-Ethnic Europe.  (see 
recommendations below) 
Fourth, the identification of the network of 'social' organisations that represent Muslims 
in each country, including interviews with social leaders.  During the research we 
identified a variety of socio-cultural, educational, religious and other types of ‘Muslim’ 
associations and organisations as well as socio-political and religious leaders with whom 
we engaged in discussing the problems of the exclusion of European Muslims.  The 
research showed that these organisations have complex structures and it is difficult to 
differentiate between social, cultural, religious and political groups since there is a high 
degree of polyvalence.  None of the organisations identified in the eight European countries 
can be seen as exclusively representative of Muslims in those countries and in many cases 
they are too numerous to include in the research agenda (so only a representative sample 
has been investigated).  The research also indicated that the proliferation and broad 
spectrum of these organisations highlights four significant findings:  
1. the increasing institutional completeness and settlement of Muslim communities in 
the EU; 
2. evidence of their increasing visibility in various areas of public life and discourse 
(media, politics, culture, education, social welfare, legislation, etc.);  
3. the problems of representation within the communities (competing and contested 
patterns of representation); and  
4. the different responses by the various States to these organisations (legitimating 
some but not others).   
Furthermore, the interviews with the social leaders (from all levels of organisation) have 
provided access to the internal debates (within the Muslim communities) and have allowed 
us to produce accounts, which do incorporate the different “Muslim Voices”.  Data from 
this research has been compiled to form the start of a pan-European data base of several 
hundred Muslim associations and organisations.  The maintenance of such a database may 
well constitute one of the first tasks of the Directorate of European Muslim Affairs (if it 
were to be established). 
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Fifth, the production of case studies and ethnographies: As a way of deepening our 
understanding of the patterns of social exclusion and especially the processes of re-
integration (or survival strategies) a number of ethnographies and case studies have been 
carried out.  For example, we have ethnographies of geographically delineated Muslim 
communities in each country (Albanians in Athens for Greece, Muslims in Milan for Italy, 
South Asians in Manchester for the UK, etc.), as well as detailed research in the same 
localities of particular concerns (e.g. art education in primary and secondary education in 
Manchester).  These ethnographies and case studies have allowed us to extend our 
understanding of the complex relationship between identity-formation (Muslim Voice) and 
economic, socio-cultural, and political patterns of exclusion and marginalisation.  
Based on these research findings we are able to make certain policy recommendations, 
which we would hope, can influence policy making at both the National and European 
level.  It goes without saying, of course, that the policy recommendations listed below are 
of a schematic and tentative nature and we welcome the opportunity to discuss them at 
greater length with policy makers (National and European). 
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
1. The organisation of publicly funded training courses, conferences and meetings on 
Islamic culture and religion for all those who have a direct or indirect relationship with 
Muslims in the workplace (for example, teachers, etc.); 
2. The establishment of a national commission to carry out the revision of school 
textbooks in order to eliminate to stereotyped use of words and images referring to 
Muslims and Islam; 
3. The revision of curricula in schools which exclude or denigrate the histories, religion 
and cultures of Muslim peoples; 
4. The encouragement of fairer representation in State organisations (for example, the 
judicial system, policing, etc.). 
5. The establishment of a national watchdog commission, in each EU country, to monitor 
the media in order to eliminate to stereotyped use of words and images referring to 
Muslims and Islam; 
6. To facilitate access to national and local broadcast media by Muslim organisations; 
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7. The recognition and inclusion of Islamic religious observance in all areas of public life 
(the workplace, education, etc); 
8. The development of socio-economic ties between Muslim communities and the varying 
national authorities to create better links with those communities' country of origin; 
9. The promotion of financial support for Muslim socio-cultural and religious associations 
(for example, Mosques); 
10. The recognition of religious discrimination as an integral factor in the application of 
equal opportunities legislation. 
11. The development of awareness within State funded organisations of the specific needs 
and requirements of Muslim communities. 
 
AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 
1. The establishment of a Commission for Religions in order to undertake cultural and 
information campaigns on religious matters in Europe; 
2. The consultation with Islamic socio-cultural organisations by the EU representatives in 
order to create increased awareness of their concerns. 
It is possible at this stage to group these diverse recommendations and to make a single 
policy proposal for further discussion.  This is the focus of the following section, which 
will discuss in some detail the basis for the proposal to establish a Directorate for 
European Muslim Affairs as part of a broader Commission on the Future of Multi-
Ethnic Europe.    
Research undertaken by the 'Muslim Voices' research team has identified a number of areas 
in which the European Union is advised to take action.  For the purposes of this research 
project report we would like to propose that these recommendations be approached under 
the umbrella heading of: establishing a Directorate for European Muslim Affairs as part 
of a broader Commission for the future of Multi-Ethnic Europe. 
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Thus, our specific policy recommendation is that the European Union take adequate steps 
to establish a Commission and within it a Directorates whose purpose will be twofold: 
Ø to continue to collect data, update existing databases and record the various ways in 
which European Muslims are socially excluded and marginalised (e.g.Islamophobia); 
and 
Ø to work closely with policy makers at the European, national and regional levels in 
order to initiate strategies and policies to combat exclusion, discrimination and 
especially Islamophobia. 
It is particularly important to note that our specific policy recommendation, although 
focusing on the European Muslims who are the object of this research project, envisages 
that it be established as part of a broader Commission whose object will be to monitor all 
forms of exclusion and discrimination experienced by the variety of ethnic, cultural and 
religious social groups in Europe.  The establishment of a Commission and its various 
Directorates at a broad European level would serve, primarily, to acknowledge that the 
problem of Islamophobia, among others, is one that affects Europe as a whole and not one 
or two individual nations or states.  This approach is important as it would ensure that the 
European Union itself co-ordinates and establishes policy in this area.  Such an 
investigation, however, would be more effective if it adopted a 'trickle-down' approach, by 
which the particularities of each member state and the regions within those states were 
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acknowledged and accommodated by the application of a structured investigation.  This 
would ensure that regional findings feed into state findings, which in turn would feed into 
EU policy.  In this way, any recommendations that the EU makes would be extensively 
informed and would be able to acknowledge and address the specificities and generalities 
that exist in EU member states and regions.  This would produce a broad policy that is 
constructively applicable to 'Europe' as well as individual nations.  
This Commission would work most effectively if it structured its activities and its 
investigations at three levels:  
1. European Union; 
2. European Union Member States; and 
3. European Union Regions 
This suggestion for a policy initiative s presented in a schematic form in the diagram that 
follows.  This also completes the introductory part of this section.   
The substantive part of the section then proceeds to rely upon research findings in order to 
consolidate the argument that supports our policy recommendation.  Furthermore, the 
substantive section that follows also provides additional information, which can be used to 
refine and develop specific and targeted policies at either the national or, the European 
level.  Finally, the substantive section starts with a brief and schematic discussion of 
Islamophobia, which we also feel is a term that needs to enter the policy vocabulary. 
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Islamophobia 
Islamophobia is manifested in many different forms and in many different areas.  The core 
aspects of this phenomenon have been identified by an organisation in the United Kingdom 
called The Runnymede Trust (hereafter referred to as 'The Trust') and they provide a 
useful starting point for any investigation into Islamophobia and its consequences.2 
The term 'Islamophobia' is relatively new, although it has been in use now for 
approximately ten years.  The term encapsulates an identifiable phenomena in Europe, 
namely that of a fear or hatred of Muslim peoples and Islam which manifests itself in 
various forms of discrimination.  In the United Kingdom, The Trust adopted the term when 
it published a consultation paper in 1997 asking organisations, groups and individuals to 
comment on the phenomenon, which it perceived to be on the rise.  The Commission 
established to evaluate 'Islamophobia' identified a number of issues that it held to be areas 
in need of analysis and perhaps policy intervention.3  The 'Muslim Voices' project team, in 
formulating the following recommendations under the broader rubric of Islamophobia, 
draws upon the work of The Trust but felt that there were areas and issues (both 
theoretically and structurally) that needed further attention and elaboration.  
It must be stressed from the outset, however, that Islamophobia differs from other forms of 
discrimination, in that the discourse that has developed about Islam and Muslims is highly 
politicised in an international arena in a way that social and political discourses about 
                                                
2 Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All, Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims 
and Islamophobia, was published in 1997. 
3 The questions circulated by the Runnymede Trust and about which organisations were invited to submit 
responses were as follows: 1. Legislation on Discrimination - Should there be new legislation to make 
discrimination on religious grounds unlawful in Britain?   2. Legislation on incitement to religious hatred - 
Should there also be new legislation to make incitement to religious hatred unlawful in Britain?  3. 
Participation and inclusion - What measures should be undertaken to ensure that British Muslim people can 
and do play a full part in political, intellectual, economic and cultural affairs?  4. Education - Are new policies 
and approaches required in the education system?  5. The media - Should guidance be provided for the media 
on the presentation and discussion of sensitive issues such as Islamophobia?  If so, what should the guidance 
contain, and by whom would it be issued?  6. Employment - Should guidance be provided for employers on 
confronting and reducing Islamophobia?  If so, what should the guidance contain, and by whom would it be 
issued?  7. Responsibilities in non-Muslim faith communities - What are the distinctive roles and 
responsibilities, in relation to addressing Islamophobia, of opinion-leaders in non-Muslim faith communities?  
8. Responsibilities in Muslim communities - Do opinion-leaders within Muslim communities have distinctive 
roles and responsibilities in relation to addressing Islamophobia?  9. Confidence-building - What practical 
confidence-building measures are required, both within Britain and in British foreign policy? 
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other religions and peoples has not.  Thus, it must be emphasised that Islamophobia has 
been identified as a form of discrimination that is distinct from racism, sexism, 
xenophobia, etc. 
The main identifying features of Islamophobia can be summarises as follows: 
Ø the perceived emergence of an 'Islamic threat', nationally & internationally 
Ø an extension of xenophobia and racism to religious hatred 
Ø the perception of 'otherness' for Muslim peoples, communities & nations 
Ø the exclusion of Muslim viewpoints from 'mainstream' debates 
 
1. In recent political debates we can identify the emergence of a so-called 'Islamic threat'.  
It can be argued that Islam has replaced the threat of communism to Western societies, 
and Islam (specifically manifested in Islamic 'fundamentalism') is now perceived to be 
the 'enemy' both without and within.  Numerous articles have been devoted identifying 
the impending Islamic threat of being either 'swamped' by Muslims, with an inevitable 
'clash of civilisations' (see, for example, Samuel Huntingdon's paper in Foreign Affairs, 
1993) or conversely that Westerners will be killed in terrorist attacks perpetrated by 
Islamic militants.  
2. Islamophobia in Britain is undoubtedly often combined with racism and xenophobia as 
many Muslims come from non-white communities and are perceived to have an 'alien' 
culture.  Existing laws to combat racial discrimination, however, are often proving 
inadequate in combating religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred.  
3. Muslim communities are often perceived to be completely different from other 
communities, they thus typify a sense of 'otherness'.  Consequently, stereotypical 
perceptions of Muslim peoples, communities and nations have developed which place 
Muslims and non-Muslims on a binary table of opposites.  For example, Muslims, it is 
argued, mistreat and discriminate against women, whereas other religions and cultures 
have outgrown patriarchy and misogyny; Islam is perceived as a monolithic faith that 
does not tolerate debate or discussion, whereas other religions and communities 
supposedly have healthy internal debates and encourage diversity. 
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4. Islamophobia is also present in the dismissal of criticisms made by Muslims of Western 
cultures and societies.  Such contributions to general cultural, social and political 
debates, which have been put forward by Muslims, are rarely taken seriously.  This 
exclusion and non-recognition of the works of Muslim scholars' ideas results in the 
exclusion and marginalisation of a Muslim perspective. 
There is evidence that anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments are accepted as being 
'natural' and 'unproblematic'.  Similar to 'common sense' racist attitudes, anti-Muslim views 
are expressed as though they were normal and writers continue to demonise Islam in both 
tabloid and 'quality' press and other literature.  Further, developments or events in countries 
such as Afghanistan or Iraq are seen as being representative of Islam and Muslims in ways 
that developments in Christian countries would not be interpreted as representative of 
Christianity. 
The consequences of these various manifestations of Islamophobia are wide ranging and 
affect Muslims at both the level of the individual and at the level of community.  The 
following sections will address various areas that a Commission and Directorate may wish 
to consider 
Problems and Criticisms 
The purpose of these recommendations is to encourage the European Union to consider 
establishing a Commission to investigate the causes and effects of among other matters, 
Islamophobia in Europe and to formulate the ways by which this form of discrimination 
can be tackled.  There are, however, problems and dangers that should be avoided when 
attempting to formulate a balanced account of the nature of Islamophobia in Europe. 
The establishment of a Commission to deal with Islamophobia elicited very positive 
responses and immense support in the United Kingdom, especially from Muslim 
organisations and individuals.  Many organisations welcomed the initiative to investigate 
the extent of anti-Muslim feeling in Britain, however, if the disturbing rise in anti-Muslim 
activities is to be tackled it must be acknowledged that Islamophobia is a European-wide 
problem and not particular to the UK.   
The issue of representation must be carefully assessed, as inadequate consideration of 
whose interests are being addressed is crucial to the success and applicability of any 
findings and subsequent policies.  The membership, therefore, of the various panels and 
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sub-panels of a European Commission and its various Directorates is of paramount 
importance.  Although the panel for The Trust's Commission represented various religions 
and organisations, the Muslim members were not seen to be representative of Muslim 
communities from a 'grassroots' perspective.  It is important, therefore, that any 
Commission and Directorate should not be seen to simply support the 'establishment' or the 
status quo.  Any Directorate for European Muslim Affairs should be able to engage in 
constructive dialogue with a variety of organisations and should draw extensively from the 
many Muslim academics, activists, etc., who live and work in Europe as well as non-
Muslims who have relevant expertise and contributions to make in this area. 
The Commission in the UK was perceived by many people to be displaced from the 
everyday, commonplace experiences of British Muslims.  It is therefore crucial that any 
attempt to investigate Islamophobia in Europe does not reproduce that perception.  The 
inclusion of people from a wide spectrum of experiences and backgrounds would help to 
foster the appropriate confidence within Muslim and non-Muslim communities - that this 
Enterprise is committed to addressing the needs and concerns of Muslims at a practical and 
not simply an abstract or theoretical level.  
A further consideration is that any Directorate should attempt to make its investigations and 
its findings accessible.  The Runnymede Report, as an academic document, had a limited 
distribution and readership.  Although, as a consultation paper, the Trust invited responses 
from any individual or organisation that was interested or had a contribution to make to the 
research, the dissemination of the Paper was not broad enough to obtain a comprehensive 
representation of the Muslim communities.  As such, the establishment of a European 
Commission and specialist Directorates should ensure that it encourages participation and 
contribution from a wide spectrum of organisations and groups.  Further, the consultation 
period should be sufficient to allow organisations adequate time to formulate their 
responses. 
For the failure to do this in the case of the UK, for example, created a situation where 
although one of the main concerns of the Report was to highlight the ways by which 
Muslims are stereotypically perceived, it actually reproduced those stereotypes in its report 
by referring to events allegedly undertaken by Muslims abroad and making reference to 
attempts made by Muslims in the UK to dispel inter-faith conflict generated by those 
events.  These kinds of debates and issues, however, are not raised about events in non-
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Muslim countries and areas and the image of Muslims as members of a monolithic, 
intolerant, global faith is reproduced.   
Finally, although it should be recognised that international events have a profound effect on 
community relations on a national and European-wide basis, the domestic politics of 
Muslim states should not be highlighted as a potential reason for the denial of rights to 
Muslims living in Europe.  Religious and cultural tolerance should be perceived as a global 
project designed to improve relations and foster equality regionally, nationally, in Europe 
and throughout other regions of the world.  Obstructive reference to the Middle East does 
not negate the issue that Islamophobia is a strong and growing force in Europe and that 
individuals, families and communities are suffering because of it. 
The rest of this substantive part is devoted to presenting additional information and 
arguments, which may be used in the formulation of specific and targeted policies.  Thus it 
covers the areas highlighted in the introduction to this section.  Furthermore the details 
provided below also highlight particularities in some of the different member states; when 
if necessary. 
 
LEGISLATION 
"In a multi-faith community such as Europe, people should not be disadvantaged 
because of their faith." 
The formulation of legislation to outlaw religious discrimination and make incitement to 
religious hatred an offence is a complex and much debated issue.  There is, however, a 
strong argument from Muslim and non-Muslim organisations that legislation to outlaw 
religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred is necessary.  Many 
organisations in the United Kingdom have been arguing for such legislation for some time 
and many have been in consultation with the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in 
order to argue for changes in legislation.    
The difficulty of investigating this issue with regards to Muslims is that it is often argued 
that it is difficult to differentiate between racism/anti-immigrant sentiments and 
discrimination grounded in Islamophobia.  The Board of Deputies of British Jews, for 
example, believes that anti-Islamic sentiments are more accurately racist in nature and that 
there is insufficient evidence to indicate conclusively that Muslims are frequently 
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discriminated against as Muslims, rather than suffering racial discrimination.  It gave a 
similar response for the extension of legislation to cover incitement to religious hatred. 
The National Secular Society in the UK was also strongly opposed to legislation on 
religious discrimination, but their view was applied to all religions.  They felt current laws 
were adequate or that the law should be extended to cover all groups hence curbing 
discrimination on any grounds of belief, including secularism.   
An important point to note is that the failure to take adequate steps to combat religious 
discrimination does contravene Article 26 of the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights which states that 'the law shall prohibit any discrimination on any grounds 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status'.  
Muslims within the various member states of the European Union are calling for reforms in 
legislation and under international conventions and treaties; Europe should establish 
adequate protection against discrimination on the grounds of religion in all its member 
states. 
Further areas which should be addressed under the broad rubric of preventing religious 
discrimination are those of freedom of worship, funding for Muslim schools, paid religious 
holidays and application of Muslim Family Law through legislation.  
The laws covering incitement to religious hatred should also offer protection for all faiths 
against blasphemy in line with those that exist for Christianity. 
For the eight European countries involved in the 'Muslim Voices' project, the current 
situation is varied.  Although there are laws that make discrimination on religious grounds 
illegal in some (not all) countries (see Table 1), the implementation of these laws is not 
always effective.  
Table 1. Legislation Against Religious Discrimination in Project Countries:  
Country Law Against Religious 
Discrimination 
Law Against Incitement 
to Religious Hatred 
Belgium - - 
Britain - - 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes - 
Greece - - 
Italy Yes Yes 
Netherlands Yes Yes 
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Switzerland Yes Yes 
 
Researchers in Belgium believe that the category of 'religion' should be added to the list of 
factors to cover this form of discrimination as awareness of this limitation in the law, 
allows racist texts and commentaries to abuse 'Muslims' rather than 'North Africans' thus 
allowing writers to escape penal sanctions.   
In Britain, as in Belgium, Muslims who have been the victims of discrimination have had 
to take their cases to court on grounds of either racial or sexual discrimination, as the law 
does not recognise religious discrimination.  Introducing appropriate legislation in these 
countries would end the need for individuals to tailor their grievances to fit current legal 
provisions.   
In its Second Review of the 1976 Race Relations Act the Commission for Racial Equality 
(CRE) identified several areas where current legislation may need attention: firstly, there is 
no law in Britain that protects people from religious discrimination; secondly there is no 
law in Britain concerning incitement to religious hatred; thirdly, current blasphemy laws 
only protects the established Christian religion.  
It is clear from the available evidence, that despite fairly comprehensive legislation in some 
regions that adequate application of the law is not easily accomplished.  Further, in certain 
areas, such as housing, education and public services, discrimination continues as these 
areas are not yet covered by the legal system.  Clearly, discrimination in these areas should 
be addressed and the Italian parliament, for example, has been discussing a new law to 
address this as well as taking action against 'indirect discrimination'.  Whether this 
discrimination is a result of specific institutional structures or an inability (or 
unwillingness) on the part of authorities to enforce equal opportunity laws is an issue in 
need of examination.  
It is difficult to discern religious discrimination from racial discrimination and xenophobia. 
French, Italian and Swiss researchers, for example, felt that the anti-immigrant feeling was 
more prominent than specific anti-Muslim feeling; many of the immigrants in these 
countries are also Muslims and thus anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments become 
intertwined as anti-immigrant rhetoric is expressed in an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic 
fashion.  This is aggravated by a perception (which is exacerbated by right-wing political 
groups) that immigrants deprive the host population of employment opportunities.  
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Chaaban [France] argues that this kind of disguised religious discrimination should be 
highlighted and that the laws that restrict or prohibit 'strangers' from gaining access to 
national and private societies must be abolished.   
Many of the problems that manifest themselves in 'Islamophobia' and discrimination have 
their roots in general misinformation about Muslims and Islam.  When legislation is in the 
process being formed we would like to suggest that a more concerted effort be made 
(educationally, culturally and intellectually) to raise public awareness about the reasons for 
changes in legislation.  The establishment of practical measures by the EU to outlaw 
religious discrimination, as prescribed in its General Act on Equal Treatment (1994), would 
be a positive step towards tackling misinformation and discrimination.  
Addressing the issue of incitement to religious hatred is laborious, as proving that such 
incitement has occurred is difficult.  The Italians and Dutch point out that this is because 
the line between opinion and incitement is blurred and therefore recommend improvements 
in legislation against incitement.  For both religious discrimination and incitement to 
religious hatred a stricter definition of what this means require thorough and concerted 
investigation.  
To ensure that the objectives of any legislation are achievable and that non-discriminatory 
behaviour is practised on a day-to-day basis, however, a broad campaign designed to raise 
awareness, both for the general public and those in authority, is vital for the production of 
any policy changes.  Italian researchers emphasise that alongside any changes to 
legislation, there should be a parallel campaign designed to encourage people to be more 
sensitive to issues surrounding discrimination against Muslims.  Without this, laws will not 
be enforced effectively.  
 
POLITICAL EXCLUSION 
As well as considering legislation to combat religious discrimination and incitement to 
religious hatred it should also be noted that in certain countries such as Germany and 
Switzerland Muslims and other 'foreigners' are unable to vote and are thus excluded from 
participation in the political arena.  This form of direct discrimination has profound 
consequences for Muslim communities.  Although many Turkish families in Germany have 
been there for three generations (with the second and third generations having been born in 
79 
Germany), they have still not been given citizenship.  The difficulties that many ethnic 
groups experience as a result of this has been documented in the first report by the Ad Hoc 
Committee to Investigate Discrimination Against Religious and Ethnic Minorities in 
Germany (McNair et al, 1997).  The authors also hope to produce another report 
concentrating specifically on the position of Muslims in Germany. 
Switzerland operates a 'three-Circles' policy by which it classifies the rights given to each 
group of people; different permits for employment, housing and property rights, are given 
to each group accordingly.  The first circle, with the highest priority, consists of European 
Union states, the second circle is for non-EU persons from the USA and Canada and the 
third is for non-EU persons from 'far away' countries and thus includes most Muslims.  
People in this third circle are subject to severe restrictions with respect to working permits 
and residency.  A further form of direct discrimination in Switzerland is a labour policy 
that forbids foreigners from taking certain jobs, for example, teaching in state schools, key 
positions in the medical sector, positions of responsibility at federal level, etc.  There is 
clearly a need to reform this policy if Muslims are to be able to integrate into Swiss society 
at social, political and economic levels.  
Although other European countries do not deny the majority of their Muslim population 
citizenship this does not indicate that such groups do not experience exclusion or 
marginalisation.   
For many French Muslims, especially the youth living in the suburbs of large cities, there 
are increasing tensions as a result of economic and social deprivation coupled with negative 
treatment by the authorities, particularly the police.  Second and third generation 
immigrants from mainly North African countries (e.g. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) are 
experiencing increasing levels of discrimination which have intensified following the 
state's crackdown on political Islamic activity linked with bombings in Paris.  Police, 
trained to search out 'Muslim terrorists', are monitoring activities within Muslim 
communities, which includes observing general trends in mosque attendance, rounding up 
and arresting those suspected of political activities linked to Algeria and generally applying 
'anti-terrorist' strategies whenever they feel it is appropriate or necessary. 
The secular state system which resulted from France's historical development of 
Enlightenment and its related conviction to the common ground of rationality has meant 
that "[v]ery visible signs of religious identity are ... almost invariably regarded as 
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disturbing" (Nonneman, et al, 1996: 10). This was borne out strikingly by the 'headscarves' 
affair.  Activities, groups and political parties that are based on religion are prohibited in 
France as it considers itself as a laic state that does not favour religions or prefer one 
religion to another.  
Political representation for Muslims varies at the level of the national and the local.  In 
Britain and Italy, for example, Muslims are establishing themselves in local politics, but 
have not yet achieved the national status (Italy, of course, is moving at a slower pace in this 
area because of comparatively recent immigration).  The leaders in local government have 
brought about changes to the running of institutions such as schools, hospitals, government 
offices (for example, halal food, modifying dress codes, prayer facilities) and are involved 
in consultation with service providers for a more culturally sensitive way of delivering 
services.   
Muslim representation by one organisation may increase the lobbying power of Muslim 
communities and may require governments to listen to concerns voiced through a diverse 
yet united body of groups.  Muslim communities should establish forums to discuss and 
debate matters relating to the community, further, government bodies (both national and 
local) should recognise the presence of these forums and consult with them for information 
and advice about national and local issues. 
Political parties in European countries should be encouraged to use their status to increase 
the representation of Muslims in their own organisations as well as other public bodies.  
Where possible, particularly in areas with high numbers of Muslim residents, political 
parties should encourage Muslims to stand for office in local and general elections. 
Greek authorities are taking a step towards incorporating a large number of Muslims living 
in Metropolitan Urban Areas into society by legalising the status of various immigrant 
groups within the border of Greece.  This should increase their inclusion and improve their 
access to most public services such as health and education and should allow them better 
social and cultural organisation and representation.  However, this legislation must ensure 
that there is no direct or indirect exclusion of certain national or religious groups and as 
such is not a move targeting Muslims directly but indirectly.  Until the authorities recognise 
that Muslims as a group are distinct from 'ethnic minorities' any changes in policy may not 
actually improve their circumstances greatly.  As the majority of Muslims in Greece are 
from Turkey their experiences are strongly influenced by international relations, that is, 
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Greek-Turkish historical and contemporary relations and foreign policy.  It is essential that 
this issue is separated from the internal problems of the minority group in Greece and that 
their problems are discussed and solved within the relevant context.  
Finally, the recognition of Islamic family law (shar'ia) would also constitute a constructive 
step towards allowing Muslims to participate fully within the host communities and 
ensuring the respect for civil rights.  Islamic legal requirements for marriage, divorce and 
inheritance at present are secondary to those prescribed by the state, and ceremonies have 
to be conducted according to state laws before they are officially recognised.  According 
Islamic laws the same status as national laws, that is, once a marriage ceremony has been 
conducted according to Islamic law (nikaah) it is recognised as a legal contract and does 
not have to be confirmed at a Registry Office, will endorse equity for Muslim citizens.  
Indeed this should be extended to all marriage ceremonies in all religions. 
 
EDUCATION 
Key Points:   
Ø non-discriminatory curriculum; 
Ø dress (tolerance of headscarves & trousers for girls); 
Ø dietary considerations -  halal school meals; 
Ø facilities for prayer; 
Ø respect for non-participation (e.g. swimming); 
Ø respect & observance of Islamic festivals 
Ø -state funded schools (in line with other denominations). 
 
Schools and education provide an important focus for change in terms of combating 
Islamophobia.  There is a strong case to be made, not only for a re-evaluation of 
educational practices for the benefit of Muslim children but also for children of other faiths 
and other minority communities.   
The curricula in most schools is grounded in a very Eurocentric or 'Western' perspective 
which excludes and marginalises the cultures, world-views and faiths of (for want of better 
descriptive terms) non-'Western'/non-Christian or non-'secular' pupils.  All pupils should be 
offered the opportunity to study a curriculum that does not exclude or trivialise their faith.  
Both Muslim and non-Muslim pupils would benefit from a more objective study of Islam's 
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historical, theological, scientific, social, cultural and economic teachings as it may work 
towards fostering interfaith and intercultural dialogue and understanding.   
The formulation of books and classroom materials that do not contain stereotypical 
depictions of Islam and Muslims (as well as other religions) is one initiative that education 
authorities should be encouraged to take.  In this way, misperceptions of Islam can be 
countered and children (and teachers) can learn in an environment that is considerably 
more tolerant of other religions and cultures.  Further, such developments would foster self-
confidence for Muslim pupils.  
Courses in Islam should be available at all levels of education for those students who 
require them.  This can be extended to supporting outreach work by Muslim organisations 
who visit institutions such as colleges, universities, public and private sector organisations 
and other large employers, to deliver short courses or talks about Islam.  This would 
increase awareness of the experiences and problems faced by Muslims and make 
colleagues more sensitive to their needs.  
Provision making for the practise Islam in schools, that is, prayer facilities, dress and 
dietary obligations, are not met by each member state equally.  Britain has progressed some 
way by allowing Muslim girls to dress according to Islamic instructions, non-participation 
in certain activities (e.g. swimming), the celebration Islamic festivals and providing halal 
school meals.   
Switzerland and Italy, especially as the latter is a fairly recent country of immigration, have 
not quite reached the same level of advancement and there are still cases of confrontation 
between schools and parents.  In order for Muslim children to concentrate on gaining an 
education, these issues have to be resolved.  
Various initiatives have been launched in Belgium to foster integration of vulnerable 
populations.  Some are aimed directly at young immigrants, especially in high risk 
localities, to try and combat early school leaving.  An Equal Opportunities Centre has been 
set up to deal with complaints of discriminatory attitudes and behaviour of teachers and 
other school personnel.  Prevention policies to combat social exclusion and insecurity are 
being devised in partnership with various local preventive entities.  The purpose of these is 
fluctuating between helping the young people and keeping potential delinquents under 
surveillance.  
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Confidence building can result from encouraging Muslim pupils to participate in their 
religious practices by welcoming them into the school system.    
One of the main issues that Muslims are concerned about in education is the acceptance of 
state aided Muslim schools, which have not as yet obtained the same status and funding as 
other denominational schools.  It must be acknowledged, however, that whilst this 
provision should be made, the rate at which such schools could be established means that in 
the meantime mainstream education has to be able to provide a non-discriminatory and 
progressive system in which all non-Christians can thrive.  At present, (in the UK) there are 
no State funded Muslim schools.  There are, however, State funded Roman Catholic, 
Church of England and Jewish schools which continue to obtain funding for new 
denominational schools.   
 
EMPLOYMENT 
KEY POINTS: 
Ø unemployment; 
Ø pay; 
Ø respect for religious festivals; 
Ø respect for religious observance; 
Ø dress; 
Ø - career advancement. 
 
Before considering suggestions for guidance for employers to confront and reduce 
Islamophobia, the general situation of Muslims in the labour market should be outlined, for 
example, the patterns and levels of unemployment, types of employment and position in 
various employment sectors occupied by European Muslims.   
Although statistics relating directly to Muslims are unavailable in most countries, using 
ethnic background enables us to gain some idea of overall patterns.  In Britain, for 
example, the recently published report by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) highlights the 
high levels of unemployment among Pakistani and Bangladeshi people (38 percent and 42 
percent respectively), the majority of whom are Muslims.  Of those in employment, two-
thirds of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men were in manual work.  The report concludes that, 
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for both sexes, in relation to whites, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suffer from 'severe 
disadvantage' in the labour market.   
The problem of high unemployment amongst Muslims is one that is need of consideration.  
The recruitment of representative numbers of Muslims, especially in areas such as Race 
Relations, local authorities, public service sectors as well as private organisations, must be 
implemented and enforced. 
Once again guidance, training and raising awareness of issues affecting Muslims in the 
work sphere are needed.  There is also need for monitoring of numbers of Muslims 
employed and at what level.  This will necessitate a code of practice with enforcement at a 
legal level similar to the Equal Opportunity laws. 
A survey conducted by the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) showed that average 
earnings of Pakistani and Bangladeshi males was 68% those of white males and amongst 
people with higher qualifications, the unemployment rate for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
is 10 percent, compared with 4 percent for white people with the same qualifications.  
In the Netherlands unemployment rates among different ethnic groups are still markedly 
higher than the indigenous labour force.  In 1995, unemployment among the four main 
minority ethnic groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) was three times 
higher than that of the indigenous population (Abell, et al 1997).  As well as having lower 
rates of employment, ethnic minority employees find themselves suffering from job 
insecurity and lower wages.   
The evidence from Switzerland would seem to confirm this; immigrant communities have a 
lower than average income compared to Swiss nationals and Muslims (Turks, Bosnians, 
Albanians, Tunisians, Moroccans, Somalis) are more likely to have low salaries, poor 
working conditions, poor insurance and lower educational qualifications.  Unemployment 
among these groups is 8% (40.6% of the total number of unemployed persons in 
Switzerland) in comparison to 3.4% of the Swiss population (Abell, et al, 1997).   
Further, Swiss labour policy strictly forbids foreigners from taking certain jobs, therefore 
Muslims are unable to teach in state schools, hold key positions in the medical profession 
and positions of responsibility at the federal level.  This direct discrimination, combined 
with various forms of indirect discrimination (jobs advertised for Swiss citizens only, 
therefore penalising foreigners who have not yet been granted full citizenship) and certain 
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unlawful practices (for example, not employing women because they choose to wear 
Islamic dress, especially the headscarf) have weakened the position of Muslims in the 
Swiss labour market.  'Quotas' are also in force whereby employers can only employ a 
certain number of people from the 'third circle'.  With high rates of unemployment and 
where work permits can only be obtained after finding a job.   
The Equal Opportunities Centre in Belgium reports that 7.5 % of the complaints they 
received about work and employment, included racist attitudes of employers, 
discrimination during the hiring process (for example at the sight of headscarf or sound of 
foreign name), discrimination in promotions and transfers and regulations about time off 
that do not allow for Muslims holidays.  
One important point, which needs to be highlighted, and which is not limited to 
employment, is that of discrimination against women who choose to wear the hijab or veil.  
In Britain there have been several recent cases of what is now termed 'hijabophobia' where 
women have been dismissed from employment after adopting the hijab.  Because of the 
lack of specific legislation that could protect people against this sort of discrimination, 
women have taken their employers to court on grounds of either racial or sexual 
discrimination.  In 1996 the Dutch Commission for Equal Treatment received 14 
complaints of discrimination rooted in religious grievances, some of these were from 
Muslims and of these most were concerning 'women wearing headscarves during work' and 
one related to 'praying' during work.   
The ease with which employers can make provisions should be emphasised.  For example, 
only about ten minutes are needed to perform prayer during the working day, probably less 
time than most tea-breaks and this can be facilitated quite simply by allocating a small 
clean room within the work space or office.  This kind of recognition of religious needs by 
employers will encourage other employees to respect their fellow Muslim workers and 
Muslims will not feel apprehensive about carrying out their religious duties.   
There is clearly a need to eliminate these kinds of discriminatory practices throughout 
Europe, not only for Muslims but also for other religions.   
Any Commission examining Islamophobia in employment should consider the 
establishment of a legal framework from which to challenge religious discrimination and 
also a broad campaign to generate awareness among employers.  Community projects 
already undertake to raise awareness among local employers of Islam and the needs of 
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Muslims, whilst highlighting that Muslims are an asset to organisations and will develop a 
more positive relationship if their needs are met and their faith is respected.   
A few practical measures that can be taken to ensure equity for Muslim employees and 
integrate the workforce and management at all levels are suggested here: 
Ø greater awareness & provision for religious needs  particularly flexibility to allow for 
prayers;  
Ø understanding & adaptability for religious holidays, especially as the precise dates 
are often not known until a few days prior to the occasion (the Muslim community 
must make an effort to reach a unanimous decision on which days these holidays 
should be);  
Ø employers must encourage inter-faith and intercultural awareness amongst employees 
in order to engender mutual respect and knowledge; 
Ø strict regulations backed by disciplinary action for to combat the abuse and ridicule 
of Muslim employees in order to avoid events such a those that took place at the time 
of the Gulf War in 1991 (for example, a Muslim factory worker in Leeds was 
urinated on whilst in the shower, had pigs blood thrown on him while at work and 
was subject to verbal abuse). 
Ø guidance should be sought from a nationally recognised body as to how to welcome 
and integrate Muslim workers into the working environment; 
Ø - monitoring of religious group representation similar to that of ethnic minorities 
within local councils and similarly this should be extended to employers in the 
private sector. 
 
 
MEDIA 
KEY CRITICISMS: 
Ø stigmatisation of Muslims as mainly problematic; 
Ø generalisation of particular incidents to Muslims; 
Ø irresponsible use of charged and negative terms; 
Ø depersonalisation of Muslims; 
Ø perpetuation of the negative images of Islam and Muslims. 
 
Although not all media outlets can be described as hostile about issues relating to Muslims 
and Islam, the national media, and in particular the print media, can often be seen to 
reproduce and reinforce negative images of Muslims and Islam.  The local media, however, 
is seen to more positively reflect Muslims and issues in Muslim communities. 
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The media is an area vital in helping combat Islamophobic sentiment across Europe.  The 
mainstream media, at present, constitutes the most powerful medium for the propagation of 
anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim discourse.  Although all aspects of European life in terms of 
politics, culture, religion, etc. should be open to discussion, debate and criticism, 
representations of Islam and Muslims in the media have been markedly negative.  They 
have focused on issues such as wars, extreme political group's activities, 'oppressed' 
women, etc, thus engendering a conceptual link between 'negativity' and Islam.   
The media needs to be evaluated in terms of its approach to Muslims and Islam and 
encouraged to be much more objective and informed.  Muslims should be allowed a voice 
within the mainstream media in order to provide an alternative account that challenges 
stereotypical impressions and assumptions.  The propagation of negative images and 
accounts of events that simply support these stereotypes can be identified as a major 
problem.  Issues relating to, for example, immigration are often conflated by the national 
media and foster an impression that Muslim immigrants, among others, are 'flooding' into 
Europe.  The media should be encouraged to contextualise its statements about such issues 
and not simply feed into pre-existing misconceptions about immigration, i.e. there are 
numerous migrants from other EU states and the USA and Canada for example, which is an 
issue rarely raised and further, the issue of emigration is also sidelined.  
Experience in certain European countries has indicated that journalists should be trained in 
cultural awareness for religions and cultures outside their sphere of experience.  Guidelines 
relating to this issue should be formulated in order to dispel negative, culturally insensitive 
and ill-informed work.  This is not to discourage debate about issues and events, but, rather, 
to ensure that any debate is not misinformed or unfairly biased - contributing further to 
negative images and perceptions of Muslims and Islam. 
 
INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING 
Inter-faith and inter-community dialogue should be encouraged and supported in order to 
investigate the ways by which progress can be made and relationships improved.  There are 
already many projects underway throughout Europe that involve the participation of 
religious and non-religious groups (Muslims, Christians, Jews, etc) in actively promoting 
understanding and good relationships between all sections of society.   
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The acceptance of Islam as an official religion, the second largest in some countries, will 
help to formally establish its presence.  Muslim communities, and especially community 
leaders, have an important role to play in reducing Islamophobia and supporting inter-faith 
communication.  
Responsible and positive attitudes from politicians and other official spokespersons from 
non-Muslim communities should encourage members of the public to question the 
stereotypes that they are so often confronted with.  
Muslim spokespersons have the responsibility of collecting broad and representative views 
and opinions from their communities and they must attempt to be as representative as 
possible.  
These advancements should be made in the context of an acknowledgement of international 
rights as the rights of non-Muslims and nominal Muslims in 'Islamic' states should be 
considered.  The situation beyond Europe, however, should not detract from the very real 
discrimination that Muslims within Europe experience. 
As ignorance is the main cause of Islamophobic sentiment, it is vital that Muslims take the 
first initiative to reach out to the society around them to dispel the myths and 
misunderstandings.  It is also the responsibility of every Muslim to ensure that they are 
behaving in an Islamic way so that people are able to see Islam and not individual cultural 
or social habits.  
Open criticism by Muslims of the un-Islamic conduct of people both here and abroad is 
seen as a way of helping to decrease Islamophobic ideas.  
Ø The encouragement of meetings and conferences with Muslim representatives and 
promotion of the rights of Muslims to express themselves in the media and 
discussions with the national and European authorities. 
Ø The organisation of exchange programs in schools and universities with Arab and 
Islamic countries. 
Ø The promotion of cultural Associations and provision of financial support and 
human resources for such institutions. 
Ø The promotion of cultural tourism to Arab and Islamic countries and the 
encouragement and support of trade Associations. 
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The social, political and economic models of any society are constantly debated and 
contested in many arenas.  The contribution that Muslims and Islam have to make to this 
discourse should not be dismissed or considered threatening, but, rather, viewed as 
contributing to ongoing debates on an equal footing with the views and opinions of other 
social, political, economic and religious, bodies. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY 
It was noted in several responses that the international events very much influence the 
situation of Muslims in Europe.  The Gulf War is probably the best example that illustrates 
this point.  Although the events were taking place thousands of miles away, Muslims in 
Europe were facing the negative fall out of the War.  
Governments should consider that Muslims have the right to articulate their opinions with 
respect to national and European foreign policy objectives.  More importantly this 
articulation should not be interpreted as necessarily anti-European or anti-Western.  
 
 
 
 
N.B. All the country coordinators and the Project coordinator would 
welcome the opportunity to discuss these recommendations for policy 
formulation at greater length with the Commission.  It is hoped that an 
appropriate meeting can be arranged in order to do so. 
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APPENDIX ONE: 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 
BELGIUM 
The presence of immigrant workers in Belgium throughout the century has depended on the 
country’s immediate economic interests.  Over the past fifty years the total number of foreigners 
established in Belgium rose steadily to total 910,000 (9% of the total population) in 1996.  More 
than a quarter of the foreigners are of Muslim culture.  Belgian immigration policy has constantly 
stratified the labour market between nationals and foreigners.  The 1992 Maastricht Treaty has 
rendered this labour market segmentation even more complex.  It is now necessary to make 
distinctions between the unequal political, economic and legal situations of Belgian nationals, 
European citizens, and non-EU nationals. 
First making up for the repeated shortfalls in manpower by importing cheap, docile labour, then 
boosting population growth in an ageing society, were the major aims of the successive waves of post-
war immigration.  With the closing of the country’s borders in 1974 came the multifaceted problem of 
integrating of cultural minorities: cohabitation, racism, recognising the Islamic religion, the education 
of children, the emergence of a population of naturalised Belgians, and political participation.  Public 
opinion and political circles had called for the rapid digestion of the immigrant population by Belgian 
society as early as the 1930s.  In the 1960s and 1970s public opinion was in favour of the gradual 
assimilation of immigrants.  The term integration came on the scene in the 1980s.  Clear definitions of 
these ideologically loaded terms were often lacking, but presenting the individual immigrant as being 
solely responsible for her/his integration or social exclusion was a constant.  The structural barriers to 
economic and cultural integration were but rarely considered. The xenophobic attitudes exhibited by 
the Belgian population since the start of the century have always targeted the latest arrivals.  While the 
earliest arrivals were gradually improving their social integration and standard of living, the 
newcomers’ abilities to “integrate” and the “unsuitability” of their customs invariably triggered the 
same worried questions.  Even today, Belgium commemorates the long-standing presence of Italian 
immigrants on its territory but the presence of Muslim groups continues to spark controversy.  These 
groups continue to be discriminated against with regard to many aspects of social life, the freedom to 
worship being foremost amongst them. 
Islam became more visible with the development of Muslim immigrant neighbourhoods.  The second 
generation’s advent was followed by problems of health, schooling, and the transmission of the home 
culture.  The decade of Islam’s increased visibility (1975-84) was also that of economic recession. 
Unlike their Italian counterparts, Muslim immigrants thus enjoyed only a single decade of full 
employment.  By the late 1970s they were already encountering a certain amount of hostility from 
“native” Belgian public opinion.  Starting in 1985 great energies were mobilised to build positive 
identities for a second generation destabilised by a chaotic youth.  Delinquency, recurrent ‘riots’ in 
Brussels’ blue-collar neighbourhoods and the rise of Islamic discourse and practices were the resulting 
social phenomena that received the most media attention.  Beyond the law-breaking on which the press 
reported and misunderstood (by the Belgian public) Islamic practices, the second generation 
immigrants sought - not without difficulty - to improve their social integration in the host country.  
Consequently, they were also more vociferously demanding than their predecessors. 
Belgium’s Muslim communities are starting to reach a certain degree of sociological complexity, 
notably with the creation of association networks.  However embryonic they may be, the institutions 
spawned by the recognition of the Islamic religion and development of the press and audio-visual 
media have likewise increased the complexity of the Islamic population’s social structure.  The same 
goes for the recent emergence of elected officials of Muslim origin.  An ideologically pluralistic elite 
stratum of people from different Muslim communities that is participating in public affairs, Belgian 
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political parties, and/or associations and trade unions seems to have started taking shape recently.   
We must stress the ethnic, socio-economic, cultural, and ideological diversity of Belgium’s Muslim 
communities.  The two major components of the Muslim population - the Moroccans and Turks - in 
particular have rather different histories of migration.  Belgium’s Turkish communities are close-knit 
and active.  The social control that the community traditionally exercises over its members, respect for 
rural traditions, and choosing spouses from one’s parents’ villages are still the rule.  The Turks also 
worship together more assiduously, whereas the North African communities appear to have embarked 
on the path of secularisation.  On the other hand, the Turks master the country’s languages less well 
than the Moroccans.  Consequently, the Moroccans do better in school.  This difference carries over to 
“mixed marriages” with Belgians as well.  Thus, Belgium’s Moroccans are further along as regards 
social, cultural, cultural, political, and economic integration than its Turks.  Yet their greater visibility, 
due to their greater number, subjects them to stigmatisation that the Turks are spared. 
Overview of Current Political, Economic and Social Developments in Belgium (1993-1998) 
Despite its small size and population (10.1 million), Belgium is ethno-culturally and politically 
rather complex.4  The population in Flanders, the northern part of the country, is Dutch speaking 
and remains strongly Roman Catholic in nature.  Politics and social policies in Flanders are under a 
certain hegemony of the conservative Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP) and a constellation of 
associations, newspapers, pressure groups, and social, professional and trade union organisations 
that are linked to this party.  Flems constitute 60% of the country’s total population.   
The language of Wallonia, in the southern part of the country, is French.  Wallonia is the first 
region in continental Europe to have been industrialised.  Its population, which accounts for 30% of 
the national population, has a long history of industrial struggle.  The majority of the population 
identifies with secularised, cultural ideas and social and labour practices.  Politics in Wallonia are 
characterised by the dominance of the French-speaking Socialist Party (PS) and a host of socio-
political, economic, cultural, and trade union organisations that are close to the socialists and that 
profess a secular philosophy.5  Belgium’s capital, Brussels, is situated in the centre of the country.  
It is a French-speaking enclave (more than 85% French-speaking) in Flemish territory, but the 
rights of its Flemish minority are recognised.  The Brussels-Capital Region is the only region of the 
country to have maintained its bilingual organisation and administration.  Its population of some 
one million is both bourgeois and working class and is the most secular in the country.  The third 
traditional group in Belgian politics, the Liberal Reform Party (PRL) is also predominant in 
Brussels.  Finally, Belgium also has an official German-speaking minority of some 60,000 people 
who live in the country’s eastern fringes, along the border with Germany.  This very Catholic and 
conservative German-speaking minority has its own autonomous political institutions, just as its 
Flemish and French-speaking counterparts. 
The creation of Belgium as a State in 1830 was encouraged by its powerful neighbours (for 
example, England), with a view to creating a neutral buffer state in a coveted centrally located area 
of Western Europe.  The result was an artificial patchwork of ethnic units with different histories 
and cultures.  In its first century of existence the country was dominated by an alliance of French-
speaking bourgeois, Catholic and liberal forces from both north and south.  Linguistic and cultural 
antinomies soon surfaced, however, just a few decades after the country’s independence.  The inter-
community conflicts heightened after World War II and became the main driving force behind the 
country’s political and socio-economic development.  The Flems complained that they were treated 
as second-class citizens in a country in which French remained the almost uncontested language of 
administration and education.  The Wallonians, however, feared that they would become a minority 
                                                
4 For further general information about Belgian society, its history, political system and particularly its institutions, see 
Fitzmaurice, 1996; Mabille, 1997 and Martiniello and Swyngedouw, 1998. 
5 The ‘political families’, composed of the traditional parties (Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Liberal) and numerous 
social, trade and cultural organisations that are close to them, e.g., associations, trade unions, co-operatives and mutual 
insurance companies, are called the ‘pillars’ of Belgian society (for more details on the country’s political sociology see 
the references listed in footnote 1). 
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and subject to discrimination in the context of the rising population and rapid economic growth of 
Flanders.  It is true that Wallonia’s industries, many of which dated back to the Industrial 
Revolution, were beginning to show signs of obsolescence from the 1950s and the ageing of the 
Wallonian population was already noticeable from the early 1960s.  As a consequence, more and 
more voices were heard in both the North and the South in the 1960s in favour of federalising the 
State.  The three traditional political parties, that controlled almost all of the seats in both houses of 
Parliament (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) since universal suffrage (1919 for men, 1948 for 
women), namely, the Christian-Democratic, Socialist and Liberal Parties, were unable to prevent 
the emergence of various regionalist parties.  These three political families were gradually forced to 
include ethno-linguistic demands in their campaigns and platforms in what appeared to be a rush 
forward to stay out in front whilst clinging to their privileges and pork-barrel politics.  This led to 
the split of each party into Flemish and French-speaking parties, thereby doubling the number of 
parties fielding candidates in the elections.  This did not lead, however, to the disappearance of 
regionalist or nationalistic parties. 
This fragmentation of Belgian politics6 multiplied the number of conflicts and prevented the 
compromise that had hitherto been the norm.  The Franco-Flemish disputes masked and/or 
contaminated all other political discussions and problems for decades.  They engendered chronic 
governmental instability and a large public debt, as each linguistic community demanded equitable 
treatment, sometimes at unnecessary financial cost.7 
Consequently, since 1970 Belgium has undergone a slow but steady string of institutional reforms 
that have turned the country into a federal kingdom that contrasts with its erstwhile undivided 
political and administrative systems.  A series of constitutional reforms (in 1970, 1980, 1988 and 
1993) gradually created ‘community’ executive and legislative bodies, the main powers of which 
are in cultural affairs and education, and their regional counterparts, which have more specific 
infrastructural and socio-economic powers.8  This metamorphosis of the Belgian State, which was 
driven by increasingly serious conflicts between the various ethno-linguistic segments of the 
population, coincided with an international economic crisis that affected the country extensively.   
At the dawn of the 21st century, Belgium is continuing to search for institutional, political and 
economic equilibrium.  The progress that has been made in terms of consolidating the European 
Union, improving the general economic situation and improving public finances, however, has 
provided little reason for optimism.  This progress has been achieved largely through social 
deregulation, which has had devastating effects on the most vulnerable social groups and these 
effects are becoming more and more visible.  For example, the various State bodies in charge of 
areas such as social security, justice, the maintenance of law and order, education, etc, are finding it 
increasingly difficult to do their jobs.  In the 1960s many people believed that a crisis in the 
administration could be overcome by the enhanced federalisation of the political system.  The 
independence that each of the federated components (the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Regions 
and the Flemish, French-speaking and German-speaking Communities - each of which can now 
legislate through binding decrees) finally obtained, however, has not necessarily served to improve 
the general population’s circumstances.  Since the early 1990s, this situation has fostered a general 
                                                
6 For example, voters had to choose from no fewer than 60 party tickets in the general elections of May 1995.  Nationally, 
the six traditional parties (Flemish and French-speaking Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals) garnered 75% of 
the votes.  
7 Belgium has proportionately the highest public debt in the European Union.  In 1997 it stood at 127% of GDP. 
8 In addition to the national/federal, regional and community levels of power, there are two other levels with specific 
powers, namely Belgium’s ten provinces and 589 communes.  Each province has its own government and parliamentary 
council.  The communes likewise each have their own councils in addition to their burgomasters (mayors) and aldermen.  
All in all, a potential 14,150 political offices must be filled by universal suffrage (this is a theoretical ratio of one elected 
official per 500 voters).  However, a considerable number of the elected representatives combine several mandates 
simultaneously.  The Arbitration Court (created in 1980) and the State Council are responsible for ruling on the conflicts 
of jurisdiction that indubitably arise amongst these various levels of executive and legislative power.  Since 1993 the 
Federal Senate also serves as a ‘think tank’ and watchdog over ‘federal loyalty’.  
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feeling of bitterness that is manifested by an ever more clearly perceptible divorce between 
politicians and the people, who are now openly voicing their mistrust of Belgium’s numerous 
executive, legislative and legal institutions on either side of the language divide.  Many observers 
predict that Belgium’s days, even as a federal state, are uncertain. 
The constitutional reform of 14 July 1993 ‘reduced’ the powers of the Federal State, which 
manages 60% of the country’s public resources, to foreign policy, national defence, public security, 
social protection, justice (including the official recognition of religions), and the establishment of 
general economic policy guidelines.  Other powers have been devolved to the regional and/or 
community federated entities.  They embrace areas such as regional development, the environment, 
housing, foreign trade, transport, employment and vocational training, agricultural policy and 
scientific policy for the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Regions’ Executives.  Further, they also 
include cultural policy, audio-visual media, education and social action and assistance (including 
the integration of settlers and their descendants) in the case of the Flemish, French-speaking and 
German-speaking Communities’ Executives. 
In addition to the institutional reforms, other major concerns in the 1990s for the federal 
government have included balancing public finances (with the aim of cutting the budget deficit to 
less than 3% of the country’s GDP and significantly easing the burden of the State’s debt); 
revitalising the economy (by restoring the international competitiveness of Belgian enterprises) and 
modernising the social security system and how it is financed.  The criteria for economic and 
budgetary convergence, imposed on Belgium by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (if it was to participate 
in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as of 1997 and be accepted for the single European 
currency as of 1999), have been the constant leitmotifs of government policies over recent years.  
To this end, the government has had no qualms about risking the trade unions’ wrath on a number 
of occasions.  For example, during the winter of 1993 Belgium experienced its first general strike 
since 1936.  Further, the government also pushed three framework laws through Parliament in July 
1996 that gave it free rein to implement drastic public spending cuts and tax increases without 
having to answer to the parliamentary opposition.  We must acknowledge the government’s success 
in this area, since the European Summit held in Brussels on 2 May 1998 - it is common knowledge 
that Belgium will be part of the ‘hard core’ of eleven countries that will switch to the Euro in 1999.  
It is also true that public opinion, which is traditionally in favour of a united Europe, concurs with 
the government on this point.  It is no less true, however, that the government’s successes in the 
areas of finance and economic recovery, which are rooted in social deregulation and the reduction 
of employers’ contributions, have not dealt effectively with the continued rise of unemployment in 
the country.9 
The cuts in entitlements and public services that have been made in the name of increased 
competitiveness and balancing the State budget have not failed to inflame Belgian public opinion, 
already inflamed by calls for independence issued by a segment of the Flemish political spectrum 
and by a series of political and financial scandals linked to illegal party financing that affected 
almost all traditional political formations in the 1990s.  Despite their declared intentions, the 
country’s political circles do not seem to have abandoned their party-cratic culture and pork-barrel, 
even nepotistic, practices, especially when it comes to the political appointment of civil servants.  
Over the last decade, people have expressed their concern about these practices and the country’s 
future on a number of occasions and by the utilisation of novel methods.  Students and teachers, 
from both the north and south of the country, repeatedly protested about their working conditions 
and above all against the decline in the quality of education.  This led to some lengthy school 
strikes.  A further example of mobilisation of the citizenry was the petition to automatically grant 
Belgian nationality to foreigners who had resided in the country for more than five years.  This 
petition was launched following the general elections in 1991 (which had also been marked by the 
                                                
9 According to the various methods of calculation used, 12-14% of the working-age population was unemployed in 1997.  
This percentage rises to over 20% for the under-25s.  The regional breakdown shows that almost 23.5% of the working 
population in Wallonia and Brussels was unemployed, versus 10% in Flanders.  
97 
first major breakthrough of racist, far-right parties) and obtained approximately one million 
signatures.   
King Baudouin I’s death on 31 July 1993, just a few days after the completion of constitutional 
reform that turned Belgium into a federal state, triggered a huge, spontaneous movement of 
sympathy.  This movement was unanimously interpreted as an expression of social exasperation in 
the face of an uncertain future.  No fewer than 500,000 people went to the palace to pay the king 
their last respects.  This grass-roots fervour indicates how strongly the monarchy continued to be 
viewed as an antidote to political wrangling and separatism, despite the monarchy’s role as a 
symbolic institution.  The strongest expression made by the Belgian population and civil society 
against Belgium’s institutions and political system, however, was yet to come.   
The arrest in August 1996 of Marc Dutroux (an ex-offender who had been imprisoned for 
paedophilia but released on parole), for the kidnap, torture, rape and murder of several young girls 
and the discovery of the bodies of four of his victims’ initiated an as yet unequalled social reaction.  
Public anger was further exacerbated by the fact that the arrest of this repeat offender revealed, 
once again, numerous examples of incompetence, deficiencies and ineptitude that have hampered 
the country’s law enforcement forces and courts for many years.  In order to displace the 
responsibility for these institutionalised inefficiencies, these central state bodies had no qualms 
about making their internal quarrels public.  This only served, however, to present a negative 
picture of Belgium and considerably damaged the authority of the State.  The situation worsened to 
such a state that King Albert II, in an unusual move, addressed the country on 10 September 1996 
calling for an investigation into these matters.   
The process of solving the problems that undermine the functioning of the State, especially with 
reference to the courts and the police force, will doubtless take many years.  The conclusions of the 
high profile parliamentary inquest committee on the Dutroux case that completed its work at the 
end of 1997 have not, as yet, been followed by action, whether in terms of disciplinary measures or 
reforms of judicial procedures and law enforcement.  Recently, in May 1998, when the reform 
process seemed to have come to a standstill, the government invited opposition parties to sit down 
at the negotiating table in order to get as broad a consensus as possible on the police and judicial 
reforms that it appears to be determined to finalise before the autumn. 
So-called ‘white committees’ have been established nationwide (particularly in Wallonia), in order 
to support the campaign for truth that is being fought by the parents of Dutroux’s victims and other 
victims of paedophilia; these committees are also supported by the parents of other victims of crime 
who are, as yet, unaccounted for.  A petition that was circulated at the end of 1996, calling for non-
reducible sentences to be applied to the perpetrators of particular heinous crimes, collected 2.7 
million signatures in the space of just a few weeks.  Finally, on 20 October 1996 the white 
committees organised a mass silent march in Brussels calling for the protection of children.  Some 
315,000-325,000 marchers participated in this ‘white march’, in order to draw attention to the 
deficiencies of a political elite that ignored the people’s needs.  Behind their denunciation of the 
courts, police force, and political circles, the ‘white marchers’ also criticised the erosion of human 
values in a money-dominated world.  A large number of other ‘white marches’, both large and 
small, followed all over the country.   
We would like to end this overview of Belgium in the 1990s, however, on a note of hope.  In the 
midst of the ‘white movement’, Nabela Benaissa, the elder sister of Loubna Benaissa, a victim of a 
paedophile, made a high profile appearance that made headlines across the country.  This young, 
headscarf wearing, Moroccan woman exhibited unusual charisma and maturity as her family’s 
spokeswoman.10  Her exemplary dignity won widespread admiration and induced a definite change 
in Belgians’ attitudes and perceptions of the country’s Muslim inhabitants.  Indeed, Nabela 
Benaissa was awarded the prize of the Belgian Human Rights League in December 1996.  
                                                
10 The Benaissa family wanted to bury Loubna’s body in Belgium, but the lack of Muslim cemeteries prevented this wish 
being fulfilled.  A funeral service was finally held at the great mosque in Brussels before Loubna’s body was ‘repatriated’ 
to Morocco, although this was not her country of birth.  The ceremony was broadcast live on television. 
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FRANCE 
Socio-economic and politico-cultural conditions are of great importance in any interesting study of 
the forms of discrimination and the processes of exclusion. 
In the last decade, major changes are in process following major events occurring in France and 
generally in Europe. These changes have occurred at the political level (the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
fall of the communist block, the Gulf war, etc.); the economic level (the Gatt agreements, European 
economic unification, etc.) and also the issue of globalisation, the effects of which are present at many 
levels: political, economic, social and cultural.As for the Muslim community, we would like to 
highlight an evolution of the immigration model. The foreign labourers who were only temporarily 
working in France are now a population which is being settled through its integration into French 
society.  This has socio-economic and politico-cultural consequences for the community as well as for 
the French State. 
Immigration History: 
Our report examines the migration phenomena in France from the middle of the last century, when 
the number of ‘foreigners’ was estimated to be 379,289 persons in 1851, that is 1.05% of the 
general population; the major part of these migrants was originated from Belgium and Italy (Schor, 
1996). 
The situation has after the First and the Second World War. France suffered heavy loss of life 
(particularly men) and the destruction of a part of its territory. Therefore the French state widely 
opened its territory to migration, and a number of migrants arrived in France from Africa, particularly 
from the Maghreb (in 1954, European migrants constituted 79% of the foreign population and Africans 
constituted 13% including North-Africans). Moreover, in neighbouring countries, such as Italy and 
Spain, an important demographic expansion resulted in overpopulation and contributed to the 
economic crisis. The political problems and the different situations (for example, conflict) in many 
places in the world have constrained some population to migrate towards other countries with more 
political and economic stability. 
Hence, the first migrants arrived from Poland (from 45,000 in 1921 i.e. 2.9% of the foreign 
population to 507,000 in 1931 i.e. 17.5%) (Schor, 1996) and also from South Asia in less 
significant numbers.  
The economic crisis of 1975 significantly restrained immigration to France, other ways, however, 
were opened, for example, family reunification and the migration of students. 
The Islamic (or Muslim) presence in France dates from the first days of Islam (about 615): From 
713 to the end of the 10th century, the military conquest of Muslims in Europe towards Spain and 
France.  In the 11th century, after their military defeat, Muslims returned to the region to trade.  In 
the 17th century, the Mauresques Muslims were deported from Spain and the King of France 
allowed them to settle in France.  From the 1950s, economic and political reasons lay at the roots of 
migration to France.  Before 1975, Muslim migrants originated primarily from rural areas. After 
this date, migration increased from the more urban areas as people travelled to find work in industry 
and the BTP (Building and Public Services). 
With the birth of the second and the third generation, the Muslim presence has opened a new 
chapter in its history as well as in the French one: The transition from immigration to citizenship. 
These changed introduce new politico-economic and socio-cultural factors, and particularly a 
significant progression in the attachment to Islam with the visibility of many cultural activities 
(Mosques, Muslim squares in the cemeteries, veils, halal meat, etc.). This presence has resulted in 
some reactions and an exclusion of the French Muslim community from many domains: economic, 
social, politic and educational, etc. 
Socio-Economic Situations and Demographic Data: 
Some indicators such as accommodations, health, employment, and unemployment are useful to 
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study this situation. 
In the census of the population by Insee (1990), ‘foreigners’ numbered 6.4%. This proportion increased 
to 18.39% in the underprivileged districts and 80.8% of these foreigners are of Muslim origin. This 
numbers illustrates the extent of the social problems experienced by Muslims and the repercussions of 
these problems extend to the other domains: health, education, security, etc. Moreover, if we look over 
the type and the status of housing/accommodation, it is possible to note a discernible difference in 
terms of ‘standards’ between the population of European origin and the population of Muslim origin. 
(55.7% of Maghrebians live in overcrowded accommodation, in comparison to just 0.5% of Italians, 
5% of the Spanish and 11.5% of the Portuguese) [Insee, Enquête sur le Logement, 1988]. 
In terms of insurance cover and medical consultation, 78% of French people have complementary 
insurance, compared to just 57% among the migrants. For that reason, French people are more 
likely to consult a doctor in comparison to the other populations: 6 times per year against 3 times 
for the Maghrebians and no more that 2 for the Francophone Muslim Africans. One of the 
consequences of this is a high infant mortality rate: 12 per1000 for the children of Maghrebian 
mothers, in comparison to 9.3 per 1000 for the children of French mothers. 
In terms of employment, the number of jobs held by foreigners has decreased from 1,346,000 to 
1,304,000, that is to say that 42,000 people have lost their jobs, while the total number of posts in 
France has increased of 4.2%. Moreover, Muslims are to be found working more and more in the 
service sector (cleaning, security, etc) than in the BTP.  In this way it is possible to assert that they 
have moved from a position of relative stability to one of precariousness. We should also note that 
the numbers of unqualified workers stands at 15% for French people and 32% for foreign. 
Furthermore, half of the young active Maghrebiens (15 to 20 years) were seeking employment in 
1992, against 20.1% of the French native youth. 
Concerning the numbers of Muslims, we have used an original technique based on the dynamic 
model and inspired from a systemic approach. We consider the population volume in the form of a 
“stock” with entrance (annual migration, births, conversion to Islam) and exit flows (return home, 
mortality). Thus, our estimation of the Muslim population number is about 3,700,000 persons; not 
far from the scientific estimations (Lochon 1996) that evaluate this number at 4,000,000 Muslims. 
Official Immigration Legislation: 
The modern laws relating to foreigners in France date from the 19th century.  The immigration laws 
have been variable with respect to the economic and political situation. The law of 9 August 1893 
introduced the foreigners immatriculation register. With the rise of xenophobia and the 1929 crisis, 
many laws have limited the entrance of foreigners and forbidden “undesirable publications”. 
However, France encouraged immigration following the two World Wars: Firstly, to reduce the 
demographic deficit, and secondly, to provide solid and docile labourers for the reconstruction of 
the country. Between 1945 and 1980; many residence permits were introduced with respect to this 
and French nationality was obtained much more easily.  After 1981, immigration was restrained in 
spite of the power alternations between the right and the left and the acquisition of French 
nationality became more difficult; however, the law of 17 July 1984 issued a resident permit of ten 
years (automatically renewable (with full right) even if the job changes) to those permanent and 
regular residents who showed their conditions improved. 
Political and Cultural Muslim Organisations: 
The laws for the establishment of associations in France date from 1901 for the French people and 
from 1981 for foreigners. For French Muslims, associative activities started with trade unionism 
defending the Muslim workers’ rights in factories. From the middle of the 1970s, the French youth 
originated from the Maghreb took over by creating musical, theatrical and sportive associations. 
The cultural and religious Muslim associations only began to appear from 1981: today there are 
many thousands of associations of immigrants or their children of French citizenship (Cesari J. 
1994). 
Many important associations are now active in many different domains: social, cultural, cultural, 
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humanitarian, etc. They are all competing to win recognition in terms of the representativeness of 
the Muslim community. However, a co-ordination of all the great associations would seem to be the 
best solution to defend the Muslim rights. 
Prior to the present period, immigrant labourers were primarily concerned with the idea of returning to 
their country of origin, and for this reason their cultural practices and religious premises remained as 
discrete possible. From the 1980s, however, and the birth of the second generation and the renunciation 
to the return contributed to draw the attention of the Muslims to the construction and the claim of 
cultural premises.  Today, Loncon (Sécrétariat de Recherche sur L’Islam SRI mars 1996) estimates the 
number of cultural premises to 1128 (1996) with 8 architectural mosques with a capacity of 1000 
places. 
Processes of Exclusion and Forms of Discrimination: 
To study the discrimination phenomena, in all the forms that it generates, one should observe 
globally the causes and the different origins of exclusion.  We are interested to the expression of 
exclusion in many domains: employment, politics, education and religious practices, etc. 
In the employment domain, many activities are forbidden for foreigners, such as in the public sector, 
national companies, and also some posts like Doctors (Medical activities) (with the exception of 
“deficient” regions and the “difficult” districts. In the private sector, some liberal professions 
(tobacconist’s shops, bar, etc) are forbidden to foreigners. As such, the number of illegal jobs has 
increased, and many foreigns show themselves obliged to accept these positions and so find themselves 
slipping into difficult, humiliating and precarious situations. 
Some sections of the social security cover called “non-contributives” are exclusively reserved to 
French citizens. Furthermore, those workers who leave France to permanently return to their countries 
lose their retirement pension, etc. 
In the religious domain, the Home Office (Ministère de L’Intérieur) manages the Muslim cult. This 
means that Islam and the Muslims, suspected of integrism, can potentially cause a breach to the peace. 
And hence the police should keep an eye on their activities. Furthermore, the Department of Education 
circulars prohibit Muslim girls from wearing the hijab in schools.  Some Muslim erudites and thinkers 
fobidden of entrance to France. Some publications of Islamic books are not an exception to the rule. 
In the political sphere, the secular nature of the State does not allow the foundation of religious oriented 
parties. While all the other religions are organised and well represented by their respective institutions, 
the Muslim community suffers of the politicisation of Islam; and this is at the origin of the dissension 
between on the one hand, the French state and some Muslim organisations (particularly La mosquée de 
Paris: The Mosque of Paris) and the other important organisations on the other hand (UOIF, Tablighi, 
FNMF, etc). The last claim that the representatives should be independent of any interior or exterior 
political influence. 
In terms of law, the period of detention pending trial stands at 63.9% for foreigners in comparison to 
40.1% for French citizens for the same offence. Furthermore, a French citizen is more likely to be set 
free before a foreigner in terms of committing similar or same offences. 
In terms of education, immigrant children (even with French nationality), face many more difficulties 
than their compatriots. While, 27.4% of those who are French by birth and more than 15 years of age 
declare that they are without diplomas, the percentage of those of Maghrebien origin without diplomas 
stands at 68% and 72.2% among the Turks. The social and economic conditions are frequently the 
reasons why children do badly at school. The educational policy has added to these problems. The 
programmes and policies undertaken (ZEP, remedial class, etc) to solve this problem remain 
inefficient. 
Conclusion: 
We have shown, in this study, that the exclusion phenomenon is not inherent to a particular 
category of persons. It can affect all the social classes, but with different consequences. Since the 
majority of Muslims are of working and especially poorer classes, they are more likely to suffer the 
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effects of exclusion more than other communities.  On the one hand, the attitudes towards and the 
representation of Islam increase this exclusion and intensify the levels of discrimination. On the 
other hand, however, the recent visibility of Islam in the public domain has given rise to many 
“wears”. This religion considered as the enemy in the past, is now co-existing with other religions, 
and its impact on the society does not pass unnoticed in social and cultural spaces (particularly in 
terms of culture and clothing). 
 
 
GERMANY 
The presence of a larger number of Muslims in Germany is the result of labour migration from the 
recruitment countries as well as refugees migrating from countries with a Muslim majority. Owing 
to this migration, Islam has become the third largest denomination after the two Christian 
denominations in terms of its membership. Currently, there are 2.8 million Muslims in Germany. 
The 2.1 million Turks form the largest group of Muslim immigrants, which is the reason for Islam 
tending to be more “Turkish” both in its outward appearance and in the way it is perceived in the 
host society. In addition to the Turkish Muslims, there are larger numbers of Bosnian, Iranian, 
Maghreb and Afghan Muslims. Also, there are Muslims of German origin. 
In the first few years following the signing of the recruitment agreement with Turkey, Yugoslavia, 
Morocco and Tunisia, Islam was a peripheral phenomenon in Germany owing to the structure of labour 
migration in this phase. In the sixties, it was mostly single, usually male labour migrants who came to 
Germany and whose life planning was oriented on a return to their home country. For this reason, there 
were hardly any attempts among these people to establish an infrastructure of their own in this phase. A 
change came about in the seventies, when Muslim labour immigrants increasingly made efforts to get 
their families over to the Federal Republic. Owing to changes in the composition of the Muslim 
immigrant groups and a gradual trend towards more permanent residence, there were more intensive 
attempts to create offers catering for these people’s own requirements. 
The Legal Situation of Muslims in Germany: 
The majority of the Muslims living in Germany have so far not acquired German citizenship, 
leaving them in a legally insecure position. Owing to economic developments over the last three 
decades, the legal regulations regarding foreigners have become more and more restricted. 
Following the onset of the oil crisis at the beginning of the seventies and the recession it triggered, a 
recruitment ban was implemented in 1973 to stop any further immigration of workers. When, in 
spite of the recruitment ban, the number of immigrants continued to grow over the following years 
owing to re-uniting of families, it was stipulated in 1981 that it was only children below the age of 
16 who were eligible for this type of immigration. Owing to the high unemployment rate, the then 
government attempted to motivate labour migrants to return to their home countries by introducing 
appropriate measures. These included capitalisation or payment of contributions to the pension fund 
on return to their home country as well as payment of a one-off bonus as a measure promoting 
return. Although the number of non-Germans did decline as a result of these measures between 
1983 and 1985, it became stable again and has since then shown continuous growth. Thus the 
prevention of further migration established itself as the prime objective of so-called aliens policy. 
The reform of the Aliens Law in 1991 resulted in re-uniting of families becoming more complicated 
owing to the introduction of more stringent conditions for granting family members such as spouses 
a visa. For example, proof had to be provided of an established residential status, sufficient housing 
accommodation and sufficient income for the person living in Germany in order that a family 
member could move to Germany to join her or him. Both these legal requirements and the 
restrictive practice of diplomatic and consular agencies aimed at preventing immigration whenever 
it was possible. The reform of the law on political asylum constituted a further measure designed to 
check immigration. It was introduced in 1993, following approval among the then opposition 
parties of a compromise solution to the issue. The latest amendment concerned the introduction of 
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also making visas compulsory for children under the age of 16, which was introduced early in 1997. 
In economic life, Muslims, who come almost exclusively from non-EU countries, are legally 
discriminated against in job placements on the labour market in comparison to native Germans and 
EU citizens. In 1992, a relative improvement was achieved with the introduction of regulations 
making it easier for migrants growing up in Germany who are between 16 and 23 years of age to 
successfully apply for naturalisation. However, the conditions required for a naturalisation of adults 
have not been changed so far. The principle of avoiding dual nationality used to be an obstacle to 
many migrants, and in particular to those from Turkey, to apply for naturalisation. The trend to 
apply for German citizenship nevertheless increased following relevant amendments in Turkey 
concerning conscription or property law and law of succession. Surveys demonstrate that the 
readiness to become naturalised has since increased even though the naturalisation rates have 
remained at a low level. 
The Economic Situation of Muslims in Germany: 
With respect to the employment situation of Muslim immigrants in Germany, the special 
circumstances under which they are living here have to be taken into account. The overwhelming 
majority of Muslim immigrants came to the Federal Republic in the framework of recruitment 
contracts. Since these cases concern non-EU states, the migrants are given second-class treatment in 
comparison to native Germans and EU citizens regarding job placements on the labour market. In 
addition to this technical discrimination special difficulties in gaining access to the labour market 
among the various generations need to be noted that also explain the disproportionately high 
unemployment rate among Muslim immigrants. With Turkish immigrants, it was at 22.5 percent, 
double that among Germans, in 1996. Since the school and vocational qualifications among the 
labour migrants of the first generation tend to be low and owing to many not making use of 
vocational further training offers because of their original intention of returning home, they have 
greater difficulties in finding a new job in the event of unemployment. This applies in particular to 
industrial branches (coal, iron and steel industry) that have been phased out over the last few years. 
General difficulties people encounter at a greater age constitute a further factor. 
Muslim immigrants of the second generation also have to struggle with the problem of insufficient 
school and vocational qualifications in gaining access to the labour market. As children of families that 
themselves have had only poor access to educational facilities, they often lack the objective opportunity 
to promote school and vocational education of their children sufficiently, and in some cases, they also 
lack appropriate awareness. Linguistic competence is the key to later success in occupational life and 
ought to be appropriately promoted. Language problems in Germany are often the reason for children 
being sent by teachers to special schools, which additionally restricts their prospects in their later 
occupational life. Moreover, both the first and the successive generations are faced with the problem of 
discrimination on the labour market. As empirical surveys demonstrate, Muslim youths also experience 
greater problems in seeking a job even if language skills and school education levels are the same. 
Special problems are encountered in particular in the case of women Muslims wearing a headscarf. In 
the case of the Muslim youths, these are the crucial factors for the high unemployment rate among 
them, which is at 25 percent for Turkish youths (1996). 
The Legal Status of Islam in Germany: 
In spite of the freedom of faith, which is guaranteed in principle in Germany, there are mechanisms 
that frequently prevent the religious life of Muslims from being on a par with other established 
denominations. One area in which a lack or a low level of acceptance in society has created 
problems is the construction of mosques. Again and again, there are cases of residents of an urban 
district attempting to prevent the construction of a mosque. As long as the mosques were 
accommodated in other premises and for this reason could usually not be identified as such, the 
existence of the mosque associations caused hardly any problems. It was only when they became 
visible that corresponding mechanisms were triggered. The issue of the acceptance of the Moslem’s 
places of worship becomes even more apparent if the mosques wish to utter the prayer call (Ezan) 
in public. A consensus can be reached in such conflict situations if the parties concerned show 
appropriate willingness to solve the problem. 
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Recognising corporate rights is an important aspect in according equal status. So far, they have been 
granted to none of the existing Islamic national federations, although several of them have filed 
applications to this end. Denying corporate status is often justified by claiming that the respective 
federation only represents a section of the religious group and that there is no official body the state can 
approach. This constitutes unequal treatment since various different liaison bodies are accepted among 
the other religious groups. Corporate rights would, for example, give the Islamic federations the right 
to have a say in Islamic religious instruction at public schools. They would be represented in 
institutions under public law, and they would be legally entitled to religious public holidays. The 
setting up of cemeteries of their own is a further right that would also require corporate status. The 
issue of burial is currently usually settled by graveyards being made available for Muslims in existing 
cemeteries. Often, the funeral can only proceed partly in observance of Islamic funeral regulations. 
The ban on slaughter according to religious rites is also a restriction of the freedom of faith. In the 
Federal Republic, it is forbidden to slaughter animals that have not been anaesthetised since this would 
clash with the Animal Welfare Law. This constitutes unequal treatment since people of Jewish faith 
have been granted the right to slaughter according to religious rights. An Islamic federation has lodged 
an appeal against the ban, which has been confirmed by a Supreme Court ruling. 
 
 
GREECE 
The Greek analysis focuses, firstly, on the Muslim minority in Thrace and smaller Muslim groups in 
the Dodecanese Islands and secondly on the problems experienced by Muslim refugees and immigrants 
living in the Metropolitan Area of Athens.   
The Muslim minority in Greece has two different aspects.  The first relates to the indigenous 
populations in Thrace, Northern Greece (between 100-120,000 according to Greek data, most of which 
are of Turkish origin, Pomaki and Gypsies living mainly in Rodopi and Xanthi), while the latter refers 
to the relatively recent entry of refugees and immigrants from the Middle East, Turkey and the 
Balkans.  The latter converges mainly in the large urban centres, namely, the Metropolitan Areas of 
Athens, Salonica, Patras and Heraklion in Crete.  There is also a secondary convergence of immigrants, 
less important though, to rural areas in Greece. 
The process of social integration is difficult and complex.  This is due to a number of factors.  
Firstly, Greece has not traditionally been a host country for immigrants and has therefore never felt 
obliged to develop a suitable social and administrative structure.  Secondly, the majority of 
immigrants living in Greece today are not legal residents and have in fact entered the country 
illegally.  
No serious empirical work has been undertaken concerning migrants.  According to unofficial 
estimates, Greece has the largest number of undocumented migrants from Albania, Bulgaria and 
Poland.  Concurrently, there has been a noticeable increase in the undocumented workers from the 
Maghreb and central African countries.  The undocumented work force is estimated to number 
500,000, with almost 200-250,000 workers coming from Albania.  In Greece the number of 
documented migrants (with valid permits, expired or awaiting recognition) was, during 1996, 
around 300,000 people.  The majority, however, are considered to be either of Greek origin (i.e. 
from other regions in Greece or second generation Greeks from Bulgaria and Rumania) or have 
refugee status (i.e. Kurdish, Iranian, Iraqi).    
Official Legislation: 
To protect religious minorities against any form of racial and/or religious discrimination, the Greek 
State enacted law 927/1979.  According to this law, all practices that directly or indirectly may 
result in discrimination, hatred or violence against members of a religious community is prohibited.  
In relation to citizenship, however, Greece has been condemned by the European Court of Human 
Rights, Amnesty International and the US Human Rights Report (1991), due to the enforcement of 
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article 19 of the Greek Nationality Law (according to which ‘a person of non-Greek origin who 
leaves Greece with the intention of not returning, may be declared as having lost Greek 
Nationality’). 
In relation the issue of religious/cultural rights, the most serious legislative discrimination concerns the 
right of self-administration concerning the religious organisation of the community, and the free 
practice of religious duties.  The first relates to the prohibition addressed to the free election of the 
Mufti.  However, because the Mufti is both the spiritual leader and the local Judge, (according to Law 
2345/1920, Mekos, 1995), the Greek administration considers it its right to officially appoint him.  The 
second issue relates to law 1363/1938, which was replaced by law 1672/1932 and the Royal Decree 
(20.5 - 2.6.1939).  It stipulates that the functioning or establishment of places of worship requires the 
permission of the officially recognised Church (law 590/1977) and of the Ministry of Education and 
Religious Affairs.  This Law applies to all Greek territory, except the Western Thrace region. 
Socio-Political & Cultural Organisations: 
Minority and immigrant organisations are principally organisations for solidarity and are of a 
cultural and educational nature.  The maintenance of basic national characteristics and customs, 
especially the language, constitute the basic aims of those communities, which have significant 
numbers of members.  As some representatives state, the children of immigrants who have the right 
to education go to Greek schools, where they are in danger of losing their national and linguistic 
identity.  Social solidarity and the maintenance of cultural characteristics, and in some 
circumstances educational activities, are generally the objectives of these organisations.  In those 
cases in which there is no official body for the representation of the country in Greece, the 
organisation may act in part as a substitute for that body.  Only in a few cases are these 
organisations of an official religious nature. 
Discrimination: 
The Muslim minorities in Greece face a complex landscape of social discrimination and processes 
of social and cultural exclusion in Greece.  The historical formation of the Greek nation, the 
subsequent antagonism between the those of Turkish origin (relating to the Ottoman Empire) and 
the contemporary state of affairs (that is, the continual strained relationship between Greece and 
Turkey and the constant fear of military conflict between the two states), maintains and intensifies 
this climate of mistrust for most Greeks.  The results are a range of direct discrimination and 
exclusion against all Muslims, especially those of Turkish ancestry (Interview 1997).  It is well 
known that most state services, the police and job centres, as well as local social services approach 
Muslims with distrust, and there is often a clear intention to impede their settlement in Greece.  
Institutional Discrimination against members of the Muslim minority takes many forms: limiting of the 
possibilities for preservation and creation of religious areas; control of the religious leadership of the 
Muslims through the state administration, (i.e. appointment of the Mufti).  For Turkish Muslims the 
name “Turk” is prohibited in official letters and names of societies etc; loss of citizenship for Turks 
who leave Greece and “state” that they will not return; limited recognition of the studies of members of 
the minority who have Turkish university degrees; and, non-recognition of societies and organisations 
that represent the Turkish minority. 
Employment: 
In order to analyse the employment situation of the Muslim minority in Greece, we have to 
differentiate among Muslims living in the traditionally rural areas of Thrace and the newly 
established migrants from the Balkans and migrant Gypsy populations. 
Muslim men in rural areas often make up the numbers of seasonal workers who come to the 
Metropolitan Area of Athens for short-term employment.  The majority of documented workers in 
Athens are employed in construction (Polish, Albanian and mainly Turkish refugees), tourism 
(Albanian, Polish and Thai female workers), heavy industry (Egyptians, Pakistanis), domestic labour 
(Albanian, Polish, Bulgarian, Filipino women) and the leisure industry (Albanian, Thai, African female 
workers).  Those immigrants without work permits are also involved in similar jobs. 
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Undocumented Albanians suffer low wages, poorer working conditions, longer working hours, 
unfair dismissals, no worker rights and receive no welfare benefits.  The Undocumented Migrants 
experience a “continuous-temporary” situation, where there exist hardships, a lack of housing and 
arbitrary behaviour by the authorities.  
Gypsies may be classified in three broad groups: First, there are the blacksmiths who tend to be 
more permanently established and identify more with the Turkish ethnic group.  The second group 
of Gypsies consists mainly of vendors who frequently move around Thrace and all over Greece 
alone or with their families.  The third group of Gypsies consists mainly of unskilled workers 
without any kind of stable employment.  They tend to live at the outskirts of the city, where they 
have their own settlements (Alan Kouyou in Komotini, for example).  This group of Gypsies is 
usually employed in transport as assistants; they also work as cleaners, etc. 
Education: 
Although in accordance to the International Convention of Rome (1950) Greece should assure the 
right to education based on personal religious and philosophical beliefs, there has been a wide 
practice of institutionalised discrimination.  Although this situation was largely improved after 
1993, Christidis (1996) refers to two kinds of discrimination: Firstly discrimination that results 
from a poor or inadequate infrastructure and secondly discrimination that results from social 
mobility and stratification.  For example, delays in the distribution of school textbooks and 
manuals, or the withholding of permission to teach at community schools for qualified teachers 
(who have graduated from Turkish Universities and colleges).  Furthermore, legislative protective 
measures against illiteracy seem to arbitrarily, insofar as the Muslim community is concerned. 
In Thrace, where the Muslim minority is officially recognised by the state, there are provisions to 
create educational structures for the children of minorities.  This obligation does not however apply to 
areas.  Here the children are placed in regular classes and are not taught their mother tongue, although 
there is a high demand for this. 
Conclusions: 
A basic precondition for dealing with the problems faced by the Muslim Minorities in Greece is 
that the Greek State and public bodies should recognise their basic rights concerning education, 
housing and social and political participation. 
In the educational sector it appears absolutely vital to modernise the educational programmes and for 
bilingual education to be applied substantially and effectively.  In addition, attendance at Secondary 
Schools by minority children should be supported, and ‘dropping out’ dealt with.  Moreover, it is 
necessary to encourage or oblige parents to send their children to school.  Concurrently, child labour 
must be controlled, as well as the coercion of children to undertake heavy agricultural work or work on 
the streets.  
Housing: a specific policy must be developed that establishes homes, or subsidises rented 
accommodation for minority families with many children, for whom it is difficult to find adequate 
habitation, or to pay rent. 
In the area of employment, an important role in the incorporation of the Muslim minority can be 
played by being trained in the work which they have already chosen, and perform occasionally 
(selling of second-hand goods, collection of material for recycling etc), and the support of the 
creation of small businesses with the aim of increasing self-employment and the employment of 
other members of the family.  As regards the employment of Undocumented Migrants, it seems that 
legislation regarding their residence in Greece is absolutely vital, as is ensuring that they are 
granted the appropriate work permit for the period they remain in the country.  In this area a 
significant role can be played by reducing the cost of insurance for employers for seasonal work, so 
that they are able to legally incorporate immigrants into their businesses. 
A significant European policy that might be developed is that concerning minority groups living in 
border areas.  One way to tackle the problems faced by the minority might be the creation of 
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observatories for the recording and analysis of the minority problems in these border regions.  Here, 
scientists and specialists from various sides could co-operate, so that their reports would be reliable 
and generally accepted.  Such an action would be an important step in understanding minority 
problems, and in the creation of appropriate policies, which would improve the social position of 
the minorities in border regions. 
 
 
ITALY 
The study moves from a multi-disciplinary framework (political, institutional, economic, socio-
cultural) grounded especially on the work of Antony Giddens (1990)11 and Anthias and Yuval 
Davis (1992)12. This theoretical paradigm rejects the hypothesis that dominated sociology for long 
time, i.e. the classification of society in terms of modernity and religion. Many events of the recent 
decades, both at the national and international level, demonstrated that religion resides within 
modernity. And above all religion has come to represent one of the major factor of exclusion of 
specific ethnic-religious groups - such as that of Muslims - in contemporary society. Religious and 
cultural exclusion is reinforced by economic exclusion, which, in its turn, is intertwined with that 
introduced by legislation, and national and local policy. 
The study makes use of different techniques and supports (qualitative interviews, bibliographical, 
documentary and newspaper analysis, quantitative data) to build up a case study on the Muslim 
community in Milan. However, the focus of the study is twofold.  
In the first place the it considers the development of Muslim communities at the national level by 
identifying specific (Muslim) immigration cycles, within which different paths for different ethnic 
groups have been also highlighted. At the same time, the study tries to identify the main effects of 
the immigration laws on migrant communities and, above all, Muslim communities.  
Legislation comes to the fore also when the question of the official recognition of Islam and 
Muslim organisations is examined. On this respect whilst the agreement between Muslim 
organisations and the Italian State has not been drawn yet, the pressure of Muslim communities, at 
the local level, aimed at obtaining the recognition of their rights, has increased more and more. 
However, the responses given by local authorities varied from place to place. The case of Milan is 
here taken as an example. 
In the second place - i.e. at the local level - a case study of the Muslim communities in Milan have 
been carried out mainly with the purpose of unravelling the power structure among Muslim 
organisations, their main concerns, political affiliation, sources of funding, etc.. A description of 
Muslim communities in terms of ethnic origin and life conditions has also been produced. 
On this respect, because of the role and weight of Milan in the Muslim “universe” of Italy, taking 
Milan is almost equivalent to considering Italy as a whole. The study have especially pointed to the 
lack of union that characterises Muslim communities and organisations - especially between Italian 
converts, many of which attend a Sufi organisation, and foreign immigrants - and highlighted the 
reasons of this. Notwithstanding this situation a sort of “division of labour” for what concerns 
requests to local authorities among Muslim organisations have taken place, sometimes as a strategy 
pursued to achieve more rights through negotiations. 
The main common concern of Muslim organisations is that of obtaining more public space for 
Muslims in Milan (more mosques, madrasas, space in radio and television, etc.), i.e. increasing their 
visibility in the public arena. 
Exclusion - which is introduced essentially by legislation, state and local policy and media (all 
                                                
11 Giddens, A. (1990), The consequencies of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
12 Anthias, F., Yuval-Davis, N. (1992), Racialized Boundaries, London and New York, Routledge. 
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themes analysed and developed by the Report) - takes place particularly in everyday life. For this 
reason special attention is given to the question of discrimination and the use of it by specific 
political parties. 
Discrimination against Muslims can be found in different spheres of life in the Italian society, 
especially in the form of “cultural racialism” (Balbo and Manconi, 1992: 74). “Cultural racialism” 
refers to the fact that religious difference based on everyone’s own belief is not recognised and 
respected by non-Muslims but considered as based on cultural differences only. 
Discrimination in Italy can be found also in the form of criminalisation of Muslim communities 
which follows the main international terrorist events. This latter phenomenon has led Muslim 
people not to put themselves at risk by participating actively to the life of Muslim organisations. 
The study makes here the point that conflation between “Political Islam” and “religious-cultural 
Islam” has been the main result of the current use of media in Italy on matter related to Muslim 
people. 
Then the study goes in depth with the question of education which seems to be the second main 
concern of Muslims (after that of mosques) in Italy and Milan in particular. Whilst national 
legislation is not yet very sensible to religious issues, at the local level there are many examples of 
schools, especially in big cities with bigger Muslim communities that teach Arabic languages and 
offer alternative diets to Muslim people. However, the fact that no courses of Koran are available in 
schools is taking part of Muslim communities to the decision of opening private Muslim schools 
alternative to the Italian ones. 
A preliminary account on the employment conditions of Muslims has also been drawn with 
particular attention to the aspects that put immigrants, coming especially from Islamic countries, in 
a weak position compared to that of authoctones. No kind of discriminating treatment based on 
religion seems to emerge here in the sense that it is not true that because immigrant are Muslims 
they are employed in the most menial jobs. However, it is true that some Muslim ethnic groups are 
quite unstable communities and thus manage to find only badly paid and precarious jobs. 
As to the quantitative level the study utilises data on the presence of Muslims in Italy and Milan in 
particular, by ethnic groups too. These data are estimated through the methodology developed by 
the Cathy Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Research of Manchester (CCSR), i.e. by applying 
the rate of incidence of Muslims in the population of each country of origin.  
Data on the trend of the Muslim presence in Italy, its distribution among Italian regional areas, the 
incidence of family reunions per each ethnic group, unemployment, ethnic business and education 
have been also included, where possible with reference to both Italy and Milan.  
The main data source used in the study is that of Ministry of Interior due to the lack of a recent 
Census (the last one dates back to 1991). However, even the aforementioned source is not able to 
give a complete picture of the Muslim presence in Italy, especially as a result of the high rate of 
non-registered immigrants that characterises this country. People without resident permit are, in 
fact, not captured by Ministry of Interior data. 
Finally, the study gives precise suggestions in terms of both national and European policy. 
Recommendations refer to both Islamic matters and social exclusion.  
In so doing specific attention has been paid to the concerns Muslim communities in Italy and Milan 
feel as most important (more space in the public arena, Islamic education for Muslim children, 
more rules to prevent discrimination based on religion, more participation to the Italian political life 
at the local level) and on the restraints that influence the chance of (Muslim) immigrants to access 
the labour market. 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
The focus in this phase of the research project was the extent to which Muslims are socially excluded 
and marginalised.  We have concentrated on the three largest Muslim groups in the Netherlands: the 
Turks, the Moroccans and the Surinamese.  Attention was paid to their immigration history, to 
legislation and Minorities policy in the Netherlands, to socio-political and cultural Muslim 
organisations, to their discrimination, employment, and education and to their (portrayal in the) 
media.  Within all these subjects the main themes have been discussed.  In the Netherlands there are 
no quantitative data available on discrimination.  The ‘informal economy among migrants’ will be 
discussed in our next report. 
Summary: 
In the following phase of the research project we will focus on the Turks and / or Moroccans, as 
they are the largest Muslim populations in the Netherlands.  Part of the Surinamese, and 
Indonesians, and most of the Pakistani, Egyptians, Tunisians and other migrant groups living in 
Holland are Muslim too, but compared to the Turks and the Moroccans this concerns only limited 
groups.  Among the total Muslim population in the Netherlands, about 46% is Turkish, 38% is 
Moroccan and 6% is Surinamese by origin: together they count for 90% of the ‘Dutch’ Muslims 
(CBS, 1989). 
Since the beginning of the seventies the number of Muslims increased from about 54,300 in 1971 to 
432,000 in 1990 mainly as a result of immigration from Turkey, Morocco and the former Dutch colony 
the Surinam.  In the same period the number of Muslim organisations has grown from less than 10 to 
about 600.  So the presence (visibility) of Muslim people in the Netherlands is a more recent 
phenomenon. 
The figures presented in our report need to be approached with some caution if they are to be 
compared with figures from other countries that register their migrants on nationality.  In the 
Netherlands after 1988 every person, either born in- or outside the Netherlands, with at least one 
parent born in a foreign country is classified as belonging to one of the above mentioned ethnic 
groups. 
Migration History: 
After World War II the rapid economic growth produced structural shortages on the Labour market.  
The expansion of the service industries and a flow of employees from the industrial sector to the 
service industries caused structural shortages in the industrial sector.  The labour force increase in 
this sector was over 600,000 persons between 1960 -1970.  Consequently a shortage of lower 
skilled jobs in the industrial sector arose.  During this period lower skilled employees were 
recruited from the Mediterranean countries - Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece, and 
also Morocco and Turkey.   
Most people from Morocco and Turkey came from agricultural regions.  In 1973 the number of these 
so-called guest-workers (‘gastarbeiders’) amounted to about 100,000 (the entire population of the 
Netherlands in 1973 was about 13.5 million).  Initially not only Dutch government, but also most Turks 
and Moroccans regarded their stay as temporarily.  As economic prospects in their home countries 
were rather bad, most Turks and Moroccans decided to prolong their stay.  Some decided to stay here 
permanently, other still wanted to return but first wanted to improve their economic circumstances.   
From 1968 migration policy became more restrictive.  Migrants were only allowed to come to the 
Netherlands if everything was arranged beforehand, and once migrants had left the Netherlands 
they lost their rights to return.  Recruitment from the Mediterranean countries halted abruptly after 
the 1973 oil crisis, because of an economic decline that lasted until 1984.  Though the recruitment 
stopped, the number of persons of Mediterranean origin increased due to family-reunification. 
The Turks and Moroccans of the first generation didn’t speak the Dutch language as they came to 
the Netherlands.  Most of them were lower educated adults, who often faced great difficulties to 
learn and to understand the Dutch language.  Furthermore both migrant groups regarded their stay 
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as temporarily, so in the beginning they made less efforts to learn the Dutch language and to 
participate (fully) in Dutch society.   
Minorities Policy: 
The report entitled “Etnische minderheden”(‘Ethnic minorities’, WRR, 1979) marked the first stage 
in a re-thinking of government policy.  For the first time it was assumed that ethnic minorities 
would be staying for good.  The Ministry of the Interior was appointed to co-ordinate policy on 
minorities in 1979.  By implication, minorities were no longer regarded as an isolated issue in, but 
as a central matter for government as a whole.  Because the Ministry of the Interior was responsible 
for local government, it was also possible to influence policy on minorities at a lower level (Abell 
et al., 1985).  Policy on minorities was given form and substance in 1983 in the Policy Document 
on Minorities. 
As Dutch government formalised minorities policy and the separation of church and state became a 
fact (both in 1983), the discussions about the relationship between Islam and state changed.  In the 
policy document of 1983 Islam was first mentioned as part of the minorities policy.  Since then a new 
dimension was added to the discussion about the relationship between Islam and state, because the 
majority of Muslims is a member of an ethnic minority group and as such Muslim organisations could 
play a role in the in integration of Muslims in Dutch society.  Officially the activities of Muslim 
organisations are only financially supported by Dutch Government if their objectives are ‘non -
religious’ and their activities contribute to the integration of Muslims in Dutch society.  According to 
the Dutch Government integration and participation in society and people’s willingness to integrate and 
participate are the principal preconditions of citizenship (Minderhedenbeleid, 1997). 
At this moment there is a vivid (public) discussion about the financing of mosques.  The different 
Muslim communities state that mosques also contribute to the integration of Muslims, because in 
Dutch mosques also various social and cultural activities are organised.  Although Dutch 
Government doubts the extent to which these activities have a non religious character, some local 
authorities have started to seek contacts with mosques because this sometimes seems the only way 
they can reach the Muslim community, especially the people of the first generation.   
Provisions for mosques are made at a local level.  Local authorities are authorised / obliged to 
develop their own policies on mosques as a part of national legislation.  As a result local policies on 
mosques vary.  Building permissions should fit in local zoning schemes, and local authorities can 
decide to what extend they want to finance the building of mosques, tolerate mosque shops without 
a license; allow the public call for prayers and grant subsidy to social and cultural activities 
organised in a mosque.   
The exact number of mosques in the Netherlands is unknown.  Judging by the information of the 
Dutch Muslim organisations the number of places for worship and mosques is estimated on 380 in 
1997 (Handboek Minderheden, 1997). 
Legislation: 
Racism and xenophobia are outlawed, but till now there are no sections in Dutch legal system that 
directly are addressed to Islam or other non-Christian religions (Ekdom, 1997).  The principle of 
non-discrimination (and equal treatment) is laid down in the Constitution and several articles in the 
Dutch Criminal Code.  In addition several codes of practice exist.  The first article of the Dutch 
Constitution reads as follows: ‘all persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally, in equal 
circumstances.  Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex, or 
any ground whatsoever, shall not be permitted’. 
Discrimination is defined (article 90 quarter) as any form of distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference, aimed at or leading to nullifying or impairing fundamental freedoms on political, 
economical, social, cultural or any other field of social life.  This means that also indirect 
discrimination is liable to penance.   
Further, the principle of non-discrimination is not only applicable to Dutch nationals, but also to 
110 
persons living in the Netherlands who do not have the Dutch Nationality. 
Though anti-discrimination legislation is quite elaborate, this does not imply that combating 
discrimination by law is not problematic.  Only five per cent of all complaints reach the state of 
court proceedings (Kartaram, in Gras et al, 1995); there is little readiness to report discrimination 
because of lack of support in submitting the complaint, and because of ignorance of the procedure 
(Gras et al, 1995).  Gras and Bovenkerk (1995) conclude that ‘The accessibility of legal procedures 
is insufficient, there is no specific victimisation legislation, an active prosecution policy is usually 
lacking, the onus of proof is usually with the alleged victim, the sanctions are too light, and the 
maximum penance is seldom being imposed’.  
A national system of registration of discrimination in general has only recently been set up by the 
National Bureau for Combating Racial Discrimination (Landelijk Bureau ter Bestrijding van 
Rassendiscriminatie, LBR).  A systematic overview of quantitative data is not available yet. 
During the end of the seventies adjustments in legal regulations were made that up till then had 
interfered with the perception of Islam, like ritual slaughter (3i) and disposal of the dead.  Currently 
there are several Islamic institutions in the Netherlands.  Some of them were easily accepted, like 
the ‘disposal of the dead’ and the ‘oath sworn on the Koran’, because no major changes were 
required from Dutch society or legislation.  Other Islamic institutions are still subject of discussion, 
like for instance the acknowledgement of Muslim feast days, Muslim dietary prescriptions, the 
wearing of headscarves, and the call for prayer (Rath et al, 1995). 
Although in the beginning of eighties ministers and civil servants first entered into consultation 
with Muslim organisations, it lasted till the beginning of the nineties before a broad public 
discussion about the position of Islam in Dutch society started.  Because of external events like the 
Salmon Rushdie affair and the Gulf War, broad layers of Dutch society realised that Muslim 
community in the Netherlands had grown. 
Labour Market: 
Within labour organisations, minorities, when compared to indigenous employees, find themselves 
in a weak position.  The division of employees from the various ethnic groups over job levels 
shows a distorted image.  Minorities, on average, are appointed to lower positions and their position 
is often less secure than those of autochthonous employees with a comparable education.  
Minorities, for example, are relatively more often appointed on a temporary employment contract 
(Veen and Riemersma, 1990).  Turkish and Moroccan employees in particular perform simple tasks 
- with all the resulting inconveniences - that require little or no education (Tesser, 1993).  Research 
by Ankersmit et al (1989) shows that 50% of Turkish employees with an education level varying 
from MBO (intermediate vocational education) to VWO (pre-university education) perform only 
simple tasks, as opposed to 7% of the autochthonous employees with a comparable education. 
In 1995, unemployment among the four main groups of ethnic minorities was three times that of the 
indigenous population (Jaaroverzicht Integratiebeleid Etnische Groepen 1997, 1996).  This increases 
the risk of ‘ethnicisation’ at the lower end of the labour market, especially in major cities.  Long-term 
unemployment has increased sharply among the young ethnic population, yet fallen dramatically 
among the young indigenous population. 
 
Education: 
Though the viewpoint of freedom of education is subscribed by many, the actual foundation of 
Muslim schools often leads to discussions about the desirability of such schools.  Opponents are of 
the opinion that Muslim schools hinder integration of Muslim pupils and lead to isolation while 
others believe that Muslim schools enhance the self-confidence of the pupils and consequently 
improve their school results (Rath et al., 1996).  Critics also fear that Muslim schools will stimulate 
‘fundamentalism’ amongst their pupils.  Not only Dutch politicians discussed the matter, migrant 
organisations also had strong opinions about the schools. 
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In 1988 the first Muslim primary schools opened.  By 1994, 29 Muslim primary schools were 
registered, on a total number of 8,139 schools.  Most of these schools are founded by local 
organisations with various backgrounds.  In 1993 only 4% of the children with a Muslim background 
went to a Muslim school.  In the period 1993-1994 the total number of children in Muslim schools 
(4,360), is negligible compared to the total number of primary school children, 1,426,533.  As far as 
known, there are no non-Muslim pupils attending Muslim schools, the majority of the teachers are 
however still non-Muslim due to the shortage of Muslim teachers.   
Media: 
The NMO (Nederlandse Moslim Omroep) is the only broadcasting organisation that is run by 
Muslims and directed exclusively at Muslims.  Other national and local broadcasting organisations 
transmit radio programmes for migrants in their own language, but do not transmit programmes 
exclusively for Muslims.  The quantity of broadcasting time for the NMO, in relation to 
representativeness, is still subject of discussions. 
In granting broadcasting time not only representativeness matters, but the Dutch Directorate of the 
Media (Commisariaat van de Media) also interferes with program content: one of the main purposes of 
NMO is to educate Dutch society about Islam in the Netherlands. 
In 1994 a research on the representation of the Islam and Muslims in de media (newspapers) has 
been carried out by order of the SMT (Nijhoff et al. (1994).  In 1995 the NMR together with the 
NMO initiated a research project that focused on newspaper articles on Muslims and Islam, 
collected during a period of one year (Abdus Sattar, 1995).  Both studies concluded that the 
representation of Muslims is mostly negative and made recommendations to improve this situation.  
Nevertheless there are also journalists who are aware of the danger of discrimination being 
furthered by the media.  The Dutch Association of Journalists initiated a ‘Migrants and Media’ 
working group in 1984.  Goals of the working group are to promote the critical discussion on 
coverage of minorities in the media and to stimulate the intake of migrant journalists in the media. 
Conclusions: 
In general all Muslims, as well as other migrant groups in the Netherlands like the Surinamese and 
the Antillians, have arrears on the above mentioned fields and especially in the fields of education 
and employment.  We would like to stress that we are not able to draw any conclusions on the 
question whether or not Muslims - as an ‘ethno-religious group’ - have more socio-economic 
backlogs than other migrant groups.  The aim of this research project is just to direct attention to the 
position of Muslims in the different European countries. 
With regard to the process of institutionalisation of Islam in Dutch society substantial progress has 
been made.  By now there are many mosques, Muslim organisations, Muslim schools, shops and a 
Muslim broadcasting station.  The institutionalisation of Islam does however encounter resistance of 
the Dutch population and administrators. 
‘Dutch Muslims’ are a very heterogeneous group.  This heterogeneity is not only caused by 
differences in countries of origin, but also by ethnic differences (the Arabs and Berbers from 
Morocco, the Turks and Curds from Turkey, and the Hindustans and Javanese from Surinam); and 
by varieties in religious and political affiliations.  As a result of these varieties there is no such thing 
as one Muslim community in the Netherlands. 
Every Muslim organisation strives for recognition of Dutch government, not only to be eligible for 
subsidy, but also to have a say in Dutch minorities’ policy.  Because the various Muslim 
organisations do not succeed in combining their forces, the internal differences of opinion are 
reinforced, and new organisations are still founded.  Dutch Muslim organisations are eligible for 
subsidy as long as their objectives are ‘non -religious’ and their activities contribute to the 
integration of Muslims in Dutch society.  Up till now none of the Muslim organisations is 
recognised as a representative organisation of all Dutch Muslims.   
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SWITZERLAND 
Switzerland is well known for its political neutrality as demonstrated by its attitude during armed 
conflicts and international crises.  Traditionally open to the world and adopting secularism, 
Switzerland has always offered refugees a land of asylum and an understanding of their differences. 
There has been a Muslim presence in Switzerland since the last century.  Islam however remained 
alien to Switzerland until the late 1960s.  Swiss law has no provision for the presence of Muslims.  
In some Swiss cantons with large number of Muslims some “Muslim voices” claim that Islam 
should be recognised as one of the religions of the population in Switzerland.  Because Islam and a 
Muslim presence are recent phenomena in Switzerland, few studies on the subject have been made 
in Swiss academic institutions.  This study is based on quantitative and qualitative data collected 
from the official registers of statistics at the federal and cantonal level.  Additionally, we have 
contacted the embassies of several Muslim countries with significant Muslim population in 
Switzerland, and collected information and data relative to those populations. 
Synopsis of Muslim Presence: 
The first flow of Muslims into Switzerland began in the early 1960s with the expansion of labour 
migration from Turkey, due to its geographical proximity.  Despite the fact that they were more 
attached to their nationality than to their Islamic identity, first generation Muslims had Islam as the 
central common link with their culture of origin.  The Swiss official census is the main source of 
statistics concerning the population in Switzerland.  This census has included, since 1970, a 
question on religion; but as the period between censuses is ten years, the usefulness of such data is 
limited. 
Contemporary Focus- General Data: 
The two largest Muslim groups settled in Switzerland are those from the Former-Yugoslavia and 
Albania followed by the Turks, with a high percentage of Kurds.  Although the Muslim population 
is characterised by its diversity, we can roughly classify it into five groups: Balkanic and Turkish, 
Arab, South-Asian, Iranian and Black African.  Each group has its own culture, language and ethnic 
characteristics but all groups have Islam as a common religious identity.  At the end of 1996, the 
number of Turks living in Switzerland was 80,177, Bosnians numbered 18,408 and Albanians 
numbered 150,000 (non-Muslims are included in these two groups).  Muslim groups from other 
origins are smaller.  According to the last Swiss annual year book of Statistics 1998, Moroccans 
formed the third largest Muslim community in the country after the Turks and the Balkanic group, 
with 4,447, followed in number by Tunisians (3,528), Iranians (3,417) and Algerians (2,931).  At 
present, the number Muslims in Switzerland is approximately 250,000 persons.  Islam emerged as 
the third largest religion in Switzerland after Catholicism and Protestantism and before Judaism. 
Official Legislation: 
Islam is not recognised as an official religion in Switzerland.  The Federal State adopts a special 
secularism, recognising Catholicism and Protestantism as the two religions of the resident 
population.  Discrimination against foreigners is still found in Switzerland, particularly against 
foreigners from ‘far afield’ countries including Muslims.  These foreigners ‘do not share the 
European ideology, in general, and may introduce a cultural tangling up in Switzerland’ as argued 
by the Swiss Government in its report relating to the application of its policy on foreigners called 
“the three circles policy” in force since 1991.  This Swiss policy divides foreigners into three 
categories according to their country of origin.  The foreigners of non-European ideology (third 
circle of foreigners) are those originally from distant countries and most of them are Muslims.  In 
addition, foreign residents in Switzerland do not have the right to vote and are thus unable to 
participate in political life. 
Although Muslims are not allowed to participate, they are still used as “objects” for electoral 
purposes (Article 72 of the Swiss Federal Constitution).  The Muslim resident population is counted 
in order to allow eligible Swiss citizens to gain seats in the Parliament.  This kind of distinction 
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between the residents in Switzerland for political purposes constitutes a discrimination against 
Muslim residents on religious grounds and a kind of “instrumentalisation” owing to the fact that 
they are not considered “full subjects”. 
In juridical areas, Muslims are obliged to abide by Swiss laws regarding civil matters such as marriage, 
divorce, inheritance etc.  (Article 46 of the Swiss Federal Constitution).  Thus, Muslims in Switzerland, 
citizens and residents with permanent permits (C) or annual permits (B), must abide by Swiss laws and 
not by Islamic laws (sharî`a).  Also, acts of violence and harassment against foreigners in general are 
common, especially against Turkish, Bosnian and Albanian refugees or asylum seekers in German-
speaking cantons.  Further, the official policy of repatriation of refugees adopted by the Swiss Federal 
Office of Foreigners towards Albanians, Kosovans and Bosnians represents a form of Islamophobia.  
The results of our research allow us to assert that discrimination against Muslims has increased over 
the last few years and that Muslims in Switzerland are discriminated against in the political, social and 
juridical spheres. 
Socio-Political and Cultural Organisations: 
The Muslim community in Switzerland is not well structured, so there is no single organisation that 
can claim to be the representative of Muslims in the country.  The majority of Islamic organisations 
are only de facto Muslim organisations not recognised by the Swiss authorities as representative of 
Muslims.  They number about 140.  The most important Islamic organisations are: 
Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Zuerich (VIOZ)-Zurich (Union of Islamic 
Organisations in Zurich) founded in 1994.  La Fondation Culturelle Islamique de Genève-
Geneva (Islamic Cultural Foundation in Geneva) founded in 1978 by the Rabita and financed by 
Saudi Arabia.  The large Mosque of this Foundation is the only distinctive Mosque in Switzerland 
that has a minaret and a dome.  Le Centre Islamique de Genève- Geneva (the Islamic Centre of 
Geneva) which is the oldest Islamic centre founded in 1961. 
The four main concerns of Muslims in Switzerland are: firstly, the establishment of mosques and 
the teaching of basic Islamic values.  The second is the protection of Islamic identity, including the 
specificities of Islam as a religion and as a culture of origin.  The third is the Islamic education of 
Muslim children to ensure that they remain attached to their roots and the facilitation of their 
integration into Swiss society.  The fourth issue is the establishment of Islamic cemeteries to 
guarantee the right of Muslims to be buried according to Islamic rite.  The Federal and Cantonal 
authorities have tried to develop a structural framework to integrate young Muslims into public life.  
They now grant Muslims relative freedom of expression in the local media and freedom to celebrate 
religious rituals in public at special occasions. 
Discrimination Against Muslims: 
Xenophobia against Muslims (or Islamophobia) is no more explicit in Switzerland than it is in other 
European countries.  At the social level, Swiss labour policy strictly forbids foreigners from taking 
certain jobs.  For example Muslims residents are not allowed to teach in state schools, to hold key 
positions in the medical sector or to hold positions of responsibility.  In the labour sector, the policy 
of the “three circles”, encourages discrimination and xenophobia amongst the Swiss population.  
Further, it increases the rate of unemployment amongst those in the third circle who are mainly 
Muslims.  Another kind of discrimination is the two-tiered Swiss system of tax collection: the first 
is applied to Swiss citizens and permanent residents, and is advantageous to them, and the second, 
called “impôt à la source” (pay as you earn), is a direct taxation which is applied to all non 
permanent resident foreigners.  Further, Swiss housing policy should be considered as 
discriminatory against foreigners because they cannot profit from housing with moderate or low 
rent.  These types of housing are only allocated to Swiss citizens. 
At the economic level, Swiss policy prevents the inclusion of foreigners in the economic sector.  
Foreigners from the third circle do not have the right to own land or buildings under the “Lex 
Friedrich” (Swiss law which prevents foreigners from buying land or buildings in Switzerland, unless 
they are in possession of a permanent residency permit).  At the juridical level, there are many cases of 
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discrimination against Muslims that have reached the cantonal and the federal courts of Justice.  Also, 
acts of violence and harassment against foreigners and especially against refugees or asylum seekers in 
German-speaking cantons are common. 
Employment: 
It is certainly true that foreigners particularly those in the third circle have a lower average income 
than Swiss nationals and that they can only obtain certain forms of employment that require fewer 
qualifications.  The results of our inquiries leads us to conclude that Muslims suffer more than other 
foreigners from low salaries, poor working conditions, poor health insurance and low educational 
qualifications.  Further, statistics show that unemployment amongst permanent resident foreigners 
at the end of December 1997 was 10.4 % whereas it was only 5% among the Swiss population.  
This project does not believe, however, that one can describe Swiss employers as being specifically 
Islamophobic. 
Education: 
The majority of Muslim children in Switzerland attend state schools that follow secular principles 
in their teaching.  As yet (1997), no Muslim schools have been established in Switzerland.  
Whereas in France wearing a headscarf in public schools is prohibited, there are no such rules in 
Switzerland.  Nevertheless, there have been cases of discrimination against Muslim pupils.  
Theoretically, “foreign” pupils do not suffer from discrimination as long as their parents are legally 
established in Switzerland.  Pupils whose parents are illegally established, however, do not have the 
right to be registered at any school (except in Geneva Canton).  This constitutes a violation of the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that each child has the right to 
receive an education and go to school regardless of the status of his parents.   
Studies and Research on Muslims in Switzerland: 
The position of Muslims settled in Switzerland has been a neglected field of study in Swiss 
universities.  The most important studies and research in the field are mentioned in our 
bibliography. 
The Media: 
Islamophobia is not so obvious in the Swiss media, although right wing newspapers have a 
tendency to report in a xenophobic manner.  In general, articles referring to Muslims or to Islam are 
prejudiced with antagonistic criticism that is sometimes ironic.  Some local newspaper coverage of 
Islamic issues has increased xenophobia against Muslims because they argue that Islam is an 
obstacle to Muslim integration.  Some social “Affairs” have been highlighted by the local media.  
The most recent one is the “Lucia headscarf Affair” which began in July 1996 against a young 
convert Muslim Swiss teacher who wore a veil while teaching in a primary school in Geneva.  She 
has been suspended (Decision of the Federal Court of Justice) from her duties because she refused 
to remove the veil.. 
There is a need for more understanding and objectivity in the media regarding some of the issues 
concerning Islam and Muslims and of their portrayal.  The media must take care not to associate all 
Muslims with fundamentalists or terrorists, and should also moderate their expressions when using 
Islamic terms and concepts. 
Conclusion: 
The Muslim community of Switzerland is characterised by its heterogeneity, but all Muslims have a 
common Islamic identity based on Qur’anic education.  Despite the fact that Islam is the third faith 
in Switzerland, it is not recognised officially by the State as one of the religions of its population.  
The second generation of young Muslims, born and raised in Switzerland, continue to voice their 
claims for obtaining an official recognition of Islam and try to participate in political life. 
Recommendations: 
There is an urgent need for both the Swiss authorities and Muslim leaders to take effective 
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measures to avoid the growth of manifestations of hatred or xenophobia against Muslims 
(Islamophobia) in Switzerland.  Muslim leaders should be more flexible, more understanding and 
open-minded with the Swiss authorities and non-Muslim communities.  Switzerland should face up 
to a new challenge, which is the challenge of the recognition of Islam as one of the religions of its 
resident population and should take some measures aiming at the institutionalisation of Islam within 
the framework of the Swiss legislation.  One suggestion is the creation of a unified Federation of 
Muslims that will act as the official representative of the Muslims to the Swiss authorities. 
 
 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
This summary presents a breakdown of the main issues, descriptive and analytical, of the report of 
Muslims in Britain which addressed the conceptual and methodological issues, when discussing the 
‘Muslim Voice’ with particular reference to defining the ‘Muslim Voice’, the socio-historical 
mechanisms by which marginalisation and exclusion have taken place and within which identity is 
constructed. It presents the context within which a politicised ‘Muslim Voice’ has emerged in Britain.  
Reference is made to the forms and processes of discrimination leading to marginalisation and 
exclusion within official legislation, employment, education and the media as way of highlighting the 
diverse ways in which Muslims in Britain have been socially, politically, economically, culturally 
marginalised and excluded at a local and national level. These accounts provide some analysis of the 
ways in which the ‘Muslim Voice’ has become politicised and also highlight those areas for which 
policy needs to be re-evaluated.   
Background: 
The Muslim presence in Britain has a long history but also until very recently a largely invisible 
one. Though the first mosques built in Britain are over 100 years old (e.g. the mosques built in 
Cardiff by Yemeni Muslims and in Woking by Indian Muslim) the idea that there are Muslims in 
Britain is almost less than ten years old. It could be argued that it is only between 1989 and 1992, 
that is, form the Rushdie Affair to the Gulf War, that a public Muslim identity was formed. Settlers 
who had previously been categorised and conceptualised as being ‘blacks’ or later as ‘Asians’ 
where suddenly discovered to be Muslims. In other words, any investigation of Muslim Voices has 
to confront two difficulties: how to understand this identity in the context post-war immigration and 
settlement in Europe and how to account for emergence of a specific Muslim identity.  
How many Muslims? 
Muslims remains inadequately captured in statistical representations. There is little consensus even 
concerning basic numbers. Muslims in Britain are currently referenced as being the second largest 
religious group. There are however discrepancies as to the actual size of the Muslim population in 
Britain. Therefore there is an urgent need for a fuller descriptive knowledge of the macro-
demography and social geography of the Muslim presence. This is important in it’s own right but 
also a necessary prerequisite for the better understanding of the micro-level sociological processes 
that form the key concerns of the ‘Muslim Voices’ project.  
Reasons for variations in estimates on Muslims in Britain lie in the fact that Census data does not 
include questions on religious affiliation.  Consequently religion has been assumed to be based on 
ethnic origin.  This method presumes that ethnicity is a viable indicator of religious faith.  This 
methodological issue surrounding the collection of data has meant that statistics on ‘Muslims’ can 
not be obtained directly.  The most accurate estimates for Muslims in Britain are made by studying 
data on Pakistani and Bangladeshi people, a large proportion of whom are Muslim. 
Consequently Muslims in Britain have been ascribed identities and measured by place of birth 
through statistics provided by the Census and The Labour Force Survey which has reflected the 
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selectivity of the migration process highlighting that the majority of Britons Muslims are of South 
Asian origin and more specifically Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian. Thus there remains a serious 
gap in accurate representation of Muslims in Britain. Representation is particularly significant in 
determining a central issue for this research for surely to determine ‘Muslim Voices’ it is first 
necessary to delineate who are the Muslims in Britain?  
Who are the Muslims in Britain? 
Pakistanis and Indians make up the majority of the Muslim population. Britain was also the main 
receiving country following the mass expulsion of Asians from East Africa in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, while more recently, Bangladeshis have added a further major Asian component to the 
British Muslim population. Smaller Muslim groups have limited representation in the literature. 
Historical Overview: 
A specific Muslim identity in Britain has emerged in the context of migration and settlement. The 
migration and settlement of Muslim communities in Britain have to all intent and purpose been 
policy driven, a policy derivative of imperial agenda which was sanctioned by notions of ‘race’ 
from it’s origins as biological categorisation to a concept constructed and reconstructed as a line of 
demarcation and justification for hierarchical promotions of colonialist and neo-colonialist 
practices. The South Asian Sub-continent as the most populous areas of the empire was often the 
main source of labour exports to Britain and other parts of the empire. Migration and settlement of 
‘black’ people is therefore inextricably linked with colonialism. 
Muslim migrants have different trajectories that have developed in different historical contexts. There 
have been four different components to Muslim migration to Britain. 
Firstly, labour migrations of Muslims from the South Asian Sub- Continent resulting from the 
aforementioned colonial links, economic ‘push’ and ‘pull’ leading to chain migration and political 
factors. The main areas of migration include Azad Kashmir, Punjab and the North West Frontier. 
Economic reasons for migration have often been overemphasised and the political dimensions to 
migration under represented in the literature. Gujerati Muslims from India migrated primarily from 
Baroda, Surat and Bharuch. These migrants were generally professionals and traders. The majority 
of Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain have migrated from Sylhet. 
The Second phase of Muslim migration to Britain was witnessed in the late 1960s and during the 
1970s as East African migrants arrived in Britain and refugees fleeing nationalist regimes in Kenya 
from 1965 and Uganda from 1969, culminating in Amin’s expulsions in 1972. Middle Eastern 
Muslims were also represented in Britain at this time. These were primarily the metropolitan 
seasonal migrations of wealthy Arabs who migrated during the oil boom years. They continue to 
reside in Britain on a seasonal basis but their main place of work and residence remains the Middle 
East  
Refugee migration from the Middle East formed the third phase of Muslim migration to Britain. 
Middle Eastern Muslims are less represented in Britain and their presence felt most notably by the 
arrival of political refugees mainly from Iran in 1978-9. Approximately one hundred to one hundred 
and fifty thousand Iranian exiles arrived in Britain fleeing the Islamic Revolution.  
The fourth and most recent phase of Muslim migration is also refugee migration most notably of 
Yemeni, Kurdish, Iraqi, Bosnian and Somali refugees. 
British Immigration Legislation:  
British policy on immigration has experienced significant changes over the last forty years from 
encouragement and incentives for migration to increasing restrictions. Legislative changes have to 
be discussed with reference to two factors: 
Firstly, economic changes. This came about due to labour shortages after WWII. 
Secondly the ‘race’ issue which came about in response to increasing public and parliamentary 
debates centring on the ‘black problem’ in inner city areas. For example overcrowding, crime and 
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drugs. 
The response to these events was the ‘racialisation’ of immigration policy. Immigration controls 
were implemented to prevent the entry of immigrants into Britain. To varying degrees these acts 
circumvented the rights of ‘black’ Commonwealth citizens with the legal right to enter Britain and 
to construct the question of nationality along racial lines (for example the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act of 1962, the 1968 Immigration Act, the Immigration Act of 1971) In essence these 
acts created the category of British overseas citizens effectively excluding British citizens of Asian 
origin from the right of abode in Britain.  More recently restrictions have been in the form of visa 
controls (for example the 1990 abandonment of rights to appeal which have restricted family 
reunification). Government policy on refugee immigration remains unclear. 
The language of categorisation began to shift from ‘race’ towards the use of ethnicity during the 
1970s as a delineator of identity. However this led to the homogenisation of Asian identity. By 
early 1980s demands that a specific Asian identity and experience be recognised with specific 
problems of social exclusion and depravation were coming to the fore and it is within these contexts 
that the demand from large sections of the Muslim communities to be recognised not as Pakistanis 
or Bangladeshis but as Muslims gained ground and the ‘Muslim Voice’ emerged as an empowered 
alternative to the ‘Black Power’ movement. The challenge from Muslims came most clearly with 
responses to the events surrounding the publication of the ‘Satanic Verses’, the campaigns for the 
provision of halal meat and the demands for Muslim grant-maintained schools.  
As a consequence of the development of global Islamic revivalism it is possible to argue that in 
Britain currently there are three main categories by which the non white settler population is 
marked out: black, Asian, Muslim. The idea of a Muslim settler population however, is not just 
another way of saying Pakistani or Bangladeshi, but increasingly it is a way of including other 
minorities (Iraqi and Kurdish refugees) as well as those born in this country and those who have 
little contact with the country of their parents birth. A ‘Muslim Voice’ includes other minorities as 
well as excluding non-Muslim South Asians. Thus the task of identifying a Muslim voice remains 
pressing. 
Settlement and Community: 
National settlement patterns for most of the South Asian migrants to Britain are reflected in the 
economically driven aspects of migration and consequently largest settlements are found in the old 
industrial centres of Britain, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Lancashire, Central Clydeside, 
and selected areas of Scotland. The old industrial cities such as Manchester, Bolton, Bradford based 
on textile industries, Birmingham based on the coal industries, Coventry based on vehicle 
manufacture, Luton and London on light engineering and Glasgow on ship building have been 
some of the net recipients of Muslim labour migrants. Small settlements of Arabs, Egyptians, 
Iraqis, Moroccans, Palestinians and Yemenis can be found in service industries in and around 
London. 
In the early years of migration and settlement a response to challenge of cultural diversity was 
encapsulated in ideas on assimilation, acculturation and more recently multiculturalism. All gave little 
space for the assertion of identity. The assertion of identity by minorities in Britain has undermined 
assimilationist and multicultural policy in favour of positive self-ascriptions of identity. As well as 
demographic factors the salience of Muslim identity is witnessed by increasing Muslim ‘visibility’ 
through economic, social and political activity. ‘Visibility’ has also intensified as Britons Muslims 
politically mobilise around Islam. Whether on international issues such as the Gulf War or more local 
issues such as the provision of halal meat in schools, appropriate dress for women students and 
employees or the recognition of Islamic schools by central and local government it is clear that there is 
a newly empowered ‘Muslim Voice’ demanding that their ‘narratives’ be heard. 
The ‘Enemy Within’ and the Crisis of ‘British’ Identity: 
As a result of ‘race ‘politics immigrant and settler populations started to define their collectivity and 
identity in juxtaposition to British nationality and identity. 
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As Muslim communities established and found the means to articulate a ‘Muslim Voice’ they have 
increasingly been perceived by the majority population as the ‘enemy within’. The emergence of the’ 
Muslim Voice’ is seen as a threat to the majority culture and national identity. In the formation of 
national identity then a Muslim presence therefore brings into question notions of what is ‘Great 
Britain’ and ‘Britishness’? This is evidenced at all levels. Most prominently in salient anti Islamic 
elements increasingly summarised as Islamophobia. 
Official Legislation: 
Muslims in Britain face significant dilemmas with reference to the recognition of Islam as an 
official religion by the State. Overall a review of State Legislation on Muslims shows that the 
attitude varies from hostile to ambivalent. For instance British foreign policy on the Kashmir Crisis, 
the Gulf War and the Palestine issue highlight British hostilities at the national and international 
level. At a local level British attitudes to the Rushdie Affair, Muslims in education, Muslim schools 
and Muslim women all highlight hostilities. Also at a local level attitudes to demands for Mosques, 
cemeteries, halal meat, in short the acknowledgement of the requirements of religion has been one 
of ambivalence.  
At a national level there have been moves to outlaw discrimination. However this is based on 
discrimination on the basis of colour, race and nationality and on the grounds of ethnic or national 
origins is not regarded as satisfactory for Muslims since these categories exclude Muslims because they 
do not regard Muslims as an Ethnic group and do not include discrimination on the grounds of religion.  
Social, Cultural, Religious, and Political Organisations: 
It is very difficult to distinguish between social, cultural, religious and political organisations of the 
Muslim community in Britain since there is a high degree of polyvalence. In addition the 
demarcation between the different domains are not necessarily the same as those that circulate in 
Eurocentric discourses.  
Muslim organisations in Britain have emerged along several lines and at several levels. They have 
developed along particular religious schools of thought, linguistic and regional identities and political 
affiliations and range from social welfare, economic and cultural religious and political institutions. All 
deal with, albeit from differing perspectives with problems of migration and settlement, family 
reunification and educational needs of the community and the maintenance of social, cultural and 
religious identity. In 1986 it was estimated that there were more than four thousand Muslim 
community organisation concerned largely dealing with welfare (see Muslim Organisation Database). 
The plethora of Muslim organisations in Britain and community infrastructure, not only Mosques and 
umbrella organisations but also the easily accessible shops, services and meeting places contributes to 
the increasing awareness of the existence of the Muslim community by members of the majority 
population which increases their visibility. 
Discrimination: 
In the last twenty years that discrimination of Muslims has become explicit and extreme. Records 
of religious discrimination are few and far between. The dearth of information on religious 
discrimination stems largely from the fact that discrimination in Britain has historically been based 
on skin colour. Islam and Muslims are increasingly becoming the focus of discrimination. For 
example the recently published report on Islamophobia by the Runnymede Trust is one 
acknowledgement of this. Significant ways in which Muslims feel discriminated against is in: 
State/City Legislation- For example the lack of protection they receive from the law as a religious 
group.  There have been campaigns to change legislation in order to outlaw religious discrimination. 
Discrimination also takes place in employment, education and the media. These are discussed in more 
detail below. 
Employment: 
The Runnymede Trusts Islamophobia Report (1997) highlights that long term unemployment is one 
of the most serious kinds of social exclusion, since it is likely to lead to low income low standard of 
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living, poor hosing and poor health. Accounts of marginalisation and exclusion in the employment 
market are to provide the focus for stage two of the research. For the purposes of this summary it is 
suffice to say that Muslims in Britain suffer disproportionately within the labour economy. 
Statistics show that Muslims, as opposed to any other ethnic or religious group, suffer from the 
highest levels of unemployment. Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and women have much higher 
levels of unemployment as compared to other ethnic minority groups and the white population.  
Education: 
One of the most pressing issues for Muslims in Britain is the educational needs of the community. 
Education may be approached from two different perspectives: 
Firstly the curriculum within the state school system. At the heart of this is Eurocentric teachings. 
Concerns range from the teaching of religious education, sex education, the study of Art, Music and 
Dance.  
Secondly the situation of Muslims schools. There are running battles between Muslim communities 
and the British government with regards state funding for Muslim schools. 
The Media: 
The concern here is largely in relation to mainstream media portrayal of Islam and Muslims. The 
traditional Orientalist stereotypes of Muslims as political anarchists and as tyrants at home 
subjugating their women have been disseminated in the media as caricatures and stereotypes. Very 
often the news that is shown about Muslims centres on negative imagery. Events both in Britain and 
abroad are analysed and presented within a certain framework, one in which only Western capitalist 
democracy is a viable ideology and in which there is no room for any other contender, especially 
not Islam. The growth of Muslim media in Britain and globally is counterbalancing this bias 
through well informed, accurate and intelligent reporting. 
Conclusion: 
Muslim identity confronts assimilationist policies central to which have been notions that cultural 
and religious identities will merge into the national identity.  It has been assumed that communal 
identities will be eroded with time and the favourable option would be citizenship and loyalty to the 
state.  Within this scenario there was no space for a ‘Muslim Voice’.  It has been argued that the 
emergence of a newly empowered ‘Muslim Voice’ and increased Muslim ‘visibility’ are a direct 
challenge to this ‘European project’. 
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APPENDIX TWO:  
STATISTICAL REPRESENTATION OF MUSLIMS IN EUROPE 
 
 
A summary of findings 
This investigation has sought to review the extent to which the Muslim presence in Europe can be 
quantified from statistical sources available in the public domain.  Table 2.18 presents best 
estimates of the Muslim population for individual countries in Europe.   
 
Table 2.18  Summary of ‘best estimates’ of Muslim populations in Europe  
(estimates in bold form basis of Figure 2.18)  
Country Estimate Year of 
Estimate 
Source 
United Kingdom 965,369 1991 Peach (1997) 
 1,250,000 - 1,500,000 1991 Nielson (1995) 
France 2,669,000 1990 Peach and Glebe (1995) 
 2,054,271 1991 Nationality data* 
 3,000,000 1995 Neilson (1995) 
Germany 1,650,952 1987 Religious affiliation data (1987 
Census) 
 2,589,071 1995 Nationality data* 
Netherlands 566,300 1993 Prins (1994) 
 505,639 - 632,216 1996 Country of birth data (1996)* 
Belgium 260,000 1989 Dassetto and Nonneman (1996) 
 323,567 1996 Nationality data* 
Switzerland 156,000 1990 Religious affiliation (1990 Census) 
 200,000 1996 Union of Islamic Organisations 
Italy 280,000 1992 Alievi (1996) 
 301,780 1995 Caritas (1996) 
 279,956 1995 Nationality data* 
Greece (100,000-500,000)  based on Christidis (1996) 
Sweden 130,000  1993 Neilson (1995)  
 200,000 1996 Sanders (1996) 
Norway 36,000 1990 Neilson (1995) 
 50,849 1995 Citizenship data* 
 35,029 1995 Country of birth data* 
 40,550 1995 Members of Islamic congregations 
(Statistical Yearbook, 1996) 
Finland  14,937 1995 Country of birth data* 
 946 1995 Religious affiliation 
 6,958 1995 Arabic speaking 
 few hundred  Neilson (1995) 
Denmark 55-60,000 1991 Neilson (1995) 
 69,170 1997 Country of birth data* 
Austria 87,000 1981 Religious affiliation (1981 Census) 
Spain 250,000 1990 Nielson (1995) 
 125-190,000 not stated Vicen (1996) 
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Portugal 25,000 1991 Nationality data  
 some thousands  Nielson (1995) 
Ireland 3,875 1991 Religious affiliation (1991 census) 
Luxembourg 1,167 1991 Nationality data* 
* derived by PROJECT using indirect method from raw data 
 
Conceptual difficulties over who constitutes the Muslim population and severe inadequacies in the 
data available to measure it mean that the estimates presented all fall within wide margins of error.  
In some cases (most notably for Greece) they must be little more than informed guesses.  However, 
while the inability to derive precise counts of the Muslim population is a key finding of this report, 
the analysis does allow us to draw out some important general observations about the nature of its 
growth and distribution. 
 
1. While Islam in Europe is generally associated with immigrant communities of relatively 
recent origin, it is important to emphasise the presence of substantial indigenous Muslim 
populations at Europe’s periphery, notably in Albania (with over 2 million Muslims) and the 
former Yugoslavia (Bosnia).  These have not been the focus of this study but clearly their 
presence needs to be recognised in any discussion of Muslims in the wider Europe.  This may 
ultimately need to include other substantial Muslim populations, such as in Turkey (seeking 
membership of the European Union) and some of the former Soviet republics to the East. 
2. Whilst all countries reviewed in this report contain Muslim populations, the majority are 
concentrated in a relatively small group of countries in North West Europe, with the largest 
communities in Germany, France (both with Muslim populations over 2 million) and the UK 
(about 1 million).  These populations do have their origins in relatively recent immigration 
flows, essentially from outside Europe, though Turkey and more recently the former 
Yugoslavia, have been major sources from Europe’s periphery.   
 
3. Muslim communities in Europe have diverse ethnic origins.  While a wide range of source 
countries are represented, the contribution of a relatively small group stands out.  The 
Magrhebian countries of North Africa, and Turkey account for the majority of European 
Muslims, with South Asia, the Middle East and more recently Sub-Saharan Africa and Bosnia, 
making up most of the rest.  Generally, Maghrebians appear to dominate the Muslim presence 
in the southern part of the study area, Turks and Bosnians being more evident in the North.  
However, between countries (even neighbouring ones) the composition of Muslims by origin 
shows striking differences.  Colonial histories are an obvious influence on this, notably 
accounting for the substantial Algerian presence in France and the predominantly South Asian 
Muslim population of the United Kingdom), while the effect of geographical proximity is 
evident in a number of cases (e.g. Turks in Germany, Albanians in Greece). 
4. Although Muslim populations have grown rapidly over a relatively short period, they 
continue to make up only a small proportion of national populations (even in Germany and 
France it remains under five percent).  However it is important to stress that the national 
summaries represented in the maps obscure a highly skewed geographical distribution within 
countries. The Muslim community is essentially an urban population in Europe, and generally 
concentrated in the major cities, where Muslims have been estimated to account for as many as 
one in ten in certain cases (e.g. Brussels).  A detailed analysis of internal distributions has been 
beyond the scope of this study.  It is important to stress that the constraints here are not only 
ones of time and resources.  In many cases the indirect methods relied upon to derive Muslim 
identity from country of origin would become increasingly unsafe at the local level.     
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5. While emphasising the diversity of Muslim populations in terms of size and origins, their 
development has certain common features. While accurate quantification of the processes 
involved is often impossible, Europe’s Muslim population has expanded from an almost 
negligible presence at the time of the Second World War, through a series of fairly distinct 
phases.  The first was a period of massive and sustained labour immigration, increasingly 
involving Muslim source countries, and peaking in the early 1970s.  Temporary enclaves of 
male labour then begun to develop as permanent settlements, as policies of family reunification 
established a second wave of immigration in the form of wives and children.  In the current 
phase, natural increase is increasingly taking over from immigration as the main component 
driving the expansion of Muslim communities, though refugee flows have been responsible for 
some major influxes in recent years  (notably the mass movement of Bosnian Muslims into 
Germany).  Finally, religious conversions from among the ‘host’ society, mainly associated 
with mixed marriages, represent a further source of increase.  Although their numerical impact 
is still probably very small (around 50,000 in France), their relative importance is likely to 
increase as Islam becomes a more established religion in Europe.    
 
 
Constraints on the analysis of Muslim populations: Issues of data 
Despite evidence of common features in the growth and development of Muslim populations in 
Europe, a single methodological approach to their quantification has proved impossible.  At the 
most fundamental level, there are clear differences in the way governments have integrated 
immigrant communities, with implications for the way the identity of individuals is represented in 
official statistics (the French and German constitutions represent extremes).  These differences have 
an obvious bearing on the method by which, and extent to which, individuals within the immigrant 
community (first and subsequent generations) can be identified. 
Governments differ not only in the way they represent individual and group identities in statistics, 
but in the frequency and manner by which they collect data on their populations.  Early initiatives 
by the European Parliament to standardise the practice of a decennial census, including the topics 
included type form of information collected, have not been successful, with some countries moving 
permanently towards register based statistics.  The extent to which statistical systems capture the 
resident population also differs widely - Greece and Italy, for example, have large unregistered 
foreign populations who by definition are missed in official statistical output.   
There are also differences in the extent to which relevant data can be accessed.  Even within the 
EU, and despite the efforts of Eurostat, there is little standardisation across countries in the 
dissemination of statistics collected on population, either in format or detail.  Reliance on published 
tables (designed for other purposes) meant that potentially useful information was often omitted 
(e.g. many tables used abbreviated classifications of country of birth or citizenship, grouping 
together countries with different religious profiles). Such extra information might be obtained 
through specially commissioned tables, but these always entailed extremely high costs.  
Although this study does not represent an exhaustive search of all relevant data, it is evident that the 
official population statistics available for most countries are unable to inform an accurate 
reconstruction of the emergence and growth of the Muslim population.  Few countries collect 
information directly on the religious affiliation of their citizens.  Even where they do, the 
conceptual subjectivity surrounding the definition of Muslim identity means that the numbers 
remain highly subjective and difficult to compare.  For most countries, the task relies on indirect 
methods using data on country of birth and/or citizenship.  It is argued that estimates derived in this 
way incur a number of errors and omissions, the magnitude of which, crucially, varies according to 
the particular history of settlement, its geographical origins, and the subsequent experience of 
political, social and demographic integration.  The study demonstrates how certain sections of the 
Muslim population are much harder to identify statistically than others.  These include a huge 
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clandestine population particularly in Southern Europe (probably forming the largest component of 
the Muslim community in Greece).  
Even where it can be assumed that the great majority of the target population are legal residents, 
processes of political and demographic assimilation are steadily reducing that part whose origins 
(and religion) can be inferred from official population statistics.  In France, for example, a large 
part of the Muslim community were born in France and also hold French nationality, and 
consequently are indistinguishable from the non-Muslim majority in standard tables based on 
citizenship or country of birth.  In some cases the task of identifying sub-groups by origin is made 
harder by the suppression of detail in these tables (e.g. in country of birth classifications).  Without 
changes in the form of data collected and made available by governments, it is clear that future 
estimations of the size of Muslim populations based on the indirect measures used here will become 
less and less accurate.  Unless there is a general move towards the collection of data on religion, it 
seems likely that estimates will have to rely on some form of demographic projection.  This would 
be extremely problematic, since change in the European Muslim population can not simply be 
modelled as a function of net migration and natural increase (both extremely difficult to foresee); 
models would also have to include assumptions about movement between non-Muslim and Muslim 
populations in the form of inter-marriages and conversions (or loss of faith), and about the religious 
faith of the offspring of those unions.  Given the number of uncertainties involved, it seems certain 
that that estimates derived in this way would fall within very wide margins of error.   
Finally, it is important to stress that the task here has been to present an overview of what can be 
gleaned about the Muslim population across Europe using data that is relatively freely accessible in 
the public domain.  Individual country estimates can almost certainly be improved upon by a more 
exhaustive search of sources in the countries concerned.   Official population statistics can inform 
the quantitative study of Muslims, but any precision, particularly at the sub-national level almost 
certainly requires the additional input of in-depth local survey work. 
